U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSE TO FAMINE AND HUNGER IN AFRICA 1981-1986

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ABSTRACT

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The main objective of this research is to investigate the policymaking apparatus of U.S. foreign policy in its response to famine and hunger disasters. Of crucial importance is the extent that an immediate and effective response to the victims of these disasters is held captive to their race, form of government, or importance to the U.S. view of geopolitics. An effective response is considered in this study to be one which addresses the causes of famine and hunger in a society (armed conflict, debt).

The administration of Ronald Reagan and its response to the African famines of the 1980s can be examined as either an abberation, or consistent with U.S.

foreign policy as has been practiced since the dismantling of colonialism.

Ronald Reagan essentially inherited a development structure that was an extension of U.S. economic and political aims. There is a tenuous relationship between U.S. development and emergency relief and humanitarian aspirations.

The President chose to decline attempts to assist African nations under duress by famine, whether such nations were socialist or non-socialist. The threat to eliminate funding from crucial international agencies which combat famine also pointed to an administration that was insensitive to appeals to equate the life of an African with that of an American or a European. The significance of this study is its focus on discerning the structure and decision-making process involved in famine response and hunger prevention. It is also significant as it is one of the early studies to examine the U.S. response to famine in the 1980s.

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Introduction

From 1960 through 1968, Africa had five nations with recorded famine conditions (Morocco, Algeria, The Congo, Nigeria, and Mauritania).[1] Since 1968, thirty-three African nations have been faced with famine (see Table 1). By October 1985, the United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) had designated eleven countries as being 'most severely affected.'[2] These nations consist of more than 122.1 million people, of which, 29.4 are affected by famine (see Table 2). It was also estimated by the OEOA that 4.7 million refugees were created by famine-related conditions. In Botswana, Niger, and Mauritania, approximately half of the inhabitants were affected by famine (see Table 2).

The OEOA list of most severely affected nations was the basis upon which the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) identified Africa's most food-deficient nations. Those nations identified were: Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Mozambique and Sudan.[3] The FAO estimated that 24.3 million of the 98.4 million people living in these countries, were affected by food shortages.[4] The FAO list of 'most affected' nations accounts for 88.68% of

TABLE 1

FAMINES IN AFRICA
(1960-1985)

Country	Year of Occurrence
Algeria	1962
Angola	1971-74, 83-
Burkina Faso	1971-74, 84-85
Benin	1971-74
Botswana	1984-85
Burundi	1972
Cape Verde	1984-
Central African Republic	1971-74, 84-85
Chad	1971-74, 84-
Djibouti	1983
Egypt	1974
Ethiopia	1973-75, 80, 83-
Gambia	1973, 80
Ghana	1971-74, 77, 83
Kenya	1983-84
Lesotho	1974, 83-84
Mali	1971-74, 83-85
Mauritania	1960, 1971-74, 83-
Morocco	1960
Mozambique	1971-74, 83-
Nigeria	1967-74
Niger	1971-74, 84-85
Rwanda	1983-84
Senegal	1971-74, 83-85
Somalia	1983-85
South Africa (Blacks only)	1983
Sudan	1973
Swaziland	1983
Tanzania	1983
Togo	1971-74,
Zaire (ne: Republic of the Congo)	1960-61
Zambia	1979, 1983
Zimbabwe	1983-84

SOURCES: Bill Rau, Feast to Famine (Washington, D.C.: Africa Faith and Justice Network, 1985), pp. 53-62. "Scope of World Hunger," Seattle Times/Seattle Post Examiner (17. March 1985), p. B12.

TABLE 2

A SUMMARY PROFILE OF EMERGENCY UNMET NEEDS
(All figures in U.S. $ millions unless otherwise stated)

Country	Population			Cereal Needs		Agricultural Inputs		Survival/ Relief		Additional Logistics		Other Pledges
	Total	Affec-ted	%	P/D	Unmet	P/C	Unmet	P/C	Unmet	P/C	Unmet	UNICEF
Angola	8.8	.5	17.6	39.8	80.2	1.3	4.8	1.3	10.5	3.1	9.0	2.70
Botswana	1.1	.8	72.7	24.7	5.2	0.0	6.0	0.0	6.4	0.0	1.1	.02
Burkina Faso	6.9	1.0	15.5	140.6	44.4	1.7	.8	0.0	2.5	.6	1.6	2.10
Cape Verde	.3	N/A	----	50.4	9.6	0.0	4.4	----	----	-----	3.9	.40
Chad	5.0	1.5	30.	194.3	85.7	2.3	1.9	.4	0.0	5.7	3.6	5.50
Ethiopia	43.6	7.9	18.1	1,070.0	429.6	3.4	92.2	.9	5.8	52.7	65.3	19.30
Mali	8.1	1.2	14.8	252.6	122.3	5.1	2.5	0.0	.2	.8	9.0	3.60
Mauritania	1.9	.8	42.1	151.5	3.4	1.3	.6	0.0	0.0	.6	14.8	2.00
Mozambique	14.0	2.3	16.4	188.3	211.6	8.9	8.1	1.8	1.6	23.1	1.6	3.50
Niger	6.1	3.0	49.1	281.2	113.7	0.0	6.2	1.7	.1	6.2	1.4	4.00
Somalia	4.7	1.5	31.9	212.8	37.2	5.4	.3	0.0	9.3	3.0	5.4	.10
Sudan	21.6	8.4	38.8	1,326.2	73.8	10.3	51.8	9.2	2.0	23.2	12.2	2.50
Total	122.1	28.9	23.6	3,832.9	1,216.0	39.7	179.6	15.3	38.4	119.0	131.1	45.72

SOURCE: United Nations, Office for Emergency Operations in Africa. <u>Africa Emergency</u> (September-October, 1985): pp. 8-9.

those people affected by famine.

Malnutrition and hunger have become more commonplace throughout the continent. In 1985, only Libya and the white populations of South Africa exceeded the average estimated daily calories that are necessary to sustain life.[5] As a consensus between the donors and recipients of famine assistance does not yet exist on the nature of famine, the likelihood of effective programmatic response remains in doubt.

Though the U.S. is one of the most dominant participants in foreign assistance programs, the question of causes and effective remedies is vitally important if the growing number of deaths attributed to hunger-related causes can be reduced. The purpose of this study is to examine the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policies and programs, under the Reagan administration, as they affected famine-stricken African countries from 1981 to 1986.

Statement of Problem

The most recent surge in awareness of famine problems across the African continent was initiated by the government of Ethiopia in 1983. The Ethiopian government petitioned the international donor community for assistance to its famine conditions.[6] Despite the request of the Ethiopian government, the response by the international community was slow. The U.S. failed, in particular, to provide any substantive assistance until early 1986. As Ethiopia was only one of many African countries which suffered famine conditions from the early 1980's, the hesitation by the U.S. to respond to such requests raise concerns about the purpose and effectiveness of not only U.S. foreign aid but also U.S. foreign policy. This research seeks to address these general concerns. The objectives of this study are:

1. To demonstrate that the pervasive character of hunger and famine in Africa is strongly influenced by foreign political and economic determinations; in short, factors that are controllable by people and governments.
2. To demonstrate that the structure of U.S. foreign policy prohibits effective, substantive action on the causes of famine, to the extent that addressing such causes interferes with the goals and objectives of U.S. economic and geopolitical policies.
3. To demonstrate the extent that Reagan administration policies, programs and practices, are applied to the causes of famine and hunger in Africa.

As famine was once viewed as an anomaly limited to a specific region, it must now be investigated in a broader context. On a widely diverse continent of nations, with a variety of climates and soils, hunger and famine are seemingly fixed realities. It is imperative to identify the broader context out of which hunger and famine can be understood; in short, those factors which are common and prevalent to the affected nations.

One framework for the study of famine, the Radical Approach, incorporates a wide variety of disciplines of both the natural and social sciences, specifically, the affects of the colonial economic order and its post-colonial economic relationships.[7] This approach suggests that political and economic factors (not just environmental constraints) are contributors to such privation. Nations confronted with massive food deficiencies are also frequently affected by: war, (Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Ethiopia); extremely low per-capita incomes (Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia); and a sacrificial attempt to satisfy foreign debts, often with injury to those most vulnerable to food shortage emergencies (almost anywhere on the continent).

Though famine may be created by acts of nature, social relationships contribute significantly to the formation of conditions that lead to famine and frequently serve to obstruct efforts to either prevent, or reduce, levels of starvation. A major factor in the formation of social relations in Africa has been the advent of underdevelopment activities, as introduced by western

European nations and the U.S.

Underdevelopment occurs when a country increasingly becomes integrated as a dependency into the world markets through patterns of trade and/or investment.[8] This integration has been inspired by the dismantling of existing development and trade activities, which have been reformulated to promote the development activities of the technically and economically advanced countries.[9] Underdevelopment is a recognition of the extent that the development of Europe and North America has been tied to the political and economic control of foreign countries. The period of colonial domination and the transition to neocolonial formations have solidified the strength of foreign investment and trade activities that are inconsistent with indigenous assessments of development needs.

As Chapter II indicates, prior to European colonial efforts, African nations were most able in providing for the essential food needs of its people. The usurpation of political power from Africans by Europeans (and subsequently, the denial of African priorities in the rule of African people), the depopulation of the African continent during slavery and the diversion of the labor activities from products to be destined for domestic consumption to products for foreign consumption (without just compensation) all combined to reverse the development process for African nations and people.[10] Underdevelopment is fundamentally the diminution and control of people and not solely the control of economic systems and political structures.

Samir Amin stresses that there is a structural difference in the design of development employed by the formerly colonized nations (Africa, Asia, Latin America) and that of the technically and economically advanced nations (Europe and North America) in the nature of their economic development.[11] These factors include:

1. production is designed for export markets;
2. concentration of productive activities among a limited portion of the national economy (e.g.- mono-crop production);
3. production is confined to the harvesting/ excavation of raw materials;
4. raw material export prices are controlled by importing, developed economies; and
5. restructuring of the human (training, education) and financial (direct investment, infrastructure) resources of underdeveloped economies to satisfy developed markets leads to similar transferals of profits (and benefits) to developed economies.[12]

Claude Barnes succinctly concludes that: "...the origin of underdevelopment in Africa as located in the way Africa was integrated into the world Capitalist economy through violent conquest and the violent construction of capitalist relations of production."[13]

An important aim of the neocolonial efforts pursued by western nations has been to maintain their economic and political advantages, vis-a-vis Africa, that were challenged by Africa's independence movements of the post World War-II period and with their subsequent experimentation with socialism.[14] The extent that the U.S. responds to Africa's famine is dependent upon the degree that such solutions are consonant with overall U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.

How the issues of famine are conceptualized and defined by the analysts of the Reagan administration, ultimately, develops into policy. Given that the U.S. is a dominant actor in the dispensation of foreign food assistance, how the problem of hunger is analyzed by governmental decision-makers will direct the nature of their response to famine and hunger.

As the Reagan administration was not simply the election of a man but the ascent of conservative political thought, the principle ideology of this administration is deserving of examination, in the context of its application to foreign food assistance. At the height of the African famine, attempts by people to understand its causes lead to a now familiar litany of thought revealing a certain intellectual bias, based upon notions of Calvinist, Darwinian and Malthusian logic. Those who share a Calvinist approach view Africa's problems as the result of its own poor work habits; the failure to work hard for a given goal. The disciples of Darwinian thought assert that those affected are ill-equipped to meet the challenge of the responsibilities that are implied with self-rule.[15] Of those who echo the view of Malthus, the issue of hunger is one of a people's hyperactive sexual activity, leading to an all too rapid increase of the population, straining available food supplies.[16]

It is the Malthusian approach to analyzing the causes of hunger and famine (and its suggested remedies) which have had the greatest influence among Conservative thinkers. Public policy has been greatly impacted by this approach, emphasizing such remedies as population control to respond to hunger. The notion of triage (also known as the 'lifeboat ethic') also found an audience in the 1970s among some analysts.[17] Such ethics would be employed onto the growing masses of the non-white world, where hunger was becoming a fixed reality amongst its citizens. Only a few would be saved it was theorized, due to the limited supplies of food, as food donor nations would withhold food supplies in the event that population levels would exceed the ability of the donor nation to respond effectively.[18] Former World Bank president, Robert McNamara, is reported to have compared the annual cost of caring for a child ($600) to the cost of child prevention ($6).[19] It is apparent that cost-benefit analysis had converged with population ethics.

The unfortunate analysis provided which created a Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' mentality made no distinction between the depression of population growth (as occurred under slavery); population density (which is quite low in Africa); nor the extent that a nation's material wealth is distributed throughout a society. A policy response to the above logic is one that would curtail, if not eliminate, food assistance programs.

The perception is that such people cannot usefully absorb support as provided by the donor nations, nor would they be able to develop their own support mechanisms beyond the crisis stage. There are also those who support an approach that owes more to cost-benefit analysis than to humanitarian concern. What again emerges from the shadow of Malthus is a tenet of thought that food resources are finite. In this mindset, to provide food to those emaciated by hunger would be to waste precious resources on people who may perhaps never recover from the maladies and dysfunctions created by starvation.

For many others, the world of global politics (east vs. west) is the plausible basis for understanding how African hunger originated. To this group, it is felt that starvation is the result of efforts to restrain western concepts of 'free enterprise.'[20] The remedy is perceived as the creation of more capitalism. Aid that would be dispensed would be provided to further develop capitalist economies. Little consideration is given to capitalism as a contributor to the creation of hunger throughout Africa. The fact that the non-socialist economies of Africa have also been unable to retard hunger and famine seems to have been excluded from the analysis of those who subscribe to the global security (east vs. west) model of the conservatives.

These and other conservative theories combine to lay the premise for a kind of directed giving. These offerings have at its core the national interest, a euphemism which has come to describe U.S. domination, or the support of a status quo, that is loyal to the preservation of an existing set of political and economic relationships favorable to the U.S. Out of this framework emerges the perception that the national interest may not be served by feeding those who starve. Once this theoretical construction is developed, insensitivity can be made acceptable. It has thus become possible to more easily seek to reduce or restrict the form of foreign assistance. What is often absent from many of the analyses of the political impact of food assistance upon the U.S. national interest is an appreciation of the very purpose for what created the need for inquiry: the survival of those in need.

Hypothesis

The capacity of the U.S. government to respond effectively to the causes and impact of famine and hunger in Africa is limited by U.S. geopolitical, economic and domestic policy interests and concerns. The following questions will assist in responding to this problem:

1. What are the causes of African famine?
2. What is the nature and purpose of emergency foreign food and development assistance, in the context of U.S. foreign policy?
3. What major bilateral and multilateral programs exist that the U.S. can influence foreign food and development production activity?
4. At what point do political considerations supersede humanitarian considerations as the basis for providing food and development assistance?
5. When is addressing the causes of famine and hunger considered incompatible with U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives.
6. To what extent has the ascendancy of the Reagan administration subverted, or acted accordance with, U.S. emergency and development assistance policies?
7. To what extent is there a U.S. emergency food assistance policy?

Literature Review

An awareness of the variety, impact, implications and assumptions in defining the causes of famine and hunger becomes imperative if remedies are to be either understood or developed. Many of the causes of famine and hunger can be identified as part of one or more of the following categories:

1. Famine and hunger are an outgrowth of environmental conditions, of which little can be done to limit their advance. This group may be identified as environmental determinists.
2. Famine and hunger are the products of the foreign and/or domestic political and economic decisions of governments, corporations and financial institutions whose policies and programs of operations limit the potential for the production and distribution of food in a nation that is characterized by inadequate supplies of food.
3. Famine and hunger are thought to be the inability of a nation to produce food at the rate that population increases.

The categories represented above have incorporated some aspect of supply and demand thinking. In one and two, the problem is perceived as some form of disruption in the supply chain. In the third category, the demand side of the equation is viewed as having become too expansive. In the case of the latter, the proper solution would be to decrease the number of those who either are, or who would potentially be, in need. The position is advanced to limit the number of children born in underdeveloped nations (i.e.-poor people), then it is reasoned that the economy of a nation would be better able to provide the necessary goods and services required for an enhanced quality of life, if not survival itself.

Of the first two perspectives, although the curtailment of the supply side of the equation is generally perceived at issue, there is a departure among such authors on the nature of limited food supplies. The first category alludes to a problem in which its causes (drought, topography, soil composition) and solutions are beyond the capacities of human design. The second category asserts that people, whether through their policies, programs and institutions, do indeed contribute to the creation (and possibly the remedy) and the crisis that hunger and famine present.

As the nature of famine and hunger in Africa may indeed have a number of substantive causes, the approach taken by those nations which purport to assist the famine-stricken African countries may either help, exacerbate, or produce an effort which does little more than preserve the status quo. Josue de Castro, Geopolitics of Hunger, was one of the earlier writers to link the preponderance of hunger as a consequence of global economic and political relations. De Castro offers insights to the extent that foreign domination, from

Imperial Rome through the era of European colonialism, has reduced the capacity of African countries to produce and distribute food goods. The often used argument that the climate of Africa inhibits food production is cast aside as de Castro provided comparisons to European countries with similar climates but more favorable agricultural responses.

The thesis that geopolitical activity has a substantive impact on a nation's capacity to produce and distribute food was given further specificity by Michael Lofchie. The author expressed the view that writers from a variety of ideological constraints tended to analyze the spread of famine as having originated from environmental conditions (i.e.- drought). The focus centered on the impact of famine and on speculation with respect to who profits (i.e.-capitalism). Lofchie attempts to extend the analysis of famine beyond environmental concerns to focus on its political and economic origins.

Claude Meissaloux: "Is the Sahel Famine Good Business," assesses the relationship of famine and social relations particularly between capitalist and under-developed economies. Meissaloux asserts that the dominance of western capitalism has not only contributed to the deterioration of the Sahel environment, but also provides the opportunity for an even greater exploitation of rural underdeveloped areas, to satisfy the import needs of western capitalist countries.

In the Political Economy of Food, the editor, Vilhos Harle, sought to establish food as yet another commodity sector, sensitive to the economic and political relations of global national and corporate interests. Food is embraced as a commodity, driven by the same market forces and relationships as any other commodity. Harle stresses the unequal distribution of power and wealth as the primary factors in the creation of hunger, both of which are lacking in the rural poor of underdeveloped countries.

Susan George, How the Other Half Dies, asserts that hunger and famine are a consequence of the concentration of political and economic power among industrialized countries and the propertied elites of underdeveloped nations. George sees the solutions offered by the industrialized nations to the problems of food deficiencies, as perpetuating the productive relationships and priorities which have led to hunger. For George, this is most apparent in the bilateral and multilateral aid programs from the western nations to those nations that are underdeveloped. The solutions to hunger and starvation, as viewed by George, do not require technological repair but the reordering of systemic imbalances that devastate the economic and politically powerless.

In a case study of the Sahel famine (Seeds of Famine), Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin connect the ecological and human devastation done to the Sahel region during the 1968-74 famine to the changing social relationships propelled by colonialism and exacerbated by the post-World War II primacy of international capitalism. From their perspective, the famine was not a sudden depression in the fortunes of a specific region, but the evidence of an ongoing deterioration of the region socially, economically and politically. Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake: "Is the Drought an Act of God or of Man?" view the increase of famine as linked to the expansion of economic development approaches which undermine traditional methods of responding to the environment which prevent the spread of starvation.

Those analysts who subscribe to populations as solely consumers and not as producers of food and other basic needs offer an analysis which predicts disaster while offering little to forestall the eventuality except for the limitation of the population. Lester Brown, By Bread Alone, consistently views the world food problem as the result of mounting population increases and the satiated dietary habits of the people of the industrialized world. Brown views people as the direct causes of hunger and famine, bypassing their political and economic institutions and their productive relationships. People are thus not the contributors to the solutions of their problems. Technological inputs are viewed as the proper responses (e.g.-Green Revolution) though the relationships of production and accumulation of wealth do not alter the distribution of wealth and goods to the poor in a society.

In Limits to Growth, Donella Meadows et al. cast a view towards hunger as a consequence of inadequate food production levels. By comparing population growth to past food production growth, estimates are drawn which forecast the likelihood of starvation on more massive scales in coming years. The efficacy of the distribution of food, economic resources and modes of production were not discussed.

In Famine 1975: America's Decision, Who Will Survive?, William and Paul Praddock offered the rationale of a Darwinian-tinged self-preservation. With the increases in population, the Paddocks established that certain nations would have to be sacrificed if the food-exporting nations are themselves able to survive. Once again, people are viewed as problems, rather than as solutions to their predicament. Specifically, people who are the brunt of production efforts which diminish their pertinence and contributions to society are denied the tools that are necessary to effect solutions to their dependent condition; beyond utility and potential.

Sudhir Sen, "How to Combat World Famine," identifies hunger and famine as concerns in need of technical solutions. The answer for Sen to food production problems are to be found in the so-called "Green Revolution" technology of genetically-altered production inputs. Again, production is seen as the basic problem. Although the dislocation of rural people that these techniques create are acknowledged, it is regarded only as a management problem which must be attended to.

Renee Dumont and Bernard Rosier in The Hungry Future, promote a more effective and efficient use of existing resources and the dismantling of institutions which impede the modernization of underdeveloped economies and productive relations, to encourage food production. Dumont and Rosier do not acknowledge people as vital participants in production, but as relics of a by-gone mode of production which must be overcome if their primary needs (e.g.-food) are to be met. People of underdeveloped societies are viewed as mainly irrelevant to their own development.

An absence in the literature are is a focus on the full parameters of U.S. foreign food and development assistance, how such assistance has been formed and how assistance is shaped by historical and contemporary events. U.S. foreign food and development assistance is often discussed, but primarily in the context of multinational agribusinesses and U.S. influence, with regard to such international organizations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank). Specific concerns of U.S. policy are collapsed into general discussions of capitalism versus underdeveloped nations. U.S. emergency foreign food and development assistance is analyzed without the specifics of the process which creates U.S. actions in the international arena.

Frances Moore Lappe: Food First, provides important analysis of global hunger concerns, and the importance of the U.S. role in the distribution of harmful foreign assistance. In her body of works, however, there is no attempt to provide the reader with the specifics of how such policies are created. The formation of policy yields important insight to the positions and constituencies which ultimately produce the basis for governmental action. Without an awareness of how such policies are created, there is an inability to devise effective strategies which may prevent the formation of such policies.

Significance of Study

The significance of this study is based on three factors. First, this will provide an analysis of the effectiveness of the Reagan administration to identify and respond to, the nature and effect of the African famine crisis. Throughout the period of pervasive African famine, representatives for the Reagan administration consistently related that the U.S. government was providing an immediate and effective response.[21]

Second, the study contributes to the still emerging body of works on African famine. Much of what exists on famine in Africa focuses on: the nature of famine; the establishment of the those material factors which contribute to these disasters; and how such disasters may be avoided. Much has been recorded of the famine of the 1970s and the response (and mistakes) made during that period. Although an important body of work has also been written of the impact of capitalism and its surrogates (e.g.-multinational corporations) in the creation of famine, there appears to be an absence of works on the impact of public policy decisions, and how these decisions are derived and implemented, with respect to their impact on famine and hunger.

The attempt to fill this void will begin with a study of how the U.S. has historically defined the causes of famine and hunger in Africa, thus, giving an indication of how it proposes to resolve these problems. The extent that such policies and programs are advanced against factors which are major contributors to famine and hunger will be unique in this area of examination. It also is important to note that at this writing, a comprehensive review of the Reagan role has not been published.

Third, this study will contribute to the body of work which seeks to identify the extent that U.S. foreign policy contains effective mechanisms for humanitarian support and relief efforts, regardless of a nation's ideology or racial composition. This will be done by examining the context for defining humanitarian assistance and the extent such parameters limit perceptions of need. Attempts will be made to suggest approaches that would define need without political/ideological considerations.

By addressing U.S. public policy concerns and their influence on famine and hunger, this study should add to a more comprehensive understanding of how such disaster situations are created and how U.S. public policy (should it be directed to do so) can provide more effective solutions. As public policy will be examined, a greater awareness of the prevailing institutional processes and analyses on the famine and hunger issues should bring greater clarity to the reasons why U.S. foreign policy responds as it does to such critical concerns.

Methodology

The setting for this study will be the period of famine activity in Africa from 1981 to 1986 and the application of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus to those conditions. This period is significant for three reasons:

(1) the increase in the number of African nations which made formal requests from the international donor community for emergency and long-term development assistance;

(2) the installation of the Reagan administration which heralded the hegemony of conservative political philosophy; and

(3) by 1986, the nature of the response by the U.S., and the remainder of the international donor community, to the famine crisis in Africa had been established. This provided opportunities to analyze the extent of cooperation between donor and recipient nations in resolving Africa's crisis.

The framework which will be employed will be the radical approach to the study of famine. The radical approach can be characterized as having four main components. One, this framework has a historical component which recognizes that the process of underdevelopment has had a deleterious affect upon the ability of nations to affect societies that are capable of providing for the essential needs of its people. Two, it asserts that present governmental and organizational structures (e.g.-World Bank, IMF) are biased against funding the poor with the means to define and create their own development options but support the maintenance of economic inequalities. Three, hunger and famine are seen as conditions which are created by poverty and an inability to control the use of land and its resources for the primary benefit of indigenous landless and low-income populations. Four, hunger and famine are also viewed as tools to destabilize governments and opposition forces, thus, maintaining the status quo of power relationships. The fact that hunger and famine are seen as being rooted in the human condition allows for the potential of human decision-making to provide remedies.

Policy analysis will be employed as the method used to investigate the development of U.S. foreign policy in the creation of bilateral and multilateral programs which impact on the capacity of nations to produce and distribute food crops effectively. By seeking to understand the development of U.S. foreign assistance, its purpose and objectives, then the context for understanding the course of action taken by the U.S. government during the African famine crisis of the 1980's may be more clearly understood.

Much of the data which will be collected will be gained from existing source materials. The major source for the statistical data to be used concerning the dimensions of the African famines will be obtained from two United Nations agencies: the FAO and the OEOA. Information pertaining to the major causes of famine and hunger will be gained from journals (Review of African Political Economy, Africa Report, Foreign Policy) and books (Seeds of Famine, Agribusiness in Africa, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, The Lagos Plan of Action vs. the Berg Report).

Information on the nature and extent of U.S. bilateral and multilateral food and development assistance can be collected from USAID Congressional Report, OEOA, the U.S. (federal) Budget, annual reports (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, U.S. Agency for International Development Congressional Presentation); newspapers (Washington Post, New York Times); interviews; conference reports and other official documents.

The nature of famine will first be established. This requires a synthesis of analytic accounts on the political, economic, social and environmental origins of famine. From this analysis, efforts towards identifying specific factors in the creation of famine will be sought. This will be accomplished by surveying analytic and descriptive accounts on the factors which contribute to the formation of famines, in addition to pertinent demographic and economic data.

An analysis of the structure of U.S. foreign policy and programs will follow; specifying the nature, substance and application of U.S. bilateral and multilateral responses to African famine emergency and development need. Policies and programs that address the causes of famine will be identified. Policies and programs which avoid attacking the substantive causes of famine will be criticized and discarded. The limitations of U.S. policy and programs apparatus will be discussed. This will be followed by an analysis of U.S. policy and programmatic response to the African famine under the Reagan administration. U.S. responsiveness to the famine crisis will be identified and criticized with respect to its application towards alleviating famine conditions by addressing its causes. Policies and programs engaged during this period which support these aims will be identified and analyzed. The extent that opportunities were presented to respond to famine causes, but were avoided, will be identified and criticized.

Hunger will be viewed as not just individual suffering but as a shared devastation, prevalent among people of lower income groups, who are unable to afford, or gain access to food. In a more clinical context, this paper will be concerned with hunger as it relates to chronic undernutrition (the inability of the body to obtain and consume enough calories and proteins for survival).

Famine is an extreme and protracted shortage of food resulting in widespread and persistent hunger, evidenced by loss of body weight and emaciation and increase in the death rate caused by either starvation or disease resulting from the weakened condition of the population.

Foreign food aid will be examined in the context of Titles 1, 2 and 3 of PL 480, euphemistically known as "Food for Peace" program. This legislation has been the primary conduit for foreign food assistance by the U.S. government since 1954.

Arable land is soil that is either cultivated, or in the process of being cultivated.

NOTES

[1]"The Scope of World Hunger," Seattle Times/ Seattle Post Examiner, 17 March 1985, p. B12.

[2]United Nations, Office for Emergency Operations In Africa. Status Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa. 1. September 1985, p. 3.

[3]United Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, 35th Session, Food Outlook, April, 1985, p. 4.

[4]Ibid.

[5]"The Scope of World Hunger," Seattle Times/Seattle Post Examiner, 17 March 1985, p. B12. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974), p. 17.

[6]Kim Bobo, "The Politics of Hunger in Ethiopia," (Washington, D.C.: Bread for the World, 1983), p. 3.

[7]Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin, Seeds of Famine (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1980), p. 130.

[8]Peter Henriot, "Development Alternatives Problems, Stratagies, Values," The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, ed., Charles Wilbur (N.Y.: Random House, Inc., 1979), p. 11.

[9]Samir Amin, Unequal Development (NY: Monthly Review, 1976), p. 203-206.

[10]Rodney, How Europe; Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us (New York: Vintage Press, 1975).

[11]Amin, Unequal, pp. 201-202; Irving Markowitz, Power and Class in Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1977), p. 83.

[12]Amin, Unequal, pp. 206-209.

[13]Claude Barnes, "Theoretical Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment," (Unpublished) April, 1980.

[14]J. Forbes Munro, Africa and the International Economy (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 1976), pp. 176-207; Henry Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1982).

[15]In the course of completing this research assignment, I have been employed as an Organizer for a public policy advocacy organization (Bread for the World) which focuses its attention on devising legislative means to remedy the difficulties of hunger concerns. In this capacity, I have made many speeches which seek to gain support for providing remedies to the impact and causes of hunger. In response to these attempts there have been many people who indicate that their view of hunger is one in which people have victimized themselves ("they need to learn how to work like we do; if we save them, won't we just be worsening the population problem in those countries; the poor [and the hungry] will be with us always; aren't we helping communists?). Their view is of individual responsibility on the part of those who hunger to lift themselves from their predicament. There has been a slow recognition that there are structural causes to hunger, and more importantly, that the policies set forth by the U.S. government can have an important impact in providing relief (immediate and long-term) to conditions that lead to hunger globally.

[16]Lester Brown, The Twenty-Ninth Day (New York: Norton, 1978); Paul Erlich, The Population Bomb (New York, Ballantine Books, 1968).

[17]Jean-Pierre Berlan, "The World Food Problem: Marx, Malthus and Their Epigones," Monthly Review (March, 1980), pp. 20-32.

[18]The Paddocks popularized this notion. William Paddock and Paul Paddock, Famine 1975! (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

[19]Ibid.

[20]Amin, Unequal, p. 353.

[21]Doug Bandow, "The U.S. Role in Promoting Third World Development," U.S. Aid to the Developing World, ed., Doug Bandow (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1985): pp. xxv-xxvi.

CHAPTER II

AFRICA FAMINE AND HUNGER: IN SEARCH OF CAUSES

To explore the question of what creates famine in Africa is to ask the question: what has prohibited people from consuming food substances in sufficient, nutritional quantities, enough to insure survival? The framework necessary to respond to this question can be divided into two segments: (1) production; and (2) distribution. People starve from either the absence of food, or the absence of available means to obtain food. In the former, sufficient quantities of food do not exist to feed people. In the latter, sufficient quantities of food exist, but access is constrained by either economic, political or transport inadequacies. The concern of this chapter centers upon the extent that specific identifiable factors, individually or collectively, impinge upon the ability of a nation to either produce and/or distribute food to all its people.

It would be difficult to factor all of the myriad of problems associated with either the production or the distribution of food within Africa and then to establish the extent they contribute to the creation of famine.

Famine is simultaneously a symptom and a condition. As a condition, it is the exponential occurrence of hunger and starvation across a somewhat wide geographic area. Famine is also a symptom of a nation's inability to either prevent or forestall such a condition by establishing priorities and assuming measures that could ameliorate the potential for crisis. When there is an ensuing crisis, and there is an evident need for foreign assistance, the failure of a government to provide for its people is apparent. The deficiencies of a government may be identified in the following categorizations:

1. the creation of food surpluses, at levels sufficient that would offset years of limited growth;
2. the means for the creation of adequate personal income at levels sufficient for the consumption of basic food goods;
3. adequate transportation systems to deliver food products to areas of extreme need and to facilitate the movement of food to market;
4. to offset low food production and/or inadequate distribution by importing necessary food products and technology.

Famine is thus perceived as not a sudden collapse of the food production and distribution chain, but the ultimate expression of the steady erosion of food production and support relations. Although famine has been packaged in the world media and by a host of authors as a condition of place, of geography and of land, the perception of hunger and famine as the result of people, governments and economics has only recently gained wide acceptance.

When famine is brought to our attention, we are presented with the image of a people who are unified in their ability to absorb suffering. By not focusing upon the human elements of famine, we are denied an opportunity to explore an area of investigation through which programs and policies can impact upon the creation of famine. To this end, the discussion on what are the major causes of famine in Africa will be explored in the following: (1) Social Systems and Structures; (2) Debt and Trade; (3) Militarization and Armed Conflict; and (4) Environment.

i. Social Systems and Structures

Social systems and their accompanying governments are indications of how a people are organized, with the professed objective of providing for a minimum of common needs and services. It is the state which defines the economic and political parameters from which the distribution of its resources, to promote the development of specific sectors of its economy, can be approached. As with most productive sectors of any economy, the question of who owns and defines the use of land and labor, as well as, the ability to obtain finance capital are imperatives for enhancing production in the food sectors of a nation's economy. Decisions by the state are crucial in the formation of these sectors.

Throughout the African continent, the omni-presence of economies whose successes are pegged upon the development of a single sector (almost exclusively mining or cash-cropping) are not coincidental. What is the impact of development strategies which rely upon the importation of food products, at the expense of domestic food growers? What are the implications to the African economies and their development goals when there exists such high levels of indebtedness to western banks? The factors which combine to create such priorities and the extent those priorities are, or are not satisfied, are often the offspring of political and economic forces, both domestic and foreign to a nation.

In Africa, the issue to be raised is often one of who articulates the interests of the greater body of a nation's population? Is there a harmony between the needs of the population and the activity of their government? If there is some great degree of compatibility between a nation's people and its ruling institutions, whose interests are being served by this consensus of government and its citizens? Who defines a nation's needs? To the extent that the ruling body of a nation is the expression of its people, then to what extent are the interests, needs and services satisfied by this structure of governance?

The history of colonial activity in Africa is relevant in 'independent' Africa, as is the question of the legitimacy of African governmental structures and rule. The history of African contact with western nations, the impact on social systems and structures indigenous to Africans, and the extent such contact has impacted upon the production and distribution of food is itself a history of Africa's loss of power over its daily activities and common needs.

Although African contact with Europe and North America has had a destabilizing impact upon the nations of Africa since the time of the Caesars, it was the coming of Europe as a colonizing power that altered the government, economic and cultural substance of an entire continent. At the onset of European penetration into Africa, the continent was far from being a collection of starving lands, as is currently depicted. One observer, Leo Africanus, writing from Timbuktu (in about 1500 A.D.) wrote:

> Here are many wels [sic] containing most sweete [sic] water, and so often as the river Niger overfloweth they conveigh the water thereof by certain sluces into the town. Corne, cattle milke [sic] and butter this town yeeldeth in great abundance...[22]

As this is the same Timbuktu of Mali which now occupies the list of those nations most severely affected by famine, it may be an understatement to note that things have changed. It is particularly noteworthy that Mali is now known more for its desert than it is known for its capacity to grow corn.

At the time of European penetration, African nations had developed strong intracontinental trade relations and thriving nation-states (e.g.-Songhay, Ghana, Egypt). With the encroaching activity of European slavery and colonization efforts, these nations and their relationships began to be change.

The onset of European slavery and colonization entangled Africa to the international community in a manner that it had not been previously. The nature and extent of African connections with Europe have been summarized by Walter Rodney:

> The concept of metropole and dependency automatically came into existence when parts of Africa were caught in the web of international commerce. On the other hand, there were the European countries who decided on the role to be played by the African economy; and on the other hand, Africa formed an extension to the European capitalist market. As far as foreign trade was concerned, Africa was dependent on what Europeans were prepared to buy and sell.[23]

First Portugal, followed by many of the other nations of Europe, sought to exploit Africa for its human (labor) and natural (agricultural and mineral) resources.[24] The mines of Brazil and the agricultural promise of the American south and the Caribbean provided a solid market for African slaves.[25] African labor was also very important for the establishment of plantations in Africa itself, as cotton, cocoa, and many other non-edible agricultural and mineral products were exported to Europe, where it was refined and resold to the African market.[26] These crops, along with the mineral extraction industries (e.g.-gold, diamonds) fueled both European economic development while funding the extirpation of African relationships.[27]

Without the suggested benefits of what is viewed as high technology, African people were most capable of providing for basic food needs and in many cases, provided the basis for trade relationships. This was brought about by cooperation among many disparate sectors of African life, which included: pastoralists, traders and farmers.

Evidence of food self-sufficiency and innovation, unspoiled by Europeans, were still to be found within Africa's interior towards the end of the 19th century. One European explorer wrote:

> Everywhere food is abundant-bananas, plantains, sweet potatoes, cassava...corn beans, peas, millet and other seeds, wild fruits, wild grapes, tobacco, honey, milk, fowls, and beef. I have been able to collect over twenty different species of bananas, all known and named and put to different uses. This tree furnishes the black man with paper and twine; from the leaves he makes mats and blankets; from the fruit he makes flour, porridge, bread and wine.[28]

By 1885, at the Berlin Conference, European nations agreed to an arrangement that led to the division and subjugation of the nations and people of Africa. This action spoke volumes of the relative military and political strength of Europe, vis-a-vis Africa, and also set the stage for the further divisiveness of the African people for generations to come. Of greater significance, the nature and orientation of African economies were to be more firmly established and would maintain this character even beyond political independence.

From the time of the Berlin Conference to the period of political transition from colonial rule to political independence in the early 1960s, the colonizing nations of Europe developed political, administrative and military elites. The creation of an indigenous work force to protect and to serve the interests of the colonial occupation was instrumental in the longevity of colonial rule and the subsequent influence of the European nations in the post colonial order.[29] Though the names and faces changed, the crucial economic relationships did not alter.[30] By the time of independence, the tone of African economic pertinence to the world community had been established. At the end of World War II, Europe was indeed weakened from its version of tribal warfare, forcing a reconsideration of what could enable them to achieve their desired hegemony of Europe in global affairs.

The post-World War II period provided many of the new African rulers with opportunities to raise the economic status of their new nations. By the early 1950s, Germany and Japan emerged from the rubble of World War II to regain much of their fallen stature in the industrialized world.[31] With much of the funds necessary to reconstruct those societies derived from the U.S. (Marshall Plan, U.S. occupation government in Japan) and international monetary institutions, Africans were hopeful of establishing a funding source which was not controlled directly by their former colonial rulers. Such funds were to begin Africa's introduction into the modern, industrialized world, while lessening their dependence upon Europe. The reality merely masked an exchange of dependency relationships (see the chapter on Debt and Trade) from bilateral to multilateral forms.

This form of development (as discussed in the segment on Debt and Trade) was based on primary products (minerals, agricultural goods) and the import of essential goods (food). With most African economies sustained by a single sector of production, the new nations were not insulated from the general decline in Africa's terms of trade for its export products (e.g.-cocoa, copper).[32] With their export markets not providing the level of foreign exchange that would cover production costs, and given evidence of technological advances (e.g.-synthetics) reducing the need for some African exports, African governments found themselves increasingly unable to pay for the imported foods and sundry goods (e.g.-military equipment) that they had grown increasingly dependent upon.[33]

A most significant problem of expanded export production was in identifying the source of labor supplies. Though much has been made of the rate and size of Africa's population increase, until African nations can afford to create, as well as, import labor-saving devices that are capable of supporting production activities, it is dependent upon the relatively small size of its workforce.

At sixteen people per square kilometre, Africa possesses a population density that is among the lowest in the world (see Table 3). With the huge size of the African continent and with seventy per cent of its population located in non-urban areas, the sparseness of the location of African people is an impediment to rural agricultural activity (see Table 3). As cash-crops, mining and food production sectors vie for the limited number of rural laborers, the potential of these sectors to lead economic growth and provide for the essential food needs of domestic populations, are greatly diminished. The alternative, mechanization, poses its own problems.

The mechanization of food producing sectors has worked against the needs of landless laborers.[34] With machines performing intensive labor activities, and their

TABLE 3

PARTIAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF FAMINE-STRICKEN AFRICAN NATIONS (1982)

Country	Density (per sq/km)	Urban (per cent)
Angola	06	24
Botswana	02	16
Burkina Faso	23	08
Chad	04	22
Ethiopia	25	15
Mali	06	18
Mauritania	02	35
Mozambique	16	13
Namibia	01	51
Niger	05	16
Somalia	10	34
South Africa	25	56
Sudan	08	21
Zambia	08	43
World	34	40
Developed	20	72
Africa		
total	16	30
sub-Saharan	16	25
France	100	73
United Kingdom	229	76
United States	25	74

SOURCE: Ruth Leger Sivard, <u>World Military and Social Expenditures-1985</u> (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1985).

application to large-scale production, an emphasis on agricultural production to assist the smallest number of producers, while ignoring small-scale producers (the majority), becomes an apparent dilemma.[35] An additional concern with regards to the importation of technologies has been the expanding consumption of foreign exchange and/or the increasing need to borrow funds on the world market to pay for such products.[36] Given the debt situation of African countries, continued borrowing exacerbates their problems. Further problems are also created as the mechanization of production will ultimately begin to reduce the employment of people who are dependent on agricultural production and mining industries.

One proposed solution is that technology to be introduced should be mindful of the employment needs of workers, as well as, production goals. Technology should be introduced that would assist workers in creating a better product while maintaining employment and expanding the potential for producer self-sufficiency. In agriculture, increased production can be obtained with simple investments of fertilizers, improved equipment and the introduction of ongoing assistance as provided by agricultural extension programs.

Though some identify the problem of Africa and its nations as 'too many Africans', a comparison between European and African countries is illustrative of the shortcomings of this viewpoint. All of the African nations listed as being famine-impacted, for example, fall below the world average for population densities. Even those African nations on the upper end of the population density scale fall short of those figures for France and the United Kingdom. Despite such glaringly high population densities for France and the U.K., there is little discussion on whether there may be too many people who are French or English (unless one discusses racial and ethnic minorities). Only Nigeria exceeds the population totals for France, W. Germany, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom.[37] The size of Europe's population, its relative close proximity to the point of production, plus the economic advantages of the slave trade, enabled the shift of European societies to their present level of industrial strength and relatively high standard of living.

The structure of economic development in Africa has been a tale of continuance from its colonial influence, rather than a severe break with its past. Though experiments to establish socialist economies have been attempted across the continent (Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), the opportunity to succeed has been impeded by a variety of important factors, which include: civil war, famine and heightening debt. Questions on whether an economy should be more socialist, rather than capitalist, were offset by the imperative to find solutions to immediate concerns. The example of Mozambique and its signing of the Nkomati accords, and the existence of trade relations with South Africa by the black-ruled nations of the region, are instances where ideology has yielded to economic and political pressures.[38]

Attempts to manage and develop economies have lead to major disincentives for food producers. The pricing policies of many African countries have dissuaded farmers from producing crops for market, as most governments seek to maintain low food costs for the more easily politicized urban dwellers. Such a strategy results in negative or marginal profits for food producing markets.[39] Farmers are also held hostage to the impact of supply and demand, as food prices immediately after harvest are generally lower (due to the availability of food products), which results in marginal profits for small-scale and poor farmers.[40] The price of food increases dramatically during the last few months before harvest. Food which had been stored is often near depletion. In Burkina Faso during 1982, millet was priced at 30 francs per kilo after harvest and resold months later for 120 francs per kilo.[41]

Food aid has also been a troubling disincentive in many African countries, as imported food commodities tend to be priced lower than domestically produced crops.[42]

The low cost of imported grain will not always be the norm, as prices have been steadly below the production costs of most grain exporting nations.[43] Should the major grain exporting nations develop a more coordinated approach towards grain export that does less damage to the price of export commodities, major grain importing nations will be at an even more severe disadvantage. With foreign aid beginning to shrink, and a mounting inability on the part of African nations to find debt relief, the prospect of African nations being dependent on the importation of basic food goods, is a formula for political, as well as, economic disaster. A food boycott would then have the potential of being a greater threat to a nation than military invasion.

From 1970 to 1983, African imports of grain (corn, rice, wheat and wheat by-products) rose to an average increase of 340% (see Table 4). This is despite food production increases across the continent. A closer examination, however, reveals some important inconsistencies. Indices for the period between 1976 and 1984 show that per capita agricultural production decreased (see Table 5). Ethiopia, Niger and South Africa showed negative per capita agriculture production while revealing increases in the total units of agricultural goods produced. Of the famine-stricken nations shown, only Sudan indicates a per capita increase in food production

TABLE 4

AFRICAN GRAIN IMPORTS BY REGION IN MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS

1970 AND YEARLY AVERAGE 1980-83

Grain/Region	1970	1980-83	Percent Change 1970-1980-83
Corn			
N. Africa	.10	2.03	+1930
S. Africa	.20	.37	+ 85
Sub-Saharan Africa	.41	1.46	+ 256
Total	.71	3.87	+ 445
Rice			
N. Africa	.05	.25	+ 400
S. Africa	.08	.16	+ 100
Sub-Saharan Africa	.65	2.43	+ 274
Total	.78	2.84	+ 264
Wheat, Wheat Flour, Wheat Equivalent			
N. Africa	2.79	14.54	+ 421
S. Africa	.18	.14	+ -22
Sub-Saharan	1.44	3.52	+ 144
	4.41	18.19	+ 312

SOURCE: World Food Institute, World Food Trade and U.S. Agriculture 1960-1984 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1985): p. 37.

TABLE 5

AFRICAN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD PRODUCTION
1976-1985

(1976-1978=100)

Country	Total Agriculture Production		Per Capita Agriculture Production		Total Food Production		Per Capita Food Production	
	1976	1984	1976	1984	1976	1984	1976	1984
Angola	105	092	108	072	102	101	105	079
Burkina	096	133	097	111	095	131	096	109
Ethiopia	095	104	096	091	093	106	094	093
Mali	098	118	100	099	098	117	099	097
Mozambique	094	103	096	084	094	104	096	084
Niger	094	113	097	088	094	113	097	088
S. Africa	094	110	096	090	094	110	096	090
Sudan	092	132	095	098	094	132	097	098
Average	096	113	098	091	095	114	097	092
Africa	098	120	101	096	098	121	101	097
Less S. Africa	099	121	102	096	099	122	102	097

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, World Indices of Agriculture and Food Production, 1976-85 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture).

(see Table 5).

What is more remarkable is that Africa, until the 1940s, was a net exporter of food grain (see Table 6). The extent that Africa will be able to reverse its trend of negative food production is tied, in part, to the ability of its governments to direct the management of its economies to encourage and support production activities, while not doing damage to domestic markets of consumption.

Development patterns among African nations and their economies expose numerous class and sexual biases that exclude many of the very people needed to enhance food production. Much of the economic development activity in Africa has had a particular bias in favor of large-scale operations, neglecting the possibility of the smaller productive enterprises. Large-scale enterprise operations are costly endeavors due to the purchase and use of land, advanced technology (mechanized equipment, laboratory-produced seeds and fertilizers) and technology advisors.[44] Only those who control, or have access to, large tracts of land and funds are able to take advantage of such western offerings. This effectively eliminates landless peasants and owners of small tracts of land. The oddity is that these are the very people most intimately involved with food production.

Women are the principle group most actively involved in the production of food, and the group most likely to be excluded from the financial and technological inputs important to food production on a more grand scale. Women in Africa produce 60%-80% of total agriculture production and 90% of the continent's food crops.[45] As most African women do not fully own the land that they work and are often prohibited from securing land in equal quantities as their male counterparts, the contributions of Africa's major food producers are being structurally reduced at a time in Africa's history when the need is the greatest.

In the rural environs of Africa, many of the men go to the cities, mines and fields for employment, while women find their labor relegated to the food sector; the sector of least financial return on investment.[46] Labor in the food production system is primarily that of women (see Chart 1). Men equal women in the labor time spent on food production in the areas of livestock care and planting, while trailing women in: food processing and storage, weeding and harvesting. It is only in ploughing that men exceed the labor input of women in a segment of the food production system. As loans and other inputs for small-scale food production are scarce, production is performed by the most rudimentary of farm implements (hoe, ox-drawn plough). Food production is easily one of the most demanding of labor sectors that a person can be involved with in Africa.

TABLE 6

The Changing Pattern of World Grain Trade, 1934-1976
(million metric tons)

Region	1934-38	1948-52	1960	1970	1976
Africa	+02	-06	-17	-37	-47
N. America	+05	+23	+39	+56	+94
S. America	+09	+01	0	+04	-03
W. Europe	-24	-22	-25	-30	-17
E. Europe and USSR	+05	---	0	+01	-25
Asia	+02	-06	-17	-37	-47
Australia and New Zealand	+03	+03	+06	+12	+08

Source: Lester Brown, "The World Food Prospect," _Science_ (December 12, 1975): p. 1055.

(+) grain export

(-) grain import

CHART 1

DIVISION OF LABOR IN AFRICA



Source: Debbie Taylor, "Invisible Farmers," New Internationalist (July, 1985): p. 13.

Land tenure in many African countries structurally limits the production potential of women in farming communities. One important area of land tenure is decided by inheritance. With the great number of nations that are Islamic and follow Islamic law, women are distanced from the land and productive potential due to inheritance laws which state that a woman gets only one-eighth of her husband's estate (if she has children) upon his death; a daughter only inherits one-half of what a son receives.[47]

Non-Islamic African societies are also known to limit the potential of women land owners. In Sierra Leone, traditional kings appropriated to women only one-third to one-half the amount of communal land that was given to men.[48] The problem and importance of land tenure is exacerbated by the diminution in the importance attributed to agriculture by African commercial banks. Only 5% of total money is allocated to agricultural activity, with little going to women.[49] Among the major providers of development funding, western governments and the World Bank, women have only recently been discovered as potential recipients of funding and only in a limited manner. For example, the largest government development agency, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), has spent a mere 2% of its budget (1978) on their Women In Development (WID) office.[50]

It is not enough to say that women have been forgotten in discussions on development and in food production. Women are viewed as a factor to be controlled, much to the advantage of the male portion of their societies. Though African men may have once been participants in the production of food, with the coming of urban-centered development and the relatively profitable cash-crop sector, the most physically demanding form of agricultural production (bereft of technological advances and supports) has become food production.

With aid programs that continue to neglect the importance of women and thus separating women from cooperative productive activities with her male counterpart, the ability of Africa to expand its food production may be tied to the ability of Africa to integrate its women into development financing, agricultural marketing and agricultural production extension services. Deliberate steps should also be taken to insure that women, particularly those who are producers, should have access to land ownership on a basis that is equal to that of men. It is also imperative that African governments clearly prioritize a thriving domestic food producing sector and sustain it with fair pricing policies and other opportunities that are commonly available to large-scale development enterprises. In this era of massive external debt, the need to lessen external food aid, while simultaneously devising methods to expand the productive opportunities for large numbers of rural unemployed, should be of the highest national urgency.

ii. African Debt and Trade

The total indebtedness of African nations is estimated between $107-$150 billion, second only to Latin America, with an estimated $350 billion.[51] The high debt burden became even more pronounced during the 1970s, owing to a variety of conditions. The stunning increases in the cost of petroleum, the first of the Sahel droughts, diminishing terms of trade, conditionality of foreign loans and unproductive development policies and programs exacerbated an already tenuous situation. The growing reality of the new African nations was their inability to control their economic (and thus, political) fate.

The extent of a nation's indebtedness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a nation's economy is under ruin. The U.S. is the world's largest debtor nation, yet, few consider it to be a devastated economy.[52] It is, therefore, more than the size of the debt but the extent that debt intrudes upon the production, growth and distribution of a nation's wealth. Debt, however, does bear a considerable impact upon nations with disjointed economic and/or political structures.

World Bank figures indicate that from 1973-1982, 17 African nations reported decreases in per capita GNP (see Table 7). African countries also accounted for 19 of

TABLE 7

AFRICAN COUNTRIES REPORTING NEGATIVE GNP GROWTH, 1973-1982
(In Percentage)

Countries	Per Capita GNP
Central African Republic	-1.3
Chad *	-7.7
Gabon	-4.7
Gambia	-0.8
Ghana	-3.8
Guinea-Bissau	-2.1
Liberia	-0.9
Madagascar	-2.5
Nigeria	-0.7
Reunion	-0.5
Senegal*	-0.7
Sierra Leone	-0.3
Uganda	-5.6
Zaire	-1.2
Zambia*	-2.5
Angola*	n.a
Mozambique*	n.a

SOURCE: World Bank, World Bank Atlas-1985 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1985).

*Famine-Stricken Country

the world's 22 nations with per capita income of less than $300 (see Table 8). Ghana and the archipelago of Sao Tome and Principe barely avoid this dubious distinction, with per capitas of $320 and $310 respectively.[53] Although per capita data do not expose the extent that economic resources are concentrated within a nation (class, ethnic groups, sex), the figures do reveal the limited productive output of these nations. As the capacity of a nation to borrow is weighed against the ability of a nation to produce items for foreign consumption or profit, a curtailment of production translates to a greater inability to fulfill the obligations inherent in borrowing money on the international marketplace.

While the economic viability of Africa has been in question for quite some time, the countries of the continent were not prepared for the collective calamities during the 1970s, which included: (1) dramatic increase in the price of petroleum; (2) worldwide recession; (3) sharp rise in the cost of imported goods; (4) collapse of Africa's terms of trade for primary commodities; (5) development policies created for and/or pursued by African nations; and (6) environmental devastation (e.g.-drought).

Though Africa's debt problems did not originate in the 1970s, few decades have contained the level of economic deterioration. The 1973-74 increases in the price of petroleum and its by-products had a significant

TABLE 8

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES OF $300 AND BELOW

COUNTRY	PER CAPITA INCOME
Benin	$290
Guinea Bissau	180
Mali	150
Niger	240
Burkina Faso	180
Ethiopia	NA
Malawi	NA
Rwanda	270
Somalia	250
Tanzania	240
Uganda	220
Chad	080
Central African Republic	280
Zaire	160
Guinea	300
Burundi	240
Madagascar	290
Angola	NA
Mozambique	NA
People's Republic of China	290
Bangladesh	130
India	260

SOURCE: World Bank. 1986 World Bank Atlas (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).

impact on both the creation and distribution of large-scale, mechanized food production. The cost of transporting goods was passed onto the importing nations and, subsequently, the consumer. As the income of most Africans was inadequate to meet the new price demands of imported goods, the global recession absorbed African nations (except Organization of Petroleum Exporters, such as Nigeria) into its decaying orbit.

The sharp rise in imported goods could be likened to the imposition of a tax on foreign goods. This 'tax' extended to such essential products as food and agricultural inputs (e.g.-fertilizers). It was during this time period that the much heralded "Green Revolution" ceased to be a viable option in Africa, as much of its miracle inputs (seeds, fertilizers) required increased farm mechanization and thus, petroleum usage.[54] African nations were caught in the dilemma of importing, and producing, inflation. The staggering global recession that followed the increases in petroleum wounded developed economies and devastated those of the underdeveloped world.

At the time of petroleum price increases and worldwide recession, nations of the Sudan-Sahel zone in Africa were seeking methods to overcome a major drought that had engulfed nine nations in the region.[55] The colonial legacy contributed to this most difficult of periods as the continent's over-reliance on mineral extraction and non-food agricultural crops began to result in sharp declines in the terms of trade. The declining terms of trade on sub-Saharan Africa's primary commodity exports have been evident throughout the 1980's (see Table 9).

Though the path towards trade decline preceded the arrival of President Reagan, there is little to indicate that assistance has been forthcoming to slow these declines in the past forty years (see Table 9). With export revenues reduced and imports rising sharply, African countries were compelled to borrow ever greater amounts of money from international lending institutions. The rapid decline into debt had begun.

Between 1975 and 1983, almost one-half of all debt reschedulings were for African countries.[56] Liberia and Senegal accounted for four reschedulings each, only to be exceeded by Togo (5) and Zaire (6).[57] The World Bank states that the indebtedness of sub-Saharan Africa is $80.268 billion (see Table 10). As a percentage of Africa's exports of goods and services, debt has grown to 28.3% (see Table 10). If African nations dedicated all of their export earnings to service their debt, they would be insufficient to cover the total external debt which has been accumulated.

For example, by 1984, the amount paid by African

TABLE 9

TERMS OF TRADE FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN EXPORT COMMODITIES
(1980=1.000)

Nation	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Benin	1.009	0.915	0.915	0.989	0.942	0.751
Botswana	0.989	1.011	0.994	0.990	0.990	1.049
Burkina Faso	0.882	0.832	0.940	0.962	0.823	0.720
Burundi	0.823	0.931	0.909	1.021	0.999	1.194
Cameroon	0.983	0.957	0.938	0.965	0.924	0.603
Central Afr. Rep.	0.885	0.911	0.903	0.955	0.881	0.868
Congo	1.064	1.021	1.970	0.981	0.946	0.573
Ethiopia	0.836	0.890	0.910	1.013	0.991	1.273
Gabon	1.073	1.018	0.954	0.955	0.905	0.563
Gambia	1.054	0.849	0.939	0.998	0.864	0.746
Ghana	0.816	0.734	0.884	0.983	0.906	0.891
Ivory Coast	0.842	0.862	0.915	0.987	0.938	0.937
Kenya	0.915	0.890	0.930	1.012	0.925	0.920
Lesotho	0.980	0.986	0.981	0.931	1.005	0.867
Liberia	0.853	0.942	0.939	0.940	0.910	0.973
Madagascar	0.868	0.935	0.939	0.988	1.022	1.075
Malawi	0.868	0.840	0.852	0.878	0.744	0.751
Mauritania	0.959	1.100	1.062	1.064	1.029	0.967
Mauritius	0.695	0.432	0.443	0.349	0.305	0.384
Niger	1.009	1.052	1.088	1.027	1.022	1.172
Nigeria	1.099	1.042	1.983	0.992	0.961	0.458
Rwanda	0.856	0.926	0.913	1.030	1.052	1.473
Senegal	1.032	0.996	1.003	1.027	0.988	0.901
Seychelles	1.045	1.045	1.002	1.007	1.035	0.981
Sierra Leone	0.944	0.952	0.966	1.016	0.975	0.978
Somalia	0.916	0.925	0.982	0.939	0.907	0.814
Sudan	0.993	0.930	1.065	1.072	0.889	0.828
Tanzania	0.848	0.848	0.882	0.911	0.963	0.909
Togo	1.031	1.031	0.972	0.911	0.945	0.869
Uganda	0.805	0.884	0.892	0.997	0.960	1.164
Zaire	0.836	0.792	0.838	0.847	0.824	0.807
Zambia	0.798	0.710	0.7790	0.700	0.722	0.776
Zimbabwe	0.899	0.841	0.918	0.915	0.849	0.828

SOURCE: Abdel Stambule, World Bank, Global Analysis (February 1, 1988).

TABLE 10

INDEBTEDNESS OF FAMINE-STRICKEN AFRICAN NATIONS
1986

COUNTRY	DEBT AS % GNP	TOTAL LIABILITIES (INCLUDING IMF PURCHASES)	ACTUAL	DEBT AS % EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES	'84 DEBT SERVICE AS A % OF GOODS & SERVICES
Angola	-----	-----	------	------	----
Botswana	28.5	281	3.8	32.6	4.4
Burkina Faso	48.3	457	12.7	255.3	20.9
Chad	38.3	115	3.8	78.1	8.8
Ethiopia	32.5	1,526	19.3	249.7	20.1
Mali	109.7	1,095	11.4	502.3	33.3
Mauritania	183.6	1,327	16.1	383.6	30.7
Mozambique	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Niger	83.3	947	18.3	259.4	17.8
Somalia	104.8	1,429	25.7	1,538.6	145.9
Sudan	79.5	7,201	25.0	913.2	96.4
Total			14,358.0	136.1	
Average	78.16	1,595.3	15.12	468.08	42.03
Grand	49.30	80,268.0	22.2	214.9	28.3
		2,169.4			
IDA	74.10	44,625.0	22.1	348.9	35.0

SOURCE: World Bank, Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1986).

nations toward their debt (as a percentage of total goods and services) had grown to a staggering 22.1% (see Table 10). No nation, nor group of nations, can be capable of managing a healthy economy when so much of its national wealth is ultimately an income transfer to developed countries due to the servicing of foreign debt. The ability of Africa to pay its debt is increasingly improbable, a fact which guarantees an unstable economic future for these affected nations.

The debt totals are even more unfavorable for African nations if the International Development Association (IDA)-eligible nations are isolated. Total indebtedness for these nations is $44.265 billion, as spread among twenty-eight nations. As a percentage of the GNP, if debt would be required to be paid during a single fiscal year, it would engross more than 74% of Africa's productive wealth (see Table 10). When measuring debt as a percentage of a nation's goods and services for export (an area where foreign exchange is accumulated) the debt total would exceed export production earnings, by an average of 348.9%.[58]

For IDA-eligible nations, the extent that debt claims export earnings is also revealing. Of the nine food-shortage nations, six have a debt approaching or exceeding fifty percent of GNP (see Table 10). The seriousness of debt is in further evidence in the export sector. The extent that export products limit or reduce indebtedness is almost made irrelevant among the food crisis nations. The average debt incurred by these nations is greater than 468% of export earnings (see Table 10). Somalia and Sudan show the greatest inability to pay their debt burden with export earnings, as debt is 1,538% and 913.2% of exports, respectively. In addressing the problems associated with debt and drought causes of famine in Africa, Henry Jackson writes:

> ...debt servicing can be said to be at the core of the African countries' economic crisis. Externally, it prolongs their dependence on external creditors. At home, it thwarts their fundamental objective of transforming their stagnating economies into modern developed societies. By depleting available hard currencies, it also cuts back capital for food imports at a time when the drought is compounding this need.[59]

Most African nations are viewed as high credit risks by commercial banks. These nations have a limited number of options to obtain funding for development assistance: (1) World Bank low-interest loans (mainly through the IDA); (2) support funding for diminished balance of payments from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and (3) bilateral foreign aid. Most of Africa's debt has become public, which is distinct from the private, commercial debt incurred by Latin American nations. When aid money and reserves have either evaporated or are insufficient in quantity, the institution of last resort has often been the IMF.

The initial post-World War II role of the IMF was to provide short term loans to offset temporary balance of payment problems of its member nations. It is the terms of these loans, conditionality, which makes IMF a very powerful force. The demands of the IMF are frequently made to alter economic policies and programs of the recipient nation to fit IMF standards. The conditionality demands of the IMF include: reduction in government spending, increases in taxes, wage controls and the devaluation of currencies.

The IMF was conceived as an institution capable of providing funds to alleviate short-term balance of payment deficits of member nations. These deficits would have a negative impact on the ability of a nation to import coveted goods and services. The void that the IMF has filled has both opened and maintained trade relationships that continue to make a nation's internal markets accessible to the more economically advanced nations' products. Many of the World Bank-sponsored development projects initiated in underdeveloped countries, began to grow increasingly dependent on the IMF to help resolve their short-term debt problems. The irony is that the developed nations, via the IMF, were demanding of Africa's poor to pay the price for the errant policies and programs developed and directed by foreign governments (essentially Europe and the U.S.), international lending institutions

(IMF), poor economic planning by recipient African governments and the frequency of corrupt national officials. The poor of Africa are essentially being asked to pay for both the legacy and the continuance of Africa's economic relationships with the west.

The reduction of government spending in most African countries ultimately means major decreases in food, employment and service programs which more profoundly impact upon the poor. By definition, those who are impoverished are so because they are unable to garner enough money to pay for their most essential needs. With most taxes being regressive in application, tax increases demand an increasing financial burden from the poor, of which they are unable to share. Wage controls reduce the ability of those who work to provide for basic needs with rises in inflation. As the per capita income of most rescheduling nations are among some of the world's lowest, wage controls hurt the average worker.

The devaluation of currency increases the cost of all foreign imports. As many African nations are no longer self-sufficient producers of essential foods and are highly reliant upon food imports, the issue of devaluation becomes an issue of survival. The average person is faced with the prospect of higher food prices and a decrease, or elimination, of food subsidies.

The impact and prioritization of conditionality demands, as set by the IMF upon nations, offers stark evidence of the drastic nature of IMF policies. In Tanzania, the IMF asked the government to devalue its currency to 60% of its original value.[60] In 1984, Chad and Zaire were each urged to release over 7,000 teachers, as part of IMF prescriptions towards economic stability (western style). When confronted with IMF-inspired increases in the price of essential foods, riots exploded in Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Egypt and Tanzania.[61]

The imbalance of Africa's financial situation with the west is illustrated by its relationship to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). By 1986, Africa's net outflow of funds totalled $960 million.[62] The total debt of Africa for 1986 is estimated at $200 billion.[63] With increasing demands placed on many nations due to famines and wars, and the repayment of loans to continue needed imports (particularly food), the possibility of IMF conditionalities being imposed across the continent may become a reality, with or without IMF prodding.

The extent debt contributes to both hunger and famine should not be viewed solely at the point that massive foreign debt has become too obvious to effectively control. Though debt levels had become overly burdensome by the 1970s, the decisions and choices that have lead to such debt have their history in the years prior to political independence.

One of the primary factors in the linkage between debt and famine has been the extent that African economies have invested heavily in the production of agricultural commodities and mineral extraction for export, at the expense of agricultural production for domestic food consumption. The extent that Africa's role has been that of fueling the growth and maintenance of the industrialized world is owed to the activities of multinational corporations, as agents of European capital.

Multinational corporations, most specifically agribusinesses, have had a long history of activity in Africa. The origins of these multinational corporate entities can be found in what were once known as trading companies. Acting at the behest of their European governments, these companies were in the vanguard of Africa's demise and capture into chattel slavery and national destruction. The names of these companies reflected their patrons: the German East African Company, the British Imperial East Africa Company, the British South Africa Company, the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Equatoriale.[64] These names are succeeded by the present generation of multinationals, which include: the United Trading Company (UNILEVER), and the Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (LONRHO). By stealth and duplicity, backed by the force of arms of their own native governments, the trading companies functioned as the extra-governmental arm of European colonialism to create substantial profits.

Under these manipulative and blatantly aggressive actions, Africa moved from a continent that was proficient in the production of food products for their internal uses, to a series of nations consumed with the production of agricultural goods for export. In the early stages of colonialism, the export of agricultural goods was the creation of small-scale farm production.[65] This was sufficient at the time, as demand for African produced goods had not begun to peak. Much of the earlier activity of trading companies was in the capture of people for sale as slaves.

By the late 19th century, the trade relationships had altered significantly. In Africa, the export of its people to the Americas had depopulated the continent to the extent that Africa was the only continent in the 19th century to have not increased in total population.[66] In Europe, there was a growing demand for Africa's natural resources and agricultural goods. With the loss of political control by Europe in the Americas, Africa became even more attractive as a source of exploitable markets of consumption and production activity. The need to shift from the export of labor overseas (slavery) to the control of the African labor force on the African continent facilitated the creation of goods for export to European markets. Africans were needed more in Africa than in the

Americas.

To expedite the need to manage European colonialism in Africa, many of the nations began to approve major concessions to the trading companies. With the "scramble for Africa" having concluded with the division of Africa among the European powers, the task came to 'pacify' the inhabitants to accepting the new political force that was stalking the continent. Though Africans were needed to work the plantations and extract precious minerals from mines, there was little hesitation in dealing harshly with any recalcitrants.

King Leopold of Belgium was one of the early participants in Europe's attempts to tie Africa's human, mineral and agricultural resources to its economic and political institutions. Leopold created (from his private wealth) the Association Internationale du Congo to exploit the greater Congo basin. With the discovery of wild rubber trees, production rose from one hundred metric tons in 1890 to 6,000 metric tons in 1901.[67] What also rose were the number of deaths, as the system of forced labor (and resistance to this labor) resulted in the dwindling of the African population of this region to half of its original size.[68] Other concession companies, while perhaps not being able to match King Leopold in his brutality were quite effective in exploiting the territories given to them to achieve incredible profits, at the expense of African freedom. The South Cameroons company was granted almost 20 million acres for the full rights to collect and produce rubber, without payment, for its Belgian financial backers.[69]

Unilever (formerly Lever Brothers) was given rights to choose 74,000 hectares of palm-bearing land, with rights to an additional 200,000 hectares after ten years.[70] Firestone Rubber Company was granted a concession from the Liberian government for one million acres of land at $.04 per acre (developed).[71] Out of this 'gift', Firestone was able to bring into production 80,000 acres to create the world's largest rubber plantation.[72]

One of the lingering influences of the concessional agribusinesses and the colonial approach they implemented was the impact they had on labor and land. Most important was the availability of "able-bodied" men. The shift of men working in conjunction with the women of their societies in subsistence agricultural activities, to that of working on cash-crop plantations or other related enterprises, had a deleterious impact on the effort of African people to avoid their dependency on food imports.[73] The decline in Africa's population growth due to the slave trade and the diversion of the remaining African labor force forced self-sufficient production activities by Africans to a secondary status.

Another significance of this period was the appropriation of the very best, most potentially productive lands for cash-crop production. Given that much of Africa lies between the tropical zones, with soil that is not especially fertile, the control of land that is most conducive to production was vital. As land tenure shifted, many of the indigenous people, forced from their lands, had to begin production activities on soil that was scarcely supportive of such activities. Long held approaches to agricultural production had to be abandoned or were compromised in attempts to placate the new demands of colonial administrators (e.g.-taxes) and to offset less productive crop yield. For example, the tradition (technology) of allowing land to lay fallow over a period of time to allow for it to regain nutrients lost in the cultivation of a crop, or the usage of crop rotation have become limited.[74] As more and more Africans were forced onto less and less land that was also limited in its crop potential, there was a need for African farmers to reduce the fallow periods for their land in order to meet the immediate needs of their families and their new rulers.

The cooperative method of soil fertilization was also being denied as land tenure began to change. Pastoralists were decreasingly able to deploy their livestock upon farm land to assist in fertilization. These animals would beat stalks back into the earth and eat whatever vegetation that was suitable for their consumption. A major obstacle to the cooperative farm cycle of production engaged in by the pastoralists and the small-scale food producers was the privitization and expansion of cash-crop activity.[75]

The maxim of profits before people was the apparent clarion call of European governments and their trading companies as it was applied to the African inhabitants. The European approach to agriculture and raw material production was to divorce its significance from a society (e.g.-African). Those who labored in the fields and the mines were introduced to a new set of priorities, one that was alien to their culture and needs. The relevance of such resource exploitation was calculated to achieve the highest profit. Food is thereby no longer examined in the context of its meeting the basic survival needs of a people. The question from the European, capitalist matrix is the extent that growing a food crop can create profitable returns, in the nation wherein the crop is created, or for export to another country where the profit is often greater.

As the profit potential was greater for cocoa, rubber, cotton and other products for export to (and consumption by) European markets, the domestic needs of African people languished. More labor time, land and technology inputs were invested in export crops, creating a void for African workers. This void was in the steady decline of labor in areas which would provide for the essential food and other survival needs of the laborers themselves.

The result of this planned neglect was soon to be obvious to all. Under normal conditions, food was stored after harvest, in the event of hardship. A colonial inspector expressed his bewilderment of the people of the then Upper Volta (now known as Burkina Faso), as they faced famine in 1932:

> One can only wonder how it happens that populations ...who always had on hand harvests in reserve and to whom it was socially unacceptable to eat grain that had spent less than three years in the granary have suddenly become improvident. They managed to get through the terrible famine of 1914 without difficulty...(however, since the late 1920s) these populations, once rich in food reserves are now living from hand to mouth...[76]

Labouret reported from Burkina Faso (c. 1950) of a dramatic drop in calories for rural workers. Calorie intake fell from 3,250 after harvest to 750, and below, before the new harvest could be consumed.[77] He further states:

> The daily ration of an adult might even go down to 208 calories per day, not during famines but simply at times of shortage. So great was the surprise of the personnel in charge of these calculations in France that they suspended their work, believing it to be in error on our part. There was no error.[78]

How many Africans died, or whose babies were malnourished, so that a person in London could satisfy their cravings for a chocolate candy, or so that a Parisian might be comfortable wearing a cotton outfit during the summer months?

The unabashed icon of imperialism, Cecil Rhodes, offered his perception of the need for such practices:

> In order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we, colonial statesmen, must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question.[79]

For Rhodes, the question of bread and butter was a matter of concern solely for Britain, even though by satisfying the British cravings, the same afflictions for the non-European nations of the world are reproduced. It is to this end that African and Asian nations were in fact able to serve the needs of the 'Empire', at the exclusion of themselves.

The rationale offered by Rhodes could also have been used by King Leopold and any other European ruler who sought to tie the nations and people of Africa to the impetus created by industrialization and the need to create new markets for the goods created. The role of Africa in the movement of European imperialism and colonialism is described by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu as:

> ...to supply the mother country's trade with a ready-made market, to get its industry going and to supply the inhabitants of the mother country ...with increased profits, wages or commodities.[80]

Africa's role has scarcely changed from this time.

As the trading companies grew in their dominance of the markets for agricultural and mineral resources, so did the opportunity to expand their control of the product from its source to the point that it is consumed in the marketplace. This attempt to control every facet of a product (vertical integration) includes: processing, trading, transport, marketing and distribution. This pursuit of absolute control was greatly assisted by the creation and activities of the International Fund for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

The introduction of the World Bank not only assisted the nations of western Europe in their post-World War II recovery, but also attempted to facilitate programs that were consistent with the goals of the colonial economies in Africa.[81] An essential feature of enhancing the relationship between Europe and its colonies in Africa (and elsewhere) was the development of infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports) that would assist in the movement of cash-crops and extracted mineral resources to those nations which occupy the center of the capitalist order.[82] The emphasis that the World Bank placed on the development of infrastructure was more than just a casual investment (see Tables 11 and 12). The funds proved to be the major incentive that baited the finance-starved nations into being led along the paths of a development which addressed the wants of domestic elites, foreign corporate enterprises and financial

TABLE 11

SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF IBRD/IDA LENDING
(In Percentages)

Fiscal Years	1948-63	1964-68	1969-73	1974-78	1978
Agriculture	8.4	12.6	19.7	31.0	38.9
Infrastructure*	73.7	62.8	53.0	36.6	33.7
Other+	17.9	24.6	27.3	32.4	27.4

SOURCE: Richard Stryker. "The World Bank and Agricultural Development: Food Production and Rural Poverty," World Development (March, 1979), p. 325-336.

*Transportation, electric power, telecommunications, water supply, and sewerage.

+Industry, development finance companies, urbanization, tourism, population, and non-project sectors.

TABLE 12

SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF IBRD/IDA LENDING*
in $US Millions)

Fiscal Years:	1948-63	1964-68	1969-73	1974-78	1978	1948-78 (Cum.)
Agriculture	$ 463	$ 621	$ 2507	$10,012	$3270	$13,576
Transportation	2029	1393	3237	5,458	1093	12,117
Electric Power	1763	1436	2244	4,311	1146	9,754
Development Finance Co's	206	483	1216	3,276	910	5,181
Industry	550	118	598	2,944	392	4,210
Education	5	157	713	1,339	352	1,214
Water-Sewers	9	119	589	1,330	375	2,047
Telecommunications	46	152	667	732	221	1,597
Other+	174	454	929	2,931	652	4,771
	$5,218	$4,933	$12,700	$32,333	$8,411	$55,467

SOURCE: ibid.

*Current borrowers only, i.e., less developed borrowers, excluding post-war reconstruction and other loans to developed countries ($3265 million) and excluding loans to IFC ($550 million).

+Tourism, population, assistance, and non-project loans.

institutions, at the expense of the needs of the newly independent nation.

Table 12 identifies in greater detail the extent that infrastructural development has led the list of World Bank investments. Most of these plans, however, were directed towards urban areas, while agricultural investments were directed toward the cash-crop (export) sector. The World Bank acknowledged this imbalance stating:

> A large part of World Bank lending has been urban-oriented. Most of the lending for port facilities, urban expressways and industry has been for urban purposes. The major part of the transport and telecommunications lending had been to link urban areas. Bank lending in these categories which had been urban-related totals roughly $13 billion or over three-quarters of total lending in the development countries. On a more restricted definition, excluding interurban transport and telecommunications, the proportion is still nearly half.
>
> Much of the lending has been concentrated on major cities. Over $2 billion, or more than 10% of all lending, has been absorbed by 13 cities, each receiving $100 million or more. Projections for the next five years indicate no diminution of this effort.[83]

The concentration of financial, administrative and technical resources in one spatial location was not only a primary factor of urban growth, but also an additional factor in the destabilization of less-profitable productive sectors. The lack of investments into food production sectors has greatly contributed to the deterioration of the rural economy and the resultant migration to the urban centers. The creation of urban population growth was, and remains, staggering. Gerald Breese, citing United Nations statistics, indicated that:

> Between 1900-1950, the population living in cities of 100,000 or more in Asia mounted from an estimated 19.4 million (a gain of 444 per cent), and in Africa from 1.4 million to 10.2 million (a gain of 629 per cent).[84]

A study conducted by Kingsley Davis on thirty-four underdeveloped countries revealed that during the 1940s and 1950s:

> ...average annual gain in the urban population was 4.5 per cent...4.7 per cent in seven countries in Africa, 4.7 per cent in 15 countries in Latin America. In contrast, nine countries during their period of fastest urban population growth (mostly in the latter half of the 19th century) the average gain per year was 2.1 per cent.[85]

Estimates on future growth of urban areas in the Third World show continued population increases. It is projected that such areas will increase by more than one billion people by the year 2000.[86] This figure represents 80.8 per cent of the anticipated urban growth in the world.

Such an emphasis away from rural sectors was not without its support in the more radically left camps, although for many different reasons. Kwame Nkrumah answered those who may have felt that Africa should forestall attempts to enter into the mainstream of the world's industrialized nations, by stating:

> There are, however, imperialist specialists and apologists who urge less developed countries to concentrate on agriculture and leave industrialization for some later time when their populations

> shall be well fed. The world's economic development, however, shows that it is only with advanced industrialization that it has been possible to raise the nutritional levels of the people by raising their levels of income. But even to make agriculture yield more, the aid of industrial output is needed; and the underdeveloped world industrialized. This dependence must slow the rate of increase in our agriculture and make it subservient to the demands of the industrial producers.[87]

The eloquence of Nkrumah's words, notwithstanding, certain tenants of his argument must be debated. One, it is inaccurate to link improved nutritional levels to industrialization. Advanced industrialization has done little for the legion of the unemployed throughout the western world who must depend on government assistance to be fed (when and to the extent it is available). If industrial technology is not developed to utilize labor potential versus limiting the access of people into the labor market, ultimately, economic development and nutritional levels will only show improvement to a limited number of people. Two, it is a mistake to assume that industrialization was the sole result of European technological genius.

The industrialization of Europe and North America can be directly tied to the use of slave labor and the domination of foreign markets. The surplus created by the labor of slaves in the fields and the mines led to such domestic benefits as industrialization and rising incomes that culminated in better diets for both Europe and North

America. Unless African and other Third-World people are willing to invest themselves in the form of slavery developed by Europe, industrialization must be addressed along alternative paths.

Third, although industrialization is a benefit, its wholesale introduction into an economy without an accompanying analysis of its impact upon other sectors would be a mistake. Industrialization efforts should supplement a nation's economic strength and diversity, not limit it. The deemphasis of one sector to enhance another sector does little to promote any serious attempt to approach self-sufficiency in an area that is vital to a nation's sovereignty.

By accepting the economic model of industrialization as the primary emphasis of national development, two assumptions were made: (1) the west and its international monetary institutions would support the idea of Africa becoming a competitive, more self-reliant, industrialized entity; and (2) the west would provide the nations of Africa with the means to develop this capacity. The extent that so-called development did occur was the extent that urban areas grew, albeit, at the expense of the food producing sectors of their economies.

Such development was not promoted as expressions of domestic economic relationships but as appendages to those agricultural and mineral extractive sectors needed by the west to further its own industrial development. These varied elements combined to enhance the point that growth can indeed occur without development. The industrialized base so coveted by African governments never materialized. As Richard Stryker explained, World Bank efforts concentrated upon: "...the rapid penetration of corporate agribusiness from the wealthy capitalist countries into the new production frontiers of the Third-World."[88] These new frontiers which were not for the development of the host nation, but for the satiation of western markets and corporate profits.

By relying upon the notion that development was a course that could only be followed along western paths, African and other newly-formed nations throughout the world, soon discovered that they had helped to expand their vulnerability to western economic domination. As the wave of political independence began to wash upon the African shores, the new governments of black rule were to find that the economic foundation of the country would prove to be their most formidable obstacle to overcome. The new rulers began to witness the decline of food crop production, while exports of agricultural goods held steady and in many instances, increased. Per capita food production has fallen by 1.1% during the 1970s and 2% in the 1980s (annually).[89] Food items such as wheat, maize, rice, millet and sorghum have shown drastic decreases since 1961.[90] Food imports have shown corresponding increases during this same period, with one quarter of all grain consumed on the continent coming from foreign sources.

To add to Africa's problems, the relative demand for many of its primary products (both agricultural and mineral) were in decline, as inflation was making itself obvious in the developed countries. Africa was now at a crossroad. The impact of generations of European activity on Africa was now apparent. It was no longer able to keep pace with the increasing demand for food, as the traditional food producers had been diverted to export production, or forced to turn to the cities as a means toward survival. Those entwined in the export production found that the market price for those items were not enough to sustain employment levels as in past years.

The dependence on the old colonial economy was now being replaced by a dependency upon foreign agricultural producers for the most precious and basic of human needs, food. With its terms of trade faltering and the balance of payments to the disadvantage of Africa, debt began to mount to unheard of proportions. As balance of payment problems continued to grow, there seemed to be an even greater reliance on the export markets to offset the troubles the nations were facing with the shortage of food. Of the more conflicting images that have emerged out of Africa during the famine crises of the past two decades has been the dichotomy of African nations exporting agricultural goods to Europe and the west, while dying from famine at home. In 1974, Tanzania faced a major food emergency, though at the same time demonstrating this strangeness of sectoral imbalance:

> ...the export sector of the Tanzania agricultural economy was flourishing, and the total level of production of export crops was approaching record highs. During crop year 1972-1973, just before the massive importation of emergency food supplies, Tanzania exported over 100,000 tons of coffee, about 235,000 tons of sisal, and nearly 280,000 tons of cashews.[91]

In Mali, one of the more troubled nations of all of those stricken by famine, the abundance of its export sector during the period of the Sahel famine of the 1970s raises the question of the importance of the food sector, Lofchie writes:

> Corn production, for example, fell by more than one-third between 1969 and 1971, and millet, desperately needed to take up the slack, showed no increases whatsoever. During the same period, Mali's export crops had attained bumper levels. During the crop year 1971-1972, cotton-seed production reached more than a 400 per cent increase during a six-year period. Groundnut production totalled more than 150,000 tons that year, an increase of nearly 70 per cent during a four-year period. Rice production, also largely for export, reached a record high in 1972, amounting to about 174,000 tons.[92]

It is clear that when the drought was being viewed as the primary reason for the Sahel famines of the 1970s, only food crops destined for domestic markets were affected, versus those agricultural products designed for export. If nature was not the cause, then the question of priorities must be introduced. Why is it that export crops should receive their needed farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers, irrigation) while the most important purpose of agriculture (feeding the people) was not given the same attention? The answer is still to be found in the economic development plans of the above nations and the emphasis placed on obtaining foreign exchange, to satisfy foreign creditors and for the ongoing purchase of goods deemed significant by the governments.

The implications for such a foreign-based strategy on the domestic needs of a people is also evident in the analysis done by the World Bank on the potential for the Sahel to provide Europe with vegetables during its winter season, the 1974 report states:

> European demand for vegetables is constantly increasing. In addition, consumers want to have throughout the year vegetables that were formerly not available in winter. Except for hothouse-grown vegetables-which rank as luxuries-and early vegetables grown under glass or plastic one or two months ahead of the main season...The Sudan-Sahel region with its long dry season (November-March... is well placed to produce such plants under irrigation. It has the additional advantage of having inexpensive manpower available for these labor-intensive crops (some 300 hrs/ha).[93]

At that time, the Sahel region was undergoing an incredibly brutal period of famine which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and destroyed the economies of most of the nations in the region. Still, in the above report, a major investment is seen as needed to assist these nations to provide funds to raise vegetables for Europeans during the winter months. It is apparent to the World Bank and the nations that would be recipients of such funds, that the best way to offset the ravages of famine at home is to export food abroad. This introduces a new claim to the magical properties of trickle-down theory.

World Bank initiatives as the above are not uncommon and are in keeping with most bilateral and multilateral aid from the developed nations to the underdeveloped nations. The structure of most aid is to benefit the donor nations. The World Bank mainly approaches funding for its projects in the context of western visions of development, rather than attacking poverty. As World Bank projects in the past have been tremendous supporters of agribusinesses (many of which were the former trading companies), in the creation of infrastructure and urban development to assist the export of agricultural goods, the design of operations tends to support orthodox, western economic thinking. The greatest impact that aid programs have had on African nations, subsequent to independence, is to the extent that they obligate vast financial resources of the recipient African nation.

Bilateral aid has also been an important segment of aid donations, though covering more specific commodities, rather than broad economic development structures (U.S. aid activity will be covered in the following chapter). Though individual nations act upon what is in their own best interests, the sum of western donations and lending of funds has often been in areas where Africa is in need of the least (e.g.-military hardware) and a dearth of funds in areas where it could be utilized in a most beneficial manner (small-scale farming, intra-African transportation systems). The sum of what has been given serves to inhibit the growth of producers (e.g.-farmers) and maintains the line of dependency upon the west for essential goods and services.

The potential for African nations to reduce their indebtedness to the west and to financial institutions is compromised by the unavailability of funding sources and approaches that could expand those sectors of productive activity which have Africans as their primary consumers/ beneficiaries. A Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) report expresses this concern:

> Where are countries going to find the foreign exchange to import the fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation pumps, vehicles and so forth, on which their production prospects will in large depend in the next few years?[94]

The response can only lead to a greater reliance on small-scale farm production, whose inputs are not nearly as costly as those of their large-scale, high technology counterparts. As many of the inputs of large-scale farm producers are imported, there is an additional saving in foreign exchange if emphasis is placed on small-scale agriculture. The need for greater indigenous food production, minus the costliness of imported inputs is a major challenge to be faced. The food deficit of Africa has increased during the past two decades as cereal imports have grown from $666 million in 1971, to $5.9 billion in 1981.[95] It was estimated that by 1984 approximately one-quarter of Africa's 531 million people were dependent on grain imports.[96]

Attempts to restore small-scale farmers to a position of respect worthy of financial compensation, relative to the importance of their sector is a matter of political, as well as, economic, decision-making. With falling per capita incomes, African people, particularly those who reside in the cities, will be confronted with higher prices for food unless there are increased government food subsidies for consumers and price supports for food crop farmers. The supply of imported grains that are sold at below market rates cannot be guaranteed in the future. It is the responsibility of Africa's governments to not only respond to the urgent immediate demands to feed their citizens but to also prepare for their future.

The extent that indigenous food production can alleviate a portion of the debt problem is still but the first of many steps that must be taken if the debt situation is to be slowed. Given the need for peaceful settlements to a variety of problems of major regional importance and the needs for increased economic cooperation, the prescription towards reducing indebtedness to the west is a call for internal settlement of issues, that promote a greater self-reliance upon Africans themselves. As former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere once stated: "self-reliance is part of liberation..."[97]

iii. Militarization and Armed Conflict

Militarization and armed conflict have been two ominously prominent features of nationhood in Africa in the post-colonial period. While militarization and armed conflict are distinct concepts and realities, there are significant parallels and convergences which exist that can be identified for their impact on hunger and famine. By accelerating the size and training of armed troops and the purchase of military and military-related equipment, the shift of economic and labor priorities to support militarization efforts has a significant impact on the structure of a nation and the nations in its region.

Labor is impacted upon, as those most able to perform the rigors of food production are absorbed into military service. Beyond the young and able-bodied being involved in military service, there is the diversion of labor away from other sectors. The importance of this diversion of potentially skilled labor is evident by the importation of foreign 'experts' to help solve Africa's food production and distribution problems.

African economies are also threatened by militarization. African spending on militarization increased from \$3.8 billion in 1973 to \$16.9 billion in 1983.[98] The spending figures for Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco show an almost tenfold increase between the years 1973 (\$763 million) and 1983 (\$7.1 billion).[99]

The increase of military spending in Africa during this same time was one of the most dramatic in the world. The continent's share of world military spending grew from \$7.8% to 10% (a 35% increase).[100] The gross dollars appropriated to a country's military are an indication of a nation's commitment. These figures may not give an accurate picture of the extent of this commitment, as do figures which indicate the percentage of total government spending. For the years spanning 1973 to 1983, the military as a percentage of GNP in Africa, rose from 2.7% to 4.5%.[101] The Middle-East is the only region in the non-European, North American world with a higher percentage of its GNP committed to the military. Of the ten nations in Africa with the highest percentage of their GNPs committed to the military, seven were on the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) list of famine-stricken nations (see Table 13).

The potential that possibly awaits Africa should

TABLE 13

PER CENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT SPENT BY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ON THE MILITARY (1983)

Country	PER CENT OF GNP
Angola*	23
Libya	18
Zambia	15
Cape Verde*	15
Egypt	10
Somalia*	9
Morocco	8
Zimbabwe	6
Mauritania*	6
Guinea	5

Source: Center for Defense Information, Military Facts (Washington, D.C.: February, 1986).

*Famine-Stricken Country

it choose to invest in socially productive sectors of its economies, rather than in armament, is evidenced in the example of Japan. Part of the reason for the strength of the Japanese economy rests in its constitutional restriction which limits Japan to commit no more than 1% of its GNP to its defenses. Zbigniev Brzezinski calculates the present Japanese commitment at from 1.4% to 1.8 percent.[102]

While Japan has benefitted from massive infusions of aid, the resistance to marked growth in the military has allowed for labor, capital and natural resources to be kept in more productive areas of the economy. By 1983, only the U.S. exceeded the Japanese GNP.[103] Of the twenty-four nations listed by the FAO as receiving emergency food assistance, ten have committed to the military more than fifteen per cent of central government expenditures, or as a part of their GNP (see Table 14). Though many nations are indeed faced with threats to their very sovereignty, and finances must be committed to the military, most of the economies are fragile and cannot sustain conflicts of nature and the failure of diplomacy. On both the diplomatic and economic front, the imperative for regional cooperation and tangible commitment are essential.

The transfer of capital and human resources to the military has several corrosive features on a nation's

TABLE 14

AFRICA EMERGENCY FOOD AID RECIPIENTS WITH SIGNIFICANT EXPENDITURES ON THE MILITARY

(Percentages)

Country	ME/GNP[a]	ME/GNP[b]	Year
Angola	23.2	62.5	1983
Bourkina Faso	2.8	20.2	1983
Chad	2.4	20.5	1983
Equitorial Guinea	3.4	21.0	1981
Ethiopia	8.6	16.8	1982
Mauritania	5.8	17.1	1983
Mozambique	3.5	29.1	1982
Somalia	9.1	22.7	1983
Zambia	15.1	30.6	1980
Zimbabwe	6.7	15.6	1982

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985): pp. 52, 56-7, 61, 73-4, 80, 87-88.

a-Military Expenditures/Gross National Product

b-Military Expenditures/Central Government Expenditures economy. An emphasis on military growth is accompanied by the purchase of military hardware, goods and related services. This emphasis can only be satisfied by either the production or importation of the desired items. As industrialization and mechanization are not abundant features in African economies, the emphasis placed on militarization and its more capital-intensive, technologically advanced forms, leads to an increasing demand for imported weaponry. The total of arms imports to Africa grew to $27.870 billion between 1979 and 1983, almost doubling arm imports between 1973 and 1978 at $14.410 billion.[104] Africa's share of world arms imports has also risen sharply from 3.4% in 1973 to 12.9% in 1983.[105] Continental Africa's share of arms import overwhelms comparisons to Latin America, whose share of imports is at 6.8%.[106]

The list of African nations that are major arms importers bears a striking similarity to the FAO list of famine-stricken countries. Of the ten nations cited as major arms importers, six are on the FAO famine list (see Table 15). Among the nations most severely impacted by famine, Ethiopia and Angola combine for more than one-third of sub-Saharan arms imports.[107] The significance of arms is more obvious when it is compared as a percentage of total imports. In Cape Verde, Somalia and Uganda, the importation of weapons are between thirty and sixty

TABLE 15

AFRICA'S LARGEST ARMS IMPORTERS, 1979-1983
(In U.S. Billions of Dollars)

Nation	Amount
Libya	12.1
Algeria	3.7
Ethiopia*	1.9
Morocco	1.8
Angola*	1.7
Nigeria	1.1
Mozambique*	.680
Sudan*	.640
Somalia*	.580
Kenya*	.450

Source: Center for Defense Information, Military Facts on Africa (Washington, D.C.: February, 1986).

*Famine Stricken Nation

percent of all imports.[108] The benefits to the importing nation(s) are limited.

By providing an emphasis on the military, countries are focusing very valuable and very limited human and financial resources on a sector that does not contribute towards the enhancement of the domestic economy. The example of Kenya is illustrative of this point. Between 1977 and 1981, Kenya promoted the growth of its military expenditures from 10% to 16% of its GNP.[109] About 70% of the entire budget was composed of imported military goods.[110]

Unless there is an imminent threat of danger, the benefits of such military growth are illusive. African nations have not benefitted from the kind of technology transfer that would permit the production and employment associated with weapons creation, nor from skills that could be incorporated in the civilian sectors, and that of the military.

Militarization also reinforces the dominance of its sector. With the opportunity for employment and advancement limited in civilian occupations, the military becomes one of the few institutions capable of providing both employment and economic mobility. In many countries, the military has become a career necessity rather than a career opportunity. The strength of the military in the economy also siphons many of those who possess the potential to make significant contributions in the business or agricultural sectors of a nation, but whose skills are dedicated towards the maintenance of the military.

One-half of the nations listed as 'severely affected' by famine are engaged in a major commitment of armed forces in a state of war (Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique). If the black populations of Namibia and South Africa were isolated statistically from the white populations of their nation, they too would be considered as famine-stricken nations. In South Africa, malnutrition is the cause for more than 60% of infant mortality among blacks, while being more than 31 times greater than the rate for whites.[111]

Warfare contributes to the creation of famine and hunger by: (1) death and injuries to food producers and combatants; (2) intimidation of food producers, thus, restricting or eliminating production; (3) the conscription of farmers into military service, again, reducing the available number of food producers; and (4) further limited investments of resources toward food production.

From the time of the independence movements, Africa has been embroiled in a series of wars and major conflicts. One important consequence of European rule was the creation of artificial national boundaries, as evolved out of the Conference of Berlin. With independence has come the unresolved problem of irredentist claims and secessionist movements which emerged from African acceptance of European designated borders. These inherited boundaries have served to prevent a peaceful transition from colonized rule to independent nationhood. Despite the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the existence of intra-African conflicts represents the inability of African nations to resolve, diplomatically, the legacy of European colonialism. With one of the major tenets of the OAU being the sanctity of existing borders, the opportunity for debate on this crucial point has been denied an important point of reference.[112] It can also be said that the armed conflicts between Africans are also a statement of the extent that Africa has increasingly become embroiled in the global conflict between the capitalist and socialist nations of Europe and North America.

Separatist movements have fueled major conflicts in: Ethiopia (Eritrea, Tigray); Zaire, Congo, Cabinda and Angola (the Bakongo); Morocco (the Polisario) and Nigeria (Igbo). Irredentist movements also have been evident, involving Somalia (with claims to Djibouti and to parts of Ethiopia and Kenya); and Morocco (with claims to Western Sahara, Mauritania and the Tiouf region of Algeria).

Regional conflicts have erupted in the areas known as: the "Horn" (Ethiopia vs. Somalia), southern Africa

(South Africa vs. all its neighbors) and east Africa (Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya). The most widespread of these regional conflicts has involved South Africa. Attacks on neighboring countries by South Africa have become a frequent reality throughout southern Africa. Since 1970, the apartheid regime has attacked every nation in the region, (except Malawi) and supports anti-government forces in Angola (UNITA) and Mozambique (RENAMO). South Africa and its proxy forces have inflicted major damage on transport, communications and port facilities throughout the region. Such attacks are also an attempt to prevent regional economic cooperative activities among the independent black nations of the region under the plans for the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The extent that SADCC could be effective economically, also could be a measure of how effective Africans in the region could be politically, as a base of effective support and military activity by anti-apartheid forces in South Africa itself. It is estimated that since 1960, the destabilization efforts of South Africa (military and economic) have cost the SADCC nations between $25-$28 billion.[113] A loss of $25 billion equals the total productive output for the SADCC nations.[114]

Wars of liberation have been a prominent feature on the continent as the struggles for freedom consolidated the efforts towards black rule during the 1960s. The former Portugese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique waged effective wars of national liberation which culminated in their collective freedom in 1976. In Zimbabwe, majority rule was ultimately established through years of guerilla warfare. In South Africa and Namibia, the final vestige of the European colonial era is being challenged with increasing effectiveness.

The stereotypical African ruler is often depicted as a military official who has gained access to power by the power of a coup. While such a stereotype does not indicate effective or ineffective rule, it does identify a source of difficulty in the governance of Africa. Twenty-four African countries are under military rule. Between 1960 and 1982, there were twenty-five coups in sub-Saharan Africa.[115] Three reasons are apparent for the prevalence of coups in Africa: (1) foreign covert intrusions into domestic governments (e.g.- Lumumba, Congo; Amin, Uganda); (2) the availability of arms (mainly imports) and their use to settle disputes; and (3) the emergence of the military as a self-contained political institution and as a major source for employment.[116]

The frequent lack of a peaceful resolution to the transition of power in African governments has disrupted the management and effectiveness of these governments. The constant shift in political and economic priorities and in those who must execute these programs and policies, is a formula for ineffectual governance.

Since 1970, Uganda has had four different rulers and five different governments. Ghana's present ruler (Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings) has ascended to the pinnacle of his nation's political power three times. By 1988, of Nigeria's twenty-eight years since independence, only ten years have been spent under civilian rule.

Though heavily militarized and faced with a very serious threat beyond their borders (and in some instances, within their borders) the nations of southern Africa are without military rule. Still, what southern Africa shares with the remainder of Africa, albeit for different reasons, is the diversion of precious labor and economic resources to aspects of the economy that are virtually nonproductive.

What the military produces, cannot be consumed by people who are unemployed, without land, or the means to produce. With such fragile economies, it is difficult to keep a state of war and accomplish production increases in other economic sectors. What is needed most by Africans throughout all sectors, but most particularly its farmers, is peace and a deemphasis on militarization. It is highly probable that this needed design will not achieve reality until a solution is found to apartheid and the artificially-created national boundaries that are found across the continent.

The weight of militarization and armed conflict have increasingly become a burden that the nations of Africa are unable to bear. Though there are important reasons for conflicts in many regions (apartheid, inherited boundaries), many of the conflicts can be settled by the force of diplomacy, rather than the force of weapons. It is apparent from the investment of weapon sales by the west into Africa, that warfare is of a higher priority than negotiations. If militarization can be likened to a loaded gun, then armed conflict is the discharge of its contents.

In the not too distant past, African rulers exchanged slaves for guns to fight a neighbor that also was supplied by the slavers with weapons of advanced technology.[117] Both sides became dependent on the instigator of their difficulties. Today, the relationship is virtually the same. Vital foreign currency is spent on questionable western technology and commodity items that add litle to the capacity of a nation to pursue a truly independent posture. With the growing dependency on food imports, Africa is selling away its future, de facto economic and political independence to satisfy questionable desires.

iv. Environment

The uniqueness of the African environmental disorders goes beyond the extremes of nature. It is the conditioning of the environment to make it most susceptible to the impact of nature that has magnified nature's unsettling design. Lloyd Timberlake succinctly states that: "more people are affected because human activities actually make the land more prone to these disasters."[118] An excess of nature becomes a natural disaster when the lives of people are either injured or threatened. As land tenure, restrictive borders, urbanization and war have altered the living environments of people, more families and individuals are increasingly living in locations that once were absent of major settlements and activity.

From the Sahel famine of the late 1960s and early 1970s to the more widespread famines of the African continent in the late 1980s, the environment of Africa has been held under close scrutiny as the provocateur of famine. The agents for this concerted degradation of the environment were principally seen to be in the form of: drought, desertification, deforestation and soil erosion. By assuming nature to be the culprit, the focus of the blame did not have to be directed upon the policies and programs of the famine nations, foreign governments, international lending institutions and development planners.

The major environmental problem that has come to the attention of the global society has been drought. Over a period spanning three decades, the Sudano-Sahelian zone has been tragically affected by drought. To a lesser extent, the southern African region has also been pressed to deal with the impact of drought throughout its region.

By viewing drought as the most major cause of famine, writers failed to set forth the opposing view of their logical structure, that is, once drought is ended, famine will end as well. The position that drought, or any other environmental cause, is at the base of famine, does not address the following:

1. the apparent discriminating effect of such ecological forces upon the poor, versus the more wealthy, landed populations, whose more lofty economic status insulates them from the impact of such a disaster; and
2. how food crops destined for domestic consumption are more heavily affected by the extremes of the environment than are export-oriented agricultural crops.

The discriminating effects of famine have been evidenced across the continent. The International Labor Organization studied the 1973 Ethiopian famine (in addition to those of Bengal and Bangladesh) and discovered that famine victims were associated with the variables of class and occupation.[119] An example of this inequity of suffering, as it impacts upon the poor, comes out of Nigeria:

> What needs to be emphasized [sic] here is that, even before the 1973 drought struck, poor farmers were almost at the end of their defenses. They had eaten their seed reserves and depended on 'friends' for gifts or loans of seed; they had no more livestock to sell, as all animals had already died or been sold...For many of the poor the only resource left by mid-1973 that they could pledge or sell was their land.[120]

Drought has not only had a discriminating impact upon the poor, but also on agricultural production. In Mali, between 1969 and 1971, corn production dropped by one-third, while export-oriented cotton-seed products increased to a high of 68,000 metric/tons between 1971-72; a 400% increases.[121] This trend has continued through to the 1980s. The Sahel nations of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Chad reported record harvests of cotton in the 1983-84 seasons.[122]

The record increases in cotton are indicative of a strong commitment to its production, a dedication that could have perhaps been better suited for food production during the simultaneous period of famine. R.E. Dummett writes of the difficulty in growing cotton, which he views as:

> ...one of the most demanding forms of crop production in terms of labor inputs because it entails carefully timed planting, sowing of seeds at regular intervals, periodic thinning of cotton plants, constant weeding, and rapid and careful harvesting to avoid spoilage.[123]

It is estimated that both southern Africa and the

Sudano-Sahelian zone are receiving rainfall averaging 60% below their long-term norm.[124] The lack of rainfall still does not address the question of priorities, nor the ability to continue production (though in more limited forms). For example, the average rainfall received in Sokoto (Northern Nigeria) was four inches more than the annual rainfall received in London.[125] Drought has been evident in the U.S., South America, the Middle East and North America (where in the case of the latter two, dry soil is in abundance). Is the problem drought, or is it the priorities assigned to the differing sectors of the famine stricken economies? Again, Michael Lofchie asks the important question: "If drought is the explanation, why has it not affected export crops?"[126]

Even in the best of years, the African climate is not the most cooperative to agricultural production. Of the 19 nations considered to be in the Sudano-Sahelian zone, 13 nations have approximately 75% of their total territory in arid and semi-arid climates (the exceptions are Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Benin, Nigeria and Ethiopia).[127] These nations have a history of being able to manage life in such dry lands. The knowledge gained from such a history is obviously being challenged at this time. Fifteen of the Sudano-Sahelian nations are also affected by decertification (except: Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Benin).[128] Another nine nations were having to endure new/recurrent drought pressures in 1982-83 (Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Senegal, United Republic of Cameroon).[129]

Within the Sudano-Sahel zone, there are a variety of differences among the nations and their ability to deal with desertification problems (see Table 16). In the areas known as sub-Sahelian West Africa (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Nigeria and the United Republic of Cameroon) there has developed a serious deterioration of rangelands.[130] If such land is incapable of supporting animal grazing, then it also becomes a prime candidate to be absorbed by the ever-growing Sahara. An additional concern is the deforestation of the region, exacerbated by the pursuit of firewood. In the Sahel West Africa (Cape Verde, Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad), there is a severe problem with the movement of sand dunes, which has been beyond the ability of these nations to manage.[131]

In the West African sub-Sahel, rangeland has deteriorated severely, as have crop lands and forested areas. The Sudan shows evidence of being under massive ecological deterioration, as every category (sand dunes, rangelands, croplands, forest areas) reflects negatively on the nation's chances of improving its economy based on food production.[132] The Horn of Africa and East Africa share problems of severe deforestation, loss of rainfed

TABLE 16

DESERTIFICATION TRENDS

COUNTRIES	SAND DUNE ENCROACHMENT	DETERIORATION IN RANGELANDS	FOREST DEPLETION	DETERIORATION OF IRRIGATION SYSTEMS	RAINFED AGRICULTURE PROBLEMS	GENERAL ASSESSMENT
Benin	0	1	1	0	1	1
Burkina Faso	0	1	1	1	2	1
Cape Verde	1	1	0	1	2	1
Chad	2	2	1	2	2	2
Djibouti	1	2	1	1	NA	1-2
Ethiopia	1	2	2	1	1	1-2
The Gambia	1	1	2	2	1	1
Guinea	0	0	1	1	2	1
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	1	1	1	1
Kenya	0	2	1	0	1	1
Mali	1	2	2	1	1	1-2
Mauritania	1	2	2	1	1	2
Niger	1	2	1	2	1	1-2
Nigeria	0	1	2	0	1	1
Senegal	1	2	1	1	2	2
Somalia	1	1	1	2	1	1
Sudan	2	1	1	1	0	1
Uganda	0	2	0	0	1	1
Cameroon	0	1	1	0	1	1

Key: 0=stable 1=some increase 2=significant increase

SOURCE: Leonard Berry. *Assessment of Desertification in the Sudano-Sahelian Region, 1978-1984* (NY: United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office, 1984): 49.

crops, and shrinking rangelands.[133]

In Southern Africa, the advance of desertification is marginally evident in the area surrounding the Kalahari Desert, while being highly active in Lesotho. In Lesotho and in the eastern portion of South Africa, the erosion of cultivated land by water has pushed Lesotho into the category of having the worst land degradation problems of any nation, with the possible exception of Nepal.[134] With the ongoing land deterioration within the territories of South Africa, known as "Homelands," the prospect of increasing losses in productive land in Southern Africa is inching closer to the depths of environmental destruction.

Deforestation is another major threat to the ecological stability of African nations. The expanses of tropical forests have diminished at a rate of 1.3 million hectares per year, with 55% occurring in West Africa.[135] Ivory Coast has lost more than 70% of its forest land since the turn of the century.[136] Madagascar, southeast Guinea, southwest Cameroon, Zaire, Kenya and Tanzania also have experienced sharp reduction in forest land.[137]

Aside from the rapid spread of deserts and the commercial exploitation of forestry, deforestation is also created by the requisites for daily life. The fuels in common daily use throughout the continent are mainly firewood and charcoal.[138] The greatest environmental damage is done by the collection of firewood for the daily preparation of foods. Very often, the firewood that is collected are branches broken from trees and shrubs. The consequence of such vegetation loss is the erosion of the soil.[139] As most African families are unable to furnish their homes with electricity due to limitations of cost and availabilities, the gathering of wood (even in urban areas) is a regular part of life for African families.

The death and/or removal of trees and other vegetation is not solely the result of the African people and their attempt to survive, it is also the result of attempts by farmers and agribusinesses to create and/or expand the acreage for production. In the example of the Ivory Coast and the loss of its rainforests, the main reason for the disappearance of the forest has been the sale of its timber to western markets.

The linkage between the degradation of the land and the frequency of drought throughout Africa is suggested by Lloyd Timberlake, he states:

> Computer models suggest that when the earth is stripped of vegetation it becomes more reflective; rainfall decreases. When there is less water in topsoil and in vegetation, there is less evaporation; rainfall decreases. When the wind blows dust off bare land, into the air, clouds do not form; rainfall decreases.[140]

Although Timberlake acknowledges that this link between social activity and environment has yet to be proven, it heightens the alarm that human interaction with the environment in the modern world directly threatens human life, as much as it threatens human environment.

Questions have been raised about the extent that Africa can continue to expand the cultivation of its lands. Of the continent's more than 3 billion hectares, only 5.2% is under cultivation (see Table 17). Only the Australian and South American continent have lower percentages of land under cultivation. Large-scale agricultural production is not viewed as likely in Africa as most of the continent lies between the two tropics (Cancer and Capricorn). This latitudinal location contains soil that is largely deficient in the amount of biological activity necessary for good crop production, particularly large-scale production which often leads to damaged soil. Large-scale food production would necessitate the clearing of large tracts of land for the efficient use of mechanized equipment. This removal of groundcover increases the potential for soil erosion.[141]

P. Buringh, however, disagrees with the notion of Africa's limited capacity as a food producer. Buringh asserts that: "the most significant, cultivable reserves of land are to be found, not in North America and Australia, but in Latin America and Africa."[142] The FAO buttresses Buringh's argument, stating that it estimates that 27% of the continent's land area is potentially cultivable.[143]

Important segments of this potentially cultivable

TABLE 17

TOTAL LAND AREA AND ARABLE LAND BY CONTINENTS

Continents	Total Land Area*	Cultivated Land*	% of Land Area Cultivated	Potential Arable Land	Ratio of Cultivated to Potential Arable Land (%)
Africa	3,010	158	5.2	734	22
Asia	2,740	519	18.9	627	83
Australia and New Zealand	820	32	3.9	153	21
Europe	480	154	32.1	174	88
North America	2,110	239	11.3	465	51
South America	1,750	77	4.4	681	11
USSR	2,240	227	10.6	356	64
Total	13,150	1,406	12.34+	3,190	44

SOURCE: P. Buringh, "Food Production Potential of the World," World Development (May-July, 1977): p. 479.

*Areas are given in millions of hectares
+average

area are still prohibited from cultivation as disease-carrying insects have created significant obstacles. In the Volta River basin, the black fly infects people with onchoceriasis (river blindness).[144] In various areas of Africa, the insect known as the tsetse fly infects livestock with the disease known as trypanossomiasis (sleeping sickness).[145] While the insect also harbors the disease for humans, the impact it has on animals precludes the sale and/or use of livestock in farm activity (e.g.-oxen for ploughing).

Though environmental constraints on crop production are indeed formidable, they are not insurmountable. An integrative planning is vital if food crop production is to flourish in countries with a fragile environmental system. This planning should seek to preserve what exists of fertile land areas from further erosion, decertification and over-intensive land use. This may require a return to indigenous food crops in greater abundance, as opposed to the steady introduction of food crops (e.g.-wheat, corn) that are ill-suited to the climate of many African countries. This approach would be extended to a decline in production of cotton, ground nuts and other cash-crops which place a great demand on the soil. Funds must also be invested towards protecting lands by planting trees and other ground covering to prevent soil erosion and other known and unknown environmental damage. Urban dwellers also do not escape their responsibility to the protection of the ecology. It is important that energy consumption be reduced to lessen the demand placed on non-renewable resources as trees. The development of more energy efficient cooking ovens has gained wider usage throughout the continent but simply needs the funding and training of individuals to introduce such technology to greater numbers of people.

What may be the key to Africa's future is the extent that funding is made available to small farmers to introduce measures into their crop production activities that can arrest the resistance of nature to food production attempts, as is the case for cash-crop production. Given the difficult economic predicament of most African nations and the lowly status afforded small farmers in economic assistance and support, the opportunity to improve Africa's environmental relationship is tied to the very economic well-being of many nations. The decisions which many African nations must face, addressing long-term survival versus immediate economic demands, almost always yield to the pressures of the moment. African countries have not been without their own ingenuity and analysis to cope with the severe problems that they have confronted. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the 1986 Programme of Action for Economic Recovery and

Recovery and Development 1986-1990 are but two examples of how African governments have come together to formulate strategies and analyses to create an effective response to famine, hunger and other related problems (see Chapter IV for further discussion).

Chapter Summary

The foreign and domestic relationships established by present day African nations are an integral part of those factors that have diminished the ability of many African governments to respond effectively to the food needs of their people. Social, political, and economic relations are factors which have an enormous impact on most any form of production. The decline of Africa's ability to respond to its food needs is the gradual result of a series of tumultuous events, from the colonial era to its neocolonial present. If African nations are to truly be effective in responding to their present food crisis, it can only be with the accompaniment of substantive social, economic and political change. The change does not exclude those nations which maintain ongoing political and economic relationships with African countries. If African countries are to be able to confront its famines, then the policies and programs of foreign nations must be made compatible in achieving that goal. The following chapter will examine the structure of foreign assistance at the disposal of the U.S. government, the primary foreign assistance donor in the world.

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CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN AID

The creation and application of foreign aid to achieve specific political and humanitarian objectives have been an important factor in the growth of U.S. global influence in the post World War II period. By forging a coalition of domestic economic interests, humanitarian principles and an amalgam of political and security concerns, foreign aid has expanded the options of U.S. diplomacy beyond trade and the commitment of troops.

During the early debate on whether foreign aid should be an area of U.S. activity, World Bank President, Eugene Black stated that aid: (1) provides a "substantial and immediate" market for U.S. goods and services; (2) it stimulates the creation of overseas markets for U.S. businesses; and (3) orients national economies of recipient nations along a more capitalist path that U.S. companies can prosper.[146] President Kennedy advanced a different rationale for the necessity of foreign aid, stating that it is: "a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around a country which would definitely collapse or pass into the Communist bloc."[147] Thus, it is evident that the foreign policy agenda is shaped by definitions of national interests and these national interests reflect U.S. economic, military and/or political goals and relations.

The term "national interest" is a legitimate concept that all nations must define for themselves, in order to identify and protect their vital political, economic and social priorities. Plano and Greenberg in the American Political Dictionary view the national interest as: "based on the use of power divorced from moral principles and values."[148] The expressed goal is the use of that power to satisfy the "security needs and well-being of the state."[149]

In the U.S., security needs and well-being converge on behalf of U.S. business interests. To the extent that these and other interests are consistent with, or accepted into, the national interest is a consequence of prevailing domestic societal forces. Barnett elaborates:

> ...the struggle of domestic political, economic, and social forces within a nation is the primary determinant of the national interest...foreign policy is more an expression of our society than a programmed response to what other nations do.[150]

The national interest has thus become a euphemism for competing elements in U.S. society which seek the hegemony of their own issue and/or policy concern. Given the competing elements in the construction of a national interest, a policy that is neither unified nor coherent may result. With respect to aid, the creation of a national interest forms the distribution, kind and extent of aid.

The two themes that are prevalent throughout the formulation of foreign aid have been strategic and economic concerns. The strategic theme involves foreign aid in the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. This view addresses all actions on the international stage in the context of the global tensions between the superpowers. The importance of a nation to the U.S. is often based upon several dynamics: political and economic relations with communist nations; military cooperation; trade relations and a nation's geographic location relative to important trade routes, adjacent countries, or military vantage positions. Humanitarian resolve is normally a victim of the above hierarchy.

The constituencies for each of these interests are normally those which can influence the outcome of elections and sectors of the economy, they include: (1) commerce/trade; (2) regional/local economic considerations; (3) defense industry and contracting; (4) ethnic/racial interests. Conflict arises when humanitarian interests are excluded, or held as secondary in importance, to U.S. strategic/economic goals (e.g.-Mozambique/Angola/Ethiopia). Legislative devices such as the Higgenlooper amendment, which was originally devised to punish governments that nationalize U.S. property and businesses, delayed efforts to respond to the Ethiopian famine crisis.[151] Another legislative restriction, the Brooke amendment, prohibited assistance to nations that are in default on U.S. loans.[152] The Government Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that "...the policy concerns raised with regard to the provisions of food aid to Ethiopia directly influenced the time it took to approve the CRS (Catholic Relief Service) [sic] requests."[153]

Much of the food assistance to Mozambique was provided under the condition of payment, despite its precarious economic situation (see Chapter 4). Angola was rewarded with greater contributions by the U.S. to the provocateurs of famine, UNITA, at a time when their intimidation of farmers (via the use of U.S. made Claymore anti-personnel mines) has greatly affected food production across Angola.[154]

The extent that aid can be directed towards causes of hunger and famine may not be supported by U.S. concepts of national economic and security interests. The strongest support that can be expected for development, food and humanitarian aid can come by combining one or more of ongoing strategic and economic imperatives as part of a rationale, which was done in the very formation of the Food for Peace program (see Eugene Black statement).

Foreign aid is divided into four categories: Food Aid; Development Aid; Economic Support Fund; and Military Aid. Each category reflects a unique area of historical circumstances and purposes. Categories of aid such as Food and Development, at their best, serve to lessen the worst manifestations of hunger and famine.

The distribution of food aid is directed from either bilateral or multilateral accounts. Bilateral aid is linked directly from the U.S. to a recipient nation. The benefit of bilateral aid from the donor's perspective is that it alone can set the terms on an agreement with a recipient nation. This is significant in areas where advantages can be won (e.g.-security agreements). From the perspective of the recipient nation, the major benefit can be in having only a single donor to satisfy in negotiations. The directness of the aid relationship can be most significant if the need is urgent.

From the donor's perspective, the benefits of bilateral aid are diminished when an aid agreement falters due to the inability of the recipient nation to comply with the terms of the accord (e.g.-payment). This is a particular concern when the single donor must fully absorb the loss of economic assistance. The collection and direction of funds towards a single nation or project may limit the flexibility of donor nations to involve themselves among a number of potential aid recipients.

For the recipient nation, the shortcomings of single-donor relations arise from the same set of circumstances that produce the more positive aspects of bilateral aid. In the era of global 'superpower' relationships and conflicts, the acceptance of funding and/or commodities from a single source may limit recipient nations from establishing accords with a wider variety of funding and trade sources. As indicated earlier in this chapter, aid was not a passive source of funding. It most definitely had significant political and economic overtones. The ultimate goal of U.S. aid was to create a dependence on U.S. agricultural exports.

Of the bilateral food programs, the most noted is the PL-480, Food For Peace. With the creation of PL 480 in 1954, under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, a new approach towards the expansion of U.S. economic and trade dominance was institutionalized. The introduction of the Act defined its objectives as:

> ...to expand international trade; to develop and expand export markets for U.S. agricultural commodities; to use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition, and to encourage economic development in the developing countries, with particular emphasis on assistance to those countries that are determined to improve their own agricultural production; and to promote in other ways the foreign policy of the U.S.[155]

The goals of PL 480 were to be attained in accordance with the framework provided under its three titles. Title I permits the sale of U.S. agricultural goods in exchange for foreign currencies, which can be used for the following purposes: (1) Less Developed Countries (LDCs) economic development; (2) U.S. agricultural market development; (3) payment of debts owed to the U.S.; (4) purchase of strategic materials; (5) purchase of U.S. military goods; (6) facilitate programs of U.S. government agencies and (7) purchase of goods and services from other countries.[156]

For those able to participate in the Title I program, it was felt that the importation of food commodities would free financial resources for other forms of development projects.[157] Those projects assumed the need to focus on industrialization and other non-food producing efforts. The primary beneficiaries of Title I sales were U.S. farmers who, by virtue of Title I, were able to secure a reliable outlet for their accumulating farm products.[158] The stated beneficiaries, developing countries, accumulated greater debt and dependency on foreign shipments of food.[159]

Title II of PL 480 addressed the need for food on an emergency basis by providing for food commodities as funded by U.S. government grants. Under the original legislation, food commodities were provided directly from government to government. This was changed in 1966 to facilitate the distribution of food through private voluntary organizations (PVOs), in addition to governmental channels. The inclusion of PVOs (e.g.- Catholic Relief Services, CARE) under Title II, was a departure from the original legislation, as PVO distribution was included under Title III. With the creation of the World Food Programme (WFP), Congress permitted access of the U.N. affiliated body to food commodities for export in emergency situations. The essential feature of Title III was that it provided the U.S. government with the flexibility to barter food products for strategic goods and materials not commonly found or produced in the U.S.

The emergence of the U.S. in the post-World War II era as the major global food producer and care-taker of a growing economy, led the U.S. to be the dominant country of the 1950s and beyond. The U.S. economy was so thoroughly dominant that until economic recovery could be fully maintained by Europe, its hungry population was considered by U.S. food producers as "our market."[160] With the approach of the 1950s, European farmers expanded their production capacity and sought to reclaim their domestic markets. What resulted were U.S. farmers creating ever-increasing supplies of food without a market outlet.

The period of the 1950s were also marked by the rise of Wisconsin Senator Joe McCarthy, who was in the vanguard of anti-Communist doctrine, symptomatic of the so-called Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The 1954 PL-480 provision carried a clause stating that sales of food commodities were permitted to "friendly nations," which were defined as: "any country other than the Soviet Union or any nation or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement."[161] As an essential feature of PL 480 was market creation, the prospect of such huge markets being unavailable to U.S. grain was contrary to the needs of middle-American farmers and the U.S. balance of trade.

The economic advantages were not lost on a number of congressional legislators, none moreso than the senator from Minnesota, Hubert Humphrey. In a series of hearings orchestrated throughout 1957, Senator Humphrey laid the foundation for the direction of the PL 480 program and the agendas of future president. The most revealing of perceived advantages in the program came from a statement by the then Senator Humphrey, extolling advantages of the program, absent of its humanitarian importance. Humphrey stated:

> I have heard here this morning that people may become dependent upon us for food. I know that was not supposed to be good news...To me that is good news, because before people will do anything they have to eat. And if you are really looking for a way to get people to lean on you and to be dependent upon you, in terms of their cooperation with you, it seems to me that food dependence would be terrific.[162]

Though Senator Humphrey was later to be reknowned for his more humanitarian instincts, he displayed a very shrewd insight and instinct for security applications of this program that was later to be known as "Food For Peace." The potential of the program as a tool to be used in the development of markets for U.S. farm commodities was not lost upon the other senator from Minnesota, Edward Thye. Thye stated:

> If they [recipient countries] ever develop the taste for powdered milk or for butter...or if they develop a strong habit for wheat, where they are rice consuming, then we will always have a market there...We put these foods at their disposal for a period of six months or a year, after which they are always going to be looking for that type of a product.[163]

In sum, the composite thinking of Black, Kennedy, Humphrey and Thye supported the notion that U.S. foreign policy and specifically, the PL 480 program, can be all things to all people. The aims of the PL 480 program were not conceived to be an abberation from overall U.S. foreign aid and policy, but as an extension of the same.

If an objective of U.S. foreign policy was to maintain and expand its security role in global affairs, then PL 480 can support that objective. If the objective of U.S. foreign policy was to expand and maintain U.S. markets for economic gain, then the PL 480 again offered a set of options. If the objective of U.S. foreign policy was to provide humanitarian support, then PL 480 could provide further outlets for U.S. surplus farm commodities. The PL 480 program is one of those rare programs in which the multitude of interests involved in the formation of both domestic and foreign policy converge.

The expansion of U.S. foreign assistance also coincided with the emergence of newly-independent African and Asian nations. These nations forged a new reality for their former colonial rulers, who were forced to confront the need to design other methods to advance their political and economic agendas. The U.S. was also motivated by the competition with the U.S.S.R. for the ideological soul of these new nations.

The Food For Peace Act of 1966 supported this emphasis by claiming a more humanitarian posture through expansion of the Title II program. Strong support was also advanced to maintain the barter concept as part of Title III. A new Title IV program was also created that would provide opportunities for U.S. farmers to teach food production techniques to farmers of the more malproductive nations. This program feature, however, was never funded. What was perhaps most unique about the "new" emphasis was in Title I.

Previous Title I programs featured clauses which supported recipient nations in the purchase of U.S. food commodities by allowing them to pay for such purchases in their national currencies, rather than in dollars, or some other major medium of foreign exchange. This was vitally important to European nations whose own currencies had declined from their pre-World War II value.[164] By the declined from their pre-World War II value.[164] By the mid-1960s, the number of newly-independent African nations of Africa and Asia began to increase rapidly, possessing currencies whose value was not at all comparable to that of the dollar. This prompted the U.S. to demand comparable foreign currencies in exchange for U.S. goods.[165] Payment for U.S. goods would greatly hinder development and food production efforts that Title I and the remainder of the PL 480 program were supposed to assist.

The 1970's influenced the level of food commodities and the "Food For Peace" program in three important ways. One, the proliferation of adverse weather conditions throughout the world (Africa, USSR) contributed to the rise in world grain prices.[166] Two, due to shortages in Soviet food production, the USSR entered the global market to purchase huge quantities of grain.[167] Three, the closing years of the Vietnam war revealed manipulations of the PL 480 program for political, non-food purposes, resulting in significant changes in the program (will be discussed below).

With the drop of global food production levels during the 1970s, the objective of PL 480 that was focused upon the disposal of surplus food commodities became irrelevant. Commodity levels under the PL 480 program fell from 9.8 million metric tons in 1972 to 3.2 metric tons in 1974 (see Table 18). U.S. funding for the PL 480

TABLE 18

ANNUAL VOLUME OF TOTAL PL 480 SHIPMENTS, FY 1955-1981
(Metric Tons/Metric Ton Grain Equivalent)

Fiscal Year	Grains	Nongrains
1955	3,101,948	316,518
1956	9,207,440	863,128
1957	12,965,169	1,306,159
1958	8,253,239	975,320
1959	10,438,493	1,049,794
1960	13,543,473	781,798
1961	15,458,030	884,040
1962	17,686,602	1,091,605
1963	16,055,762	1,310,815
1964	15,637,926	1,138,072
1965	17,307,701	1,103,331
1966	17,390,714	766,714
1967	12,994,477	962,670
1968	13,530,784	1,048,277
1969	8,911,786	1,084,672
1970	10,088,604	929,589
1971	8,927,958	906,879
1972	8,993,769	911,864
1973	6,637,482	663,526
1974	2,961,470	352,517
1975	4,522,477	304,828
1976	6,215,112	437,488
1977	6,016,913	417,083
1978	5,632,300	462,400
1979	5,851,600	438,014
1980	5,524,025	543,024
1981	4,829,255	801,308

SOURCE: Lawrence Fuell, "The PL 480 (Food for Peace) Program: Titles I/III Terms and Conditions: Planning and Implementation Procedures," April, 1982.

program also fell slightly during the period from 1973 (see Table 19). With the demand for U.S. grain at extremely high levels and the attempts by U.S. farmers to fill those orders, the surplus that was required to fill the various titles of the food aid programs declined dramatically. For the nations of the Sahel region, this convergence of events could not have happened at a more inopportune time, as drought exacerbated an already tenuous situation and led to the death of more than 100,000 people in this sparsely populated region.[168]

In partial response to the lack of available commodities and to the continued politicization of food aid accounts (see below), the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act restricted the use of food aid commodities to countries that were defined as "most seriously affected" by acute hunger conditions, to no more than 30% of food aid.[169] The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 furthered restrictions by limiting food aid commodities to nations, whose GNP was less than $300, to no more than 25% of commodity totals.[170]

Of related importance was the establishment of a minimum level of food commodities (1.3 million metric tons).[171] The World Food Programme and the PVOs were to be granted one million of the above total. The importance of these actions were to: (1) protect food aid programs from political considerations in the distribution of food

TABLE 19

ANNUAL VALUE OF PL 480 SHIPMENTS BY TYPE OF TRANSFER, FY 1955-1981
(Thousands of Dollars)

Year	Title I/III Concessional Sales: Local Currency	Title I/III Concessional Sales: Long-Term Dollar Credit (DC) and Convertible Local Currency (CLCC)	Title II Donations: Gov't-to-Gov't and World Food Program	Title II Donations: Private Voluntary Agencies	Barter for Strategic Materials	Total PL 480
1955	73,000	-------	52,000	135,000	125,000	385,000
1960	824,000	-------	38,000	105,000	149,000	1,116,000
1965	1,142,000	158,000	55,000	183,000	32,000	1,570,000
1966	866,000	181,000	87,000	180,000	32,000	1,346,000
1967	803,000	178,000	110,000	157,000	23,000	1,271,000
1968	723,000	300,000	100,000	150,000	6,000	1,280,000
1969	346,000	427,000	111,000	154,000	1,000	1,039,000
1970	309,000	506,000	113,000	128,000	---------	1,056,000
1971	204,000	539,000	138,000	142,000	---------	1,023,000
1972	143,000	535,000	228,000	152,000	---------	1,058,000
1973	6,000	661,000	159,000	128,000	---------	954,000
1974	----------	575,000	147,000	145,000	---------	867,000
1975	----------	762,000	148,000	191,000	---------	1,101,000
1976	----------	966,000	83,000	143,000	---------	1,292,000
1977	----------	760,000	92,000	250,000	---------	1,102,000
1978	----------	739,000	112,000	223,000	---------	1,074,000
1979	----------	793,000	128,000	265,000	---------	1,186,000
1980	----------	853,000	185,000	217,000	---------	1,255,000
1981	----------	770,000	234,000	275,000	---------	1,279,000
Total	12,292,000	9,828,000	2,398,000	4,748,000	1,732,000	31,447,000

SOURCE: Ibid.

and finances; and (2) set minimum food levels under which the program would allow those PVOs to be able to gauge their organizational capacity, as a means to meet expected food allocations. This would assist in reducing much of the ad hoc organizational efforts to which PVOs must frequently adhere.

Congress' most immediate response to the politicization of food aid occurred as the result of the Nixon administration's manipulation of the food aid process to allow South Vietnam and Cambodia funds for direct military use. The significance of such covert use of funds had broad implications:

> Nearly half of the 152 million in PL 480 Title II food aid during 1974 went to South Vietnam and selected parts of Kampuchea [Cambodia], while only about 1/6 went to all of Africa and Latin America combined. (The U.N.'s list of 32 countries most affected by the global economic crisis includes neither Vietnam nor Kampuchea [Cambodia].[172]

In 1977, the International Development and Food Assistance Act offered less dramatic, but important, changes in the Food For Peace Program. The 1977 legislation established criteria for a new poverty level, as based on the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA annually sets a statistical per capita GNP that it uses to define poverty.[173] What was undoubtedly attractive about the IDA statistical minimum was that it factors inflation rates into its calculations. These attempts to identify poverty levels were extremely important in attempting to direct Title I food aid to countries where poverty is most widespread. As will be discussed below, there are still shortcomings in the approach.

A change was also created under Title III provisions of PL 480 as "Food For Development" was initiated. This new Title III sought to promote food production in Title I recipient nations by promoting the application of a country's Title I food sales to respond to the development needs of small farmers and the rural poor.[174] Under this title, food aid commodities can be limited if disincentives to domestic food production are determined.[175] Eligibility is also established by the ability of recipient nations to identify or create "self-help" actions that serve to increase food production. These "self-help" actions range from improvements in transportation to birth control.[176]

The arrangement of foreign food aid in the context of the PL 480 program masks a process that is intimately woven in the web of political considerations. Of the many important factors involved in the creation of U.S. food aid policy, the three most prominent are: the President, congressional committees charged with oversight and legislative responsibilities (Foreign Affairs and Relations, Agriculture, Appropriations), and the Inter-Agency Staff Committee (ISC) which is comprised of

Executive branch representatives (AID, Department of Agriculture, Commerce, State, Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget).[177]

Removed from the glare of public scrutiny, the ISC is charged with making the policy decisions and approval of programs, which direct the management of the PL 480 program.[178] Most important of their judgements are the decisions which permit nations access to food assistance programs and the quantity and/or cost that the U.S. would be willing to allocate.[179]

Geopolitical concerns rival and frequently dominate humanitarian ethics, as the debate and political response to the African famine makes evident. While AID is charged with the management of food and development operations and analyses, the extent that one could expect AID to play an effective role in reducing famine is handicapped by its interplay with other agencies.

Though the Food For Peace program (PL 480) is the centerpiece of U.S. bilateral food aid, there also exists two lesser known food distribution programs: Section 416 program provision of the Agriculture Act of 1949 and the Commodity Import Program (CIP). Section 416 program serves to assist U.S. farmers in the reduction of surplus dairy (and to a lesser extent, wheat) products to "needy people."[180] The method of payment by the recipient nation includes the barter or exchange of resources considered strategic by the U.S.[181]

As part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Commodity Import Program assists AID in financing the export of what are considered to be essential commodities, including: agricultural, construction and transportation equipment, fertilizers, chemicals, raw materials, semi-finished products and foodstuffs.[182] The financing is provided in the form of loans or grants. Food Aid under CIP is not considered tied to emergency assistance criteria or rates of extreme impoverishment, thus permitting such nations as Israel and Egypt to receive major allocations of food aid commodities.[183] Though the CIP does include commodity exports, it is the capacity of the program to finance the importation of commodities to offset balance of payment problems.[184]

Another bilateral food assistance program which no longer exists but deserves mentioning is the Food Security Wheat Reserve. Although it was created in 1980, the history of the reserve has its origins in the Sahel famine of the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. The Act was created during the African famine to establish the authorization of four million metric tons of U.S. government owned wheat which would be held in storage and disbursed for nations in need of emergency, humanitarian assistance of food.[185]

The concept and implementation of a wheat reserve faced controversy for a variety of reasons. One, those informed of the dietary habits of most African and Asian people argue that wheat was not a normal part of the dietary habits of the average person in these food recipient nations.[186] Rice, millet, maize (among other foods) are more widely consumed grains that people of these endangered nations are accustomed.

The distribution of wheat not only posed problems for people unaccustomed to such a grain but also posed the additional problem of how to educate people on its preparation.[187] Given the urgency of emergency famine situations and the all too frequent shortage of labor involved in these efforts, the choice of wheat wastes valuable labor time and effort.

There was also resistance from U.S. wheat producers who feared that the creation of such a reserve would result in its being reintroduced onto the grain markets and thereby, depress the price of wheat. An additional fear was that such reserves would be established for other popular, U.S. grown farm commodities and would again add to the threat of potential price deflation.

The above arguments notwithstanding, the creation of a wheat reserve was as much the result of opportunism as it was the result of extended debate on the merits of the legislation. In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter imposed an embargo on U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union as a response to the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

With contracts to the USSR now cancelled, the fear existed that U.S. farmers would no longer have a mechanism to sell the tons of wheat and other grains that negotiations with the Soviets had created. With the spectre of falling grain prices, the marriage of convenience between the humanitarian need for some kind of a food reserve and the economic need to keep the surplus grain from finding its way back onto the market, led to the passage of the Food Security Wheat Act, in December of 1980. For reasons which will be explored in the next chapter, the Food Security Wheat Reserve was denied reauthorization in September, 1986.

The "Presidential Reserve," as passed in March, 1985, by Congress as part of the Food Assistance for Africa Agricultural Act (FAAA), was to establish famine relief and inland transportation support. Two conditions were to be met before the reserve could be released: (1) AID must introduce a plan of action to Congress and indicate how reserve funds would be utilized before relief; and (2) the President must give approval and verify that such funds are imperative for famine relief funds.[188]

The need for a reserve that could be used in famine emergencies is a response to the difficulties in getting grains moved from U.S. silos, to export harbors, across an ocean, to the recipient country and, ultimately, to the areas (mainly in rural regions) where famine has often had its greatest impact. Most important is the provision for funding to be used for transport. The historic problem for food assistance is the lack of commitment to, and the shortage of, vehicles to transport food from the docks to the areas of need.[189]

In some respects, the passage of the Africa emergency food bill represented the most hollow of political victories. It had only come after the worst period of the famine had laid waste to Africa's people and lands. The existence of the Presidential reserve was only guaranteed through September 30, 1985, reducing the U.S. capacity to effectively respond to the famine crisis.

Multilateral aid programs have also served a functional capacity in the assignment of food commodities, funding and the development of a nation's food producing potential. The structure of multilateral assistance would appear to give certain advantages to both donor and recipients. Under such arrangements, donor countries are able to 'share' any financial risks involved in assistance activity, as well as, have the ability to commit smaller sums of money while freezing the uncommitted funds for investment programs across a wider spectrum.

The multilateral approach advances the view that with a wider number of nations as donors, there would be a lesser likelihood of recipients having to yield to a single donor's demands. In theory, one would suppose that there would also be larger sums of money available for food activities, as a greater number of nations would have pooled their resources. After years of experimentation and interaction, the supposed advantages of a multilateral approach for recipient nations have not kept pace with its reality; the contrary can be said for donor nations.

The largest source of emergency food aid is the U.S., under P.L. 480. The World Food Programme, a multilateral agency, does not match the size of PL 480. The capacity of multilateral organizations to influence a single nation has been limited in a variety of forums where voting is weighed in accordance to financial contributions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund), or where the defacto distribution of power is with the nation that has the largest financial investment (e.g.-International Fund for Agricultural Development).[190] The most dominant force at these gatherings has been the U.S. For the recipient, the selection of multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, aid is more a matter of the availability of commodities than of a selection based upon policy considerations.

One multilateral respondent to the immediate and long-term challenge of hunger and famine is the World Food Programme (WFP). Established in 1962 with the support of the United Nations, FAO and the U.S., the primary focus of the WFP is to provide food for social and economic development. There are four primary areas on which WFP seeks to address:

1. Human Resource Development (includes direct food assistance);
2. Infrastructure Development (food is substituted as wages in development projects);
3. Production Development (use of commodities in such a manner as to support development activities, e.g., feed grain for livestock); and
4. Resettlement Programs (use of food aid to assist communities that are involved in crop production, whose plantings had not reached maturity).[191]

There were fears expressed by many of the donor and the recipient nations that WFP distributions of food would lead to reductions in bilateral food assistance. Donors argued that WFP would lessen the influence of their bilateral accounts (via conditionalities) upon recipient nations.[192] If the need was not massive, a recipient nation would simply go to the WFP (or so it was reasoned) and receive the needed assistance. With the U.S. being the largest producer of food commodities during the inception of the WFP, such concerns were not of sufficient weight to block the maintenance and expansion of the program.

In its early years, it was the U.S. which provided the necessary levels of food commodities to build the reserve capacity of the WFP (about half of all contributions).[193] Much of what was provided for WFP comes from the Title II of PL 480. From the perspective of the U.S., the WFP provided another outlay for its food commodity producers by changing the food consumption patterns of the world's poor to one that would be more reliant upon western producers to satisfy their needs and preferences.

i. Food Aid As Weapon

The structure of U.S. food aid has a long history of being merely an accomplice to the motives of U.S. economic and political dictates. U.S. food aid serves major domestic U.S. food producers and security interests much more than what is expressed as its stated intentions of serving the poor of foreign lands. Development assistance is another important feature of U.S. foreign aid, which AID defines as an attempt to: "promote economic growth and equitable distribution of its benefits."[194] This AID-supplied definition limits the measurement of development to the criteria of economic growth. As a criteria, growth is woefully inadequate to weigh the perceived distribution, integration and participation of the various sectors into a nation's economy. Economic growth has been achieved in nations as diverse as Brazil and Kenya, while simultaneously offering evidence of a steep decline in health, education and housing benefits to their people.[195] The implied thrust of AID's definition of development is that growth would be of primary concern. AID avoids the questions of: (1) how growth is created; (2) what sectors of the economy are to be designated to promote growth; and (3) who are the beneficiaries of growth?

The last portion of AID's definition of development suggested that any benefits accumulated from such an approach would then be distributed "equitably" across society. Development assistance repeats the longstanding theme of "trickle-down" economic theory, which has proven its ineffectiveness since the U.S. depression of the 1930s.

It also reveals the bias of development thinking in the U.S. which claims to seek resolution of poverty, hunger and famine crises by avoiding the people most in need of being served. The bias towards economic growth supports those projects and plans which lend themselves to statistical indices which may have little relevance to the poor. Such projects and plans are most apparent in the emphasis placed on macro-economic planning and projects which address the chronic nature of poverty and the collective rises of famine in an obtuse manner.

The macro-project approach further estranges the poor from participation, and ultimately, the benefits of development assistance. The ownership of land and other inputs are important requisites for becoming a beneficiary of food production assistance.[196] In Africa, as elsewhere throughout the world, land ownership is a powerful lure to attract financial investments.[197]

The third implication of the AID's definition of development is the absence of foreign aid considerations to nations whose indicators of poverty would make them the primary recipients of aid but whose economic and/or political leanings are not favored by the U.S. Of particular concern is the priority given to nations that are more closely aligned to U.S. foreign policy interests, than for those that assume a more non-aligned posture.[198] As will be discussed below, it appears that humanitarian imperatives are not as highly considered in U.S. aid deliberations as advantages in U.S. interests.

In 1973 and again in 1975, this concern prompted Congress to impose language in the Foreign Assistance Acts to limit AID's release of food development funding of nations, based upon security relevance to the U.S., rather than considerations of poverty and emergency needs.[199] This legislation came to be known as the "Four Pillars" approach to U.S. bilateral development assistance.

The goals of the "Four Pillars" as found under the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act were:

(a) alleviation of the worst physical manifestations of poverty among the world's poor majority;
(b) promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve selfsustaining economic growth with an equitable distribution of benefits;
(c) encouragement of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced; and
(d) integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international system.[200]

While the ultimate stated aim is to reduce poverty, the bias inherent in accomplishing this task is a growth first, distribution second, approach. The ingredient most essential for growth is implied as the "free market."

There is evidence to suggest that from the standpoint of AID, the most effective means to reduce poverty, promote economic growth, and encourage the development of a "free market" system is to further integrate/encourage countries into the global, capitalist-dominated, international economic system. It is questionable that the same system that has so ably assisted and benefitted from the existing economic and political inequalities would be the vehicle for deliverance of underdeveloped nations.

The effectiveness of the New Directions approach must also be viewed as questionable. Congress exempted the Economic Security Fund (ESF) and multilateral development banks from New Directions legislation.[201] As the former is the fastest growing account in U.S. bilateral aid and the latter includes substantial U.S. allocations to the World Bank, these exclusions are of major importance to development and political decisions and activities. Further attempts were sought to install a more 'poverty focus' on the allocation of aid.

In 1981, Congress passed the Hunger and Global Security bill which contained provisions to require AID to increase international development bank allocations that would benefit those in poverty.[202] In 1982, Congress also passed the "Targeted Development Aid" amendment to instruct AID to provide at least 40% of the goods and services it provides in development projects to directly benefit people in poverty.[203]

Despite these attempts, there is still doubt as to the effectiveness of these measures. Although New Directions and other subsequent legislation were an improvement over the structure of prior assistance programs, major flaws still exist. While the expressed intent was to insure a 'poverty focus' in assistance programs, development dollars followed military aid to many of the Least Needy Nations (LNNs).

The most prominent of the LNNS are Israel and Egypt. Though the listing for the ten largest recipients of U.S. bilateral aid have changed, Israel and Egypt have remained as the top aid recipients (see Table 20). Israel receives the largest share of its aid in military assistance, while Egypt receives the bulk of its aid from development accounts. Turkey and Pakistan are also two nations whose presence is featured regularly on the list of major aid recipients. If GNPs were to be taken into consideration, only Pakistan would qualify for aid under a poverty focus.

According to the World Bank, the per capita GNP of the remaining three nations range from $5320 (Israel) to $670 (Egypt), Turkey's GNP is a relatively comfortable $1360.[204] The imbalance of aid distribution and the bias of U.S. aid is evident as: (1) the total amount of bilateral aid to Africa, minus Egypt, is exceeded by the amount of aid given to Israel; and (2) Sudan is the only African nation, other than Egypt which qualifies regularly as a recipient of U.S. foreign aid (see Table 12).

Though a stated purpose of U.S. aid is to alleviate the worst vestiges of poverty, the means by which this is to be achieved do not correspond frequently with the desired goal. The evidence suggests that it is much more advantageous to to be considered vital to U.S. security needs than it is to be considered in need of either humanitarian or development support.

ii. <u>U.S. Development Assistance</u>

TABLE 20

TOP TEN RECIPIENTS OF U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID-ACTUALS
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Country	Year	Rank	Total Economic and Military Assistance	Security	Development	PL 480
Egypt	1980	1	1,184,228	865,845	--	318,383.0
	1981	2	1,683,741	1,379,792	--	303,949.0
	1982	2	1,980,300	1,673,400	--	286,900.0
	1983	2	2,343,700	2,076,900	--	418,000.0
	1984	2	2,479,883	2,251,675	--	238,208.0
Israel	1980	2	1,786,000	1,785,000	--	1,000.0
	1981	1	2,164,000	2,164,000	--	---
	1982	1	2,206,000	2,206,000	--	---
	1983	1	2,485,000	2,485,000	--	---
	1984	1	2,610,000	2,610,000	--	---
	1985	1	3,350,000	2,350,000	--	---
Turkey	1980	3	406,329	406,239	--	90.0
	1981	3	453,815	705,540	--	45.0
	1982	3	704,100	703,000	--	.1
	1983	3	688,800	687,800	--	
	1984	3	857,777	856,777	--	---
	1985	3	879,490	878,590	--	---

TABLE 20--Continued

Country	Year	Rank	Total Economic and Security Assistance	Security	Development	PL480
Pakistan	1982	8	203,300	100,600	--	100,000
	1983	4	543,100	468,800	--	78,400
	1984	4	579,133	525,783	--	50,000
	1985	4	538,013	525,970	50,000	---
Bangladesh	1980	6	175,563	116	80,280	95,000
	1982	8	172,600	200	74,400	98,000
Indonesia	1980	5	229,857	33,090	82,721	114,046
	1981	7	167,209	32,240	68,812	66,157
India	1980	4	232,141	273	103,200	128,668
	1981	4	104,499	4	---	170,558
	1982	7	221,900	.1	98,500	123,300
	1983	9	209,000	.1	89,000	120,500
	1984	10	202,754	126	87,500	40,000
S. Korea	1980	7	162,899	130,560	---	30,000
	1981	5	191,699	162,737	---	27,000
	1984	9	231,786	231,786	---	---
	1985	10	231,943	231,943	---	---
Phillipines	1980	8	160,181	95,539	39,679	20,024
	1981	6	173,134	75,591	38,523	24,042
Portugual	1980	10	100,864	74,864	---	29,000

TABLE 20--Continued

Country	Year	Rank	Total Economic and Security Assistance	Security	Development	PL480
Spain	1981	10	133,150	133,150	---	---
	1982	5	149,000	149,000	---	---
	1983	5	414,500	414,500	---	---
	1984	6	414,988	414,988	---	---
El Salvador	1981	9	139,464	80,395	32,792	20,024
	1982	5	268,100	197,000	36,200	34,900
	1983	6	326,000	221,300	58,800	7,700
	1984	7	408,831	316,784	41,061	2,086
	1985	5	561,076	421,250	87,755	3,071
Costa Rica	1983	8	218,000	161,600	27,100	27,700
Honduras	1985	8	231,943	214,904	44,333	18,351
Sudan	1980	9	121,980	65,409	30,097	26,474
	1981	8	141,704	82,280	24,487	34,937
	1982	6	252,100	201,200	24,000	26,900
	1983	10	206,000	126,500	28,500	28,500
	1984	8	237,306	166,459	20,781	50,000
	1985	9	253,220	160,430	28,000	64,778

TABLE 20--Continued

Country	Year	Rank	TOTAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE	SECURITY	DEVELOPMENT	PL480
Greece	1982	4	281,300	281,300	---	---
	1983	7	281,300	281,300	---	---
	1984	5	501,406	501,406	---	---
	1985	6	501,366	501,366	---	---

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, Main Volume (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985).

NR (Not Ranked)

U.S. development assistance is diverted into bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. U.S. bilateral development is administered by AID. The accounts which have the greatest pertinence to African development are: (1) African Development Foundation; (2) Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition; and (3) Sahel Development Fund. The African Development Foundation (ADF) provides grants to locally-initiated, micro-enterprise programs. These programs may range from farmer cooperatives to adult literacy.[205] Though ADF is modestly funded, it is effective in its approach of engaging in a working partnership with those who are the intended beneficiaries of aid.

The Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition account forms the more traditional outlet of rural sector assistance for developing nations. Commodities produced under this account tend to span the breadth of agriculture, with food production being only a segment of the agricultural activity promoted.

This portion of the Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition program is known as "Functional Assistance Accounts," which includes: (1) Population Planning; (2) Health; (3) Education and Human Resource Development and (4) Energy, PVOs and 'Selected Development Activities.'[206] The Sahel Development Program is AID's response to the extended hunger and famine conditions in the Sahel region of Africa during the 1970's. The goals of the program are stated as seeking to: (1) reduce the difficulties to the economies of the Sahel brought about by the famine; (2) achieve food production self-sufficiency in the region; and (3) the stabilization of the Sahel's natural environment.[207]

These above goals are supported by U.S. cooperation with the two primary development structures in the Sahel region. The Permanent Interstate Committe for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) is one such agency, which includes: Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal and Burkina Faso.[208] The other major organization in the Sahel is the Club des Amis du Sahel (Club), which is supported by twenty Sahelian nations and the U.S.[209] U.S. geopolitical interests are in the forefront of seemingly innocuous aid distributions. According to AID, among the many reasons for the U.S. role in the region is to "...preclude Libyan expansionism..."[210] With the Sahel region bordering along Libya's southern flank and the desperately weakened people and economies of the region unable to find relief, the fear of Libya's potential to exploit the situation to its advantage magnified.

iii. Multilateral Assistance

The largest area of U.S. development assistance is to be found in its multilateral aid programs. Funds are provided to international organizations for the purpose of supporting development projects. The major benefactor of U.S. multilateral assistance is the World Bank, for the stated purpose of providing both intermediate and long-term development loans. The origins of the World Bank date to the post-World War II, Bretton Woods agreement, which provided funds for war-ravaged Europe to rebuild its infrastructure and industries.[211] The U.S. was the major supplier of capital, as its economy was easily the most dominant of the post-war era.[212]

A consequence of the post-war period was the emergence of national liberation movements in the nations colonized by Europe. The perceived need by the rulers of these new nations for finance capital lead to the creation of the 'soft' (low-interest) loans to be found in the International Development Association (IDA). The creation of IDA was actually an alternative idea that developed when the U.S. and other western nations resisted the notion of having a U.N. sponsored agency administer loans, thus diluting potential U.S. leverage in any loan agreement.[213]

The position of the U.S. as the major funding source of the World Bank further translates into dominant voting strength in the operations and policies of the Bank. The formula used to calculate the share of voting strength for donor nations gives the U.S. a full 27% of the votes in IDA.[214] These votes may also allow the U.S. the capacity to exercise political leverage to influence World Bank and IDA policies by: (1) being able to admit or block nations from participating in World Bank/IDA affairs; (2) supporting or preventing aid to nations which correspond to U.S. national interests; (3) identifying the conditions for membership; and (4) setting the priorities and agenda of the Bank institutions.

The Bank's priorities have assumed some of the same characteristics of U.S. foreign aid, including: (1) macro-development emphasis; (2) promotion of export-oriented agriculture at the expense of domestic food production; (3) lack of substantive funding support for the inclusion of women in the development process; and (4) overall lack of participation offered to those in poverty to participate in the development process. The major recipients of IDA funding are mainly nations that are generally supportive of U.S. goals and objectives internationally (Table 21).

Under A.W. Clausen's tenure as World Bank president, the Bank began to retreat from its more poverty-focused leanings of his predecessor, Robert McNamara. Under McNamara, loans moved from the bias displayed in favor of the urban sectors to infra-structure development. Clausen called for a greater emphasis on 'growth' sectors and activities. Sheldon

TABLE 21

IDA'S TEN LARGEST BORROWERS, 1961-1981

COUNTRY	GNP/CAPITA	1961-81	AS % OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
INDIA	240	9,566.0	21.6
BANGLADESH	130	1,788.2	13.1
PAKISTAN	300	1,446.9	1.8
EGYPT	580	981.2	.9
INDONESIA	430	931.8	.3
TANZANIA	280	631.5	3.1
SUDAN	210	595.5	3.6
SRI LANKA	270	536.6	1.5
KENYA	420	458.3	1.5
ETHIOPIA	420	443.1	7.9

SOURCE: World Bank, IDA In Retrospect (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 11.

Annis interpreted this new emphasis as steering towards: (1) greater emphasis on free market economies; (2) privatization of public sector functions; and (3) promotion of 'efficient' policies that would entice investments by commercial banks and developing countries.[215]

The sum of Clausen's approach is one of traditional capitalism in economies that are vulnerable to more mature capitalist institutions. If the object is for developing nations to be more capitalist, then they must have more control of their own national markets if the foundations of capitalism are to take root. The object of Clausen's remarks were clearly to open developing economies to further economic penetration from the more developed countries.

The African Development Bank (ADB) is one of the many regional development banks that emerged during the 1960s as a response to the perceived inadequacies of the World Bank lending structure.[216] Other parallel structures included the Asian Development Bank (ADB); and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The stated objectives of the ADB are to: "increase resources, offer greater flexibility in lending policies, and provide more local control in the determination of policies and the use of finances."[217] Though the regional banks and IDA are different in their focus, there is little difference in their intent.

The intent of the World Bank does, however, provide a separate course of direction. Cheryl Payer identifies one such difference in the Bank's definition of who would be recipients of Bank funding and project support:

> In its projects the Bank has found it easiest to devise a way to assist the poor with some tangible assets, however meager (a small farm, a cottage industry, or a small-scale commercial operation in the urban centers.[218]

The ultimate goal of the Bank in its rural programs is evident by its statement of intent for rural development: "...the modernization and monetization of rural society, and with its transition and traditional isolation to integration with the national economy."[219] Rural development, as designed by the Bank, is still the perpetuation of the economic dominance of the developed nations at the expense of the poor and underdeveloped nations.

Another response to emerge from a multilateral framework is IFAD. With origins in the 1974 World Food Conference, IFAD possesses a unique approach towards alleviating hunger. From its view, the development focus is directed towards the following themes: (1) increasing food production; (2) improving nutritional standards; and (3) alleviating poverty in rural areas.[220] The IFAD approach addresses two vital factors in the impoverishment of people: (1) landlessness; and (2) credit access to the poor.

The IFAD perspective accommodates the belief that people who are poor are not without productive capabilities for their own development. This approach is based on two important assumptions: (1) growth can neither be maximized nor sustained without the utilization of the productive potential of the mass of small producers, and without guaranteeing them a minimum share of output; and (2) output is a function of five factors of production, namely: land, labor, capital, entrepreneurship and knowledge, and the access to them.[221]

These assumptions and approaches give IFAD the appearance of engaging socialist methodology to achieve a capitalist production environment. Whatever the root of IFAD's approach and the base of its assumptions, it is clearly a departure from the macro-enterprise, high-technology bias of the World Bank and other development institutions.

The membership of IFAD is divided into three categories. Category I is comprised of economically developed countries (Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation); Category II countries are those oil-exporting nations (mainly those of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and Category III countries, which are mainly those nations that are seeking to lift themselves from their poor economic condition.

The first two categories are the donors, the remaining category consists of recipients. Those in Category III are of the very poorest of the food deficit nations (identified by per capita GNP). The division of nations into these three categories also represents the structure for voting and decision-making within the organization, thus insuring that both recipients and donors have a representative voice in the establishment of policy. It is also significant that OPEC nations are participants, expanding the list of traditional donor countries, with what is hopefully a fonder appreciation of the problems inherent in development programs from the view of a recipient.

By the end of 1984, IFAD contained 20 members in Category I; 12 in Category II; and 107 in Category III.[222] These combined three categories of official giving produced a total of 160 projects (57 in Africa) by the end of 1984.[223] Most of the loans are provided at rates of 1%, 4% and 8% per year, over a period from 15 to 50 years.[224] The funding sources of IFAD originated from the first two categories, in which the Category I nations were expected to provide 58% of funding, with Category II nations providing 42%. This formula served to initiate intense debate as the U.S. argued for changes in the funding formula to more closely approximate an even division of financial commitment during the 1985 replenishment (funding contributions). IFAD's 1981-1984 budget was $1.1 billion (see Table 22). African nations have received 28% of the loans and grants offered for projects, with Asia receiving the largest share at 41% (see Table 22). These projects are expected to yield more than 20 million tons of grain annually equalling one-fourth of 1981 cereal deficits of all underdeveloped nations.[225]

Landless women have also been active loan recipients, receiving 52% of all available loans.[226] The effort by IFAD to incorporate the rural poor at the center of their project activity demands a much greater involvement by the local populations themselves. In many instances, new social institutions have to be created in order to sustain project activity. These institutions may not have previously existed in certain areas, due to the distrust of land-owners, disruption brought about by the creation and perpetuation of colonial rule and also by the pressures created by nature (drought, desertification).

By whatever means social institutions have eroded, creating a void in social relations and activity, it became imperative that the local recipient groups be formed to support the IFAD approach. IFAD underscores the importance of people by stating:

> ...experience had proved that the response of the poor tends to be greater when opportunities to

TABLE 22

LOANS AND GRANTS PROVIDED BY IFAD, 1978-84

(Special Drawing Rights Million)

Region	Number	Amount	Percentage
Africa	57	466.4	(28)
Asia	44	687.3	(41)
Latin America & the Caribbean	31	245.1	(14)
Near East & North Africa	28	286.6	(17)
Total Loans	160	1,685.4	
Total Grants		79.6	
Grand Total		1,765.0	

SOURCE: International Fund for Agricultural Development, Annual Report-1984 (Rome: IFAD): p. 8.

> participate in decision-making are enlarged, particularly in respect to decisions concerning what is produced, how much should be sold, when it should be sold, and at what price.[227]

Though the approach may be different, the aim of the program does not extend to the more fundamental, systemic problems of the historically underdeveloped nations. It is instructive to note how the goal(s) of IFAD in Latin America and the Caribbean are understood:

> IFAD's interventions in the region have focused on the backward areas in aneffort to integrate the indigenous population and small farmers into the national economy and to raise their productivity and income.[228]

The U.S. interests in IFAD are almost paradoxical. At the time that it is encouraging the granting of loans to the landless and the poor for farm production in developing countries, it has done little for small farm owners within the U.S. As the plight of African-American farmers (synonymous with small farm production) has always met with insensitivity from local and state banking authorities, the pursuit of policies designed to organize landless peasants, provide land, farm implements and low interest rates would never be attempted in the U.S., due to fears of being cast as either Marxist, idealist, or an idealistic Marxist.

For conservatives who stress self-help, IFAD poses an interesting dilemma as it still requires lending from external sources, but the amount of money usually needed by poor farmers to produce is almost insignificant (as little as $30), while demonstrating effective results.[229] IFAD's simple dictum that "...one cannot bypass people in order to reach people..." may help to erode the entrenched, institutional support for macro-development projects and encourage the investment into micro-development activities.[230] A great deal of apprehension has been frequently expressed on the subject of whether food aid creates damaging effects on the food production capabilities of developing nations.

Theodore Schultz was one of the earliest to publish what he considered to be the link between the importation of large quantities of food and the fall of domestic food prices for the farmer in the importing country.[231] Edward Schuh identified four areas where food imports may impact upon the food production capacity of an importing nation: agricultural prices, farm and food policies, nutritional levels and population growth.[232]

Based on the above information, the potential for declines in food prices would depend on: (1) the significance of food aid relative to domestic suppliers; (2) whether food aid assumes preeminence in the domestic market over commercial imports; (3) the manner that food aid is introduced to the local economy; and (4) the institutional arrangements which prevail. In short, if food aid is introduced over a short span of time and does not regularly add to total food supplies, then the impact is minimal; if food aid is applied over an expanded period of time the impact of food aid is magnified, thus keeping food prices low for domestic producers.

The impact of food aid is also felt in the policy making arenas as such aid delays the government from making decisions in the vital area of land reform, an essential for creating a reversal in the downward trend in rural development. As the poorest of the poor are those without land, or access to it, land reform is a concern that governments must face with the utmost urgency.

The connection that is thought to exist between food aid and population was initially drawn to underline fears that if poor people are properly fed, they would have even more reasons to not show restraint in the growth of their families and the subsequent growth of a nation. This view holds that people are a hindrance to a society and are, therefore, nonproductive.

There also is the very important debate on whether food aid will lead to dependency and whether such a dependency is negative. Given the comparative advantage of the food producers of developed nations to produce food at a cost that is lower than what farmers of under-developed nations are able to produce, the advance of such an argument limits the potential of importing nations to be self-sufficient producers.

The perspective that the savings earned from receiving cheap food imports can then sustain development projects in other sectors ignores the cost of food aid and the ever larger share of food commodities. With the increase in transport costs since the 1960s and the general rise in farm prices, food aid becomes threatening to nations that are in the midst of a debt crisis and which must face what the prospect of reprisal would be if debt repayments were to unilaterally cease (e.g.-the elimination of food exports from the U.S.).

Whether the major concern is the potential disincentives of food imports, or the potential for a nation to be exposed to a dependency relationship, at the root of such anxiety are the governmental policies that support cheap food for urban dwellers, and low returns for the farmers.

iv. Security Assistance

The largest share of the U.S. foreign aid budget rests in the category identified as Security Assistance. The intent of funding under this category is to distribute funding and material support for those nations and regions of the world which fit into the confines of U.S. political and security interests.

The primary emphasis has been to countries that are part of a U.S. definition of national interests. Security Assistance is arranged into two classifications: (1) Economic Support Fund; and (2) Military Aid. The

Economic Support Fund (ESF) was created for the express purpose of giving Congress and the President a budget account which can be used for foreign policy and security objectives. AID identified the broad applications of ESF as the following:

> Under special economic, political, or security conditions the national interests of the U.S. may require economic support for countries which can not be justified solely under a Development Assistance rationale.[233]

Aid was to be distributed via ESF to nations that were perceived as 'friendly' or vital to the national interest. Loans or grants for such purposes include: infrastructural development, balance-of-payment supports and non-military development support. Many other development programs prioritize the distribution of assistance to countries whose economies are maladjusted or which are in need of emergency assistance.

ESF purports to reward those nations whose foreign policies, geographic location and/or natural resources are considered to be of vital national interest. The political reality of ESF is a part of and not simply apart from U.S. military interests. With the great number of U.S. diplomatic and military agreements, ESF funds become an important part in concluding bilateral arrangements.

ESF also has become indispensible in the forwarding of U.S. military goods to U.S. allies. The listing of major ESF recipients is strikingly similar in appearance to the list of major recipients of military aid (see Table 23). In Congressional testimony during 1985, a State Department representative stated that the payment for U.S. arms deliveries to many underdeveloped countries is largely financed by ESF funds.[234]

The examples used by AID that cite the objectives of ESF are also revealing of the intent of the ESF program:

> ...to support our continuing efforts to promote peace in the Middle East by helping to maintain the economic stability of Israel and Egypt, by financing reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, selected development activities in Jordan and in the West Bank and Gaza, and in promotion of regional cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors; ...to provide balance of payment supports to important U.S. allies, such as Turkey and Pakistan, which are experiencing serious economic difficulties; ...to provide economic assistance to countries heavily burdened by the expense of regional defense or countries with which the United States has security asistance relationships; ...to provide assistance in meeting the basic human needs of the poor and averting the threat of social unrest and political instability in countries of special security interest.[235]

The location and intent of the examples chosen by AID closely corresponds to the basic question concerning this type of foreign aid: should it exist? With security needs having primary consideration in the U.S. foreign aid budget and the allocation of development dollars to nations of security importance to the U.S., the call for the support of New Directions contradicts overall U.S. foreign aid strategy.

With Security Assistance consuming greater amounts

TABLE 23

TOP TEN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND RECIPIENTS, 1980-1985
(Millions of Dollars)

Country	1980	Rank	1981	Rank	1982	Rank	1983	Rank	1984	Rank	1985	Rank
Israel	785	(2)	764	(2)	806	(1)	785	(1)	910	(1)	1,950	(1)
Egypt	865	(1)	829	(1)	771	(2)	750	(2)	853	(2)	1,065	(2)
Turkey	198	(3)	200	(3)	300	(3)	285	(3)	139	(4)	175	(5)
Pakistan	---	---	---	---	100	(5)	200	(4)	225	(3)	200	(4)
Costa Rica	---	---	---	---	115	(4)	157	(5)	130	(5)	160	(6)
El Salvador	---	---	45	(5)	---	---	140	(6)	120	(6)	285	(3)
Sudan	40	(6)	50	(7)	100	(6)	82	(7)	120	(7)	114	(8)
Phillipines	20	(9)	30	(9)	50	(9)	---	---	50	(10)	---	---
Jamaica	---	---	41	(6)	91	(7)	59	(8)	55	(9)	---	---
Portugual	40	(5)	25	(10)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Honduras	---	---	---	---	---	---	56	(10)	---	---	148	(7)
Jordan	69	(4)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	100	(9)
Zimbabwe	23	(8)	---	---	75	(8)	60	(9)	---	---	---	---
Liberia	---	---	32	(8)	35	(10)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Zambia	24	(7)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Kenya	15	(10)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Nicaragua	---	---	57	(4)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
C. Am. Reg'l (RIOCAP)*	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	98	(10)
Caribbean Reg'l+	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	78	(8)	----	----
Dominican Rep.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	95	(11)
ESP Total	2,051		2,232		2,770		2,971		3,146		5,247	

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Main Volume Fiscal Years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987).

*includes $46.9 million & $8 million for Grenada
+includes funds for: Belize ($10 million); El Salvador ($90 million); Honduras ($72.5 million); Panama ($30 million)

of the total foreign aid budget (see Table 24), hunger and development needs of the poor are increasingly irrelevant to the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The importance of ESF became fully apparent during the Nixon administration. When former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger developed the scheme to provide South Vietnam and with PL 480 funds to support military operations, Congress responded by placing new restrictions in the eligibility and use of programs funds and commodities.[236] Though this was indeed a reversal for the State Department, the Nixon administration still sought to provide U.S. allies with funding for a variety of programs and purposes without the restrictive reins of Congress.

A feature of ESF legislation that supports these aims lies in the Special Requirement Fund. As a part of ESF, the Special Requirement Fund enables the president to respond quickly to unforeseen events that may impact upon the "stability of areas strategically important to the United States."[237] The danger for foreign food assistance accounts is that they must compete for foreign food aid funding with yet another program that does not service the needs of the poor as its intended goal.

With the Congress being pressured to meet the targets of the new Balanced Budget Act, all appropriations are under tighter scrutiny to comply with the mandate. Congressman David Obey, Chairman of the House of

TABLE 24

U.S. FOREIGN AID BY PROGRAM
(Billions of Dollars)

Program	1981	%	1983	%	1985	%
Development	3.503	35	4.201	31	4.775	30
Food	1.229	12	1.028	7	1.964	11
Military	3.184	31	5.535	40	5.909	36
ESF	2.104	21	2.962	22	3.826	23
Security	5.288	52	8.497	62	9.735	59
Development/ Food	4.732	47	5.229	38	6.739	41

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Main Volume, Fiscal Years 1983, 1985, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983, 1985, 1987).

Representatives' Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, stated the political problem of too weighted an emphasis on foreign aid:

> The country will not tolerate increasing foreign aid by paying for it by gutting cancer research, gutting educational opportunities, squeezing highways and squeezing the investment portion of the budget here at home.[238]

The conflict within foreign aid appropriations is deciding which programs within its appropriated amounts to reduce: Food, Development, ESF or Military.

v. MAP, IMET, FMS

The other half of the Security Assistance programming is to be found in the three programs which constitute U.S. military aid: (1) Military Assistance Program (MAP); (2) International Military Education and Training (IMET); and (3) Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Grants for the purchase of arms, support equipment and related services are provided under MAP. Military training and education have now become even more popular as there is a concern about the capacity of recipient nations to be able to properly operate the equipment they have purchased.

Foreign Military Sales provides credit arrangements for the purchase of military arms and related equipment. This has been the most commonly used program for the sale of military goods, helping to promote the U.S. to the top position as the world's largest supplier of military goods. In 1968, the Foreign Military Sales Act was created and subsequently, divided military assistance into its present grant and sales programs. As a distinct area of U.S. arms sale activities, FMS proved to be a minor part of not only U.S. foreign policy, but also the U.S. economy.

The sale of military hardware and related items also creates an economic need, Gen. Michael Rogers writes:

> It is a fact of life that many nations must purchase from foreign sources at least some of their military hardware and supporting services; they do not have the industrial base to provide all of the equipment they need.[239]

As technology advances, there has also been a consistent trend to provide goods that are capable of laying greater waste to human life but at ever-escalating economic costs to the importing countries.

This relationship is even more apparent as the battlefield has moved to the skies, whereby, fighter aircraft (and anti-aircraft ground systems) are becoming increasingly expensive. The costly nature of modern military equipment has been a major contributor to the Third-World debt crisis and has prompted discussion and attempted legislation to eliminate the FMS program and transfer all sales of military equipment to grants (MAP).[240]

There is also an increasing discussion on "offsets", a term used to describe a remedy for the payment of military goods and services by granting recipient nations "a range of industrial or commercial compensation."[241] In order to satisfy military commitments and sales agreements, the U.S. forfeits a part of its domestic production by permitting greater foreign competition. In many respects, U.S. producers in other areas of the non-military economy are having to pay the cost of U.S. arms sales, to the profit of U.S. military producers and foreign policy strategists.

With an expansion of U.S. military base commitments since 1980 in Honduras, the prospect of new facilities in Zaire and Kenya, the continuance of operations in the Philippines, and the promise of additional U.S. aid, there is the potential for these new commitments to be locked into the budget, increasing U.S. Security Assistance funds. Whether the Food and Development Programs will be able to withstand assaults from aid to both Israel, Egypt and other nations considered to be of primary strategic military importance, as overall foreign aid is declining, is a significant question for aid recipients.

Chapter Summary

Though there is a broad based range of bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, the evidence of U.S. assistance suggests that responding to those in greatest danger, or in assisting nations in promoting broad-based development, is often at odds with its role as a complementary instrument of U.S. foreign policy to promote the expansion of the U.S. economic and political agenda. The decline of development assistance and the ambivalence toward programs which empower a nation's poor have occurred as the investment in military goods and training have increased steadily.

The intent of U.S. foreign aid is revealed in the allocation of its funds, an allocation whose gross dollar amounts approximates the listing of nations who benefit from U.S. military investments. The challenge ahead for those concerned with the delivery of U.S. food and development must not only rest on higher dollar figures but on an equitable effort to change the purpose, direction and beneficiaries for which aid is intended.

Any notion of U.S. humanitarian assistance must be tempered with its subordinate position as yet another facet of U.S. foreign policy. By establishing the nature and development of U.S. foreign assistance programs, the activities of the Reagan administration in responding to African emergency and development needs can more clearly be examined. The policies and priorities of the Reagan administration from 1981 through 1986, a period of immense need throughout Africa, can be seen as either an elaboration of past U.S. policies formations, or a departure from earlier precedents.

NOTES

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[147]Ibid.

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[150]Richard Barnett, Roots of War (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Inc., 1972), p. 6.

[151]U.S. General Accounting Office, The United States' Response to the Ethiopian Crisis, Report to the Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1985), p. 13.

[152]Ibid.

[153]Ibid.

[154]Interview with Jackie Wilson, September 24, 1987. Ms. Wilson is the Legislative Director of the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), a legislative lobby organization concerned with U.S. public policy as it affects the African continent.

[155]Lawrence Fuell, The P.L. 480 (Food For Peace) Program: Titles I/III Terms and Conditions; Planning and Implementation Procedures," (April, 1982), p. 1.

[156]Susan Epstein, "U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Food Assistance Programs," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research, 1984), p. 2.

[157]Clarence Palmby, Made In Washington (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Publishing Co., 1985), p. 55.

[158]Ibid.

[159]Ibid.

[160]Ibid., p. 54.

[161]Epstein, "U.S. Bilateral," p. 3.

[162]Emma Rothschild, "Is It Time To End Food For Peace?" New York Times Magazine (March 13, 1977), p. 44.

[163]Ibid.

[164]Palmby, Made, p. 54.

[165]Ibid.

[166]Richard Barnett, The Giants (NY: Touchstone Books, 1977), p. 162.

[167]Ibid., pp. 161-164.

[168]Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin, "Africa's Other Famine," Commonweal (July 3, 1981), p. 396.

[169]Epstein, "U.S. Bilateral," p. 5.

[170]Ibid.

[171]Ibid.

[172]Mark Wilson, "Food As A Weapon," Science for the People (June-July, 1979), p. 18.

[173]Teresa Hayter and Catherine Watson, Aid (London: Pluto Press, 1985), p. 69.

[174]Epstein, "U.S. Bilateral," p. 6-7.

[175]Ibid., p. 7.

[176]Ibid.; Fuell, p. 17.

[177]General Accounting Office, Famine In Africa (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, March, 1986), pp. 10-11.

[178]Ibid.

[179]Ibid.

[180]Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1986, Main Volume,

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 196.

[181]Ibid., p. 216

[182]Ibid.

[183]Epstein, "U.S. Bilateral," p. 18.

[184]Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1984, Main Volume (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 184.

[185]Epstein, "U.S. Bilateral," p. 24.

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[187]Ibid., p. 16.

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[227]Ibid., p. 43.

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CHAPTER IV

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO FAMINE AND HUNGER IN AFRICA, 1981-86

The Department of State has followed since the early 1970's a conceptual framework for addressing development activity in the Third World, known as the Four Pillars approach. The four areas that support this framework are: (1) policy reform; (2) strengthening the indigenous private sector; (3) institution building; and (4) technology transfer.[242] With the appearance of the Reagan administration there has been a heavy emphasis placed on the first two aspects of the approach. What has occurred under the Reagan been a more strident emphasis on global security (defined as military growth) as the preeminent feature of all U.S. foreign policy and assistance programs.

Policy reform and attempts to strengthen indigenous private sector activity in underdeveloped countries have been placed in the overall framework of immediate U.S. security interests. The Reagan administration's response to causes of famine has proven itself to be captive of the attempt to restore the primacy of the U.S. in global politics by the introduction of a more confrontational, combative approach. This new foreign policy design sought to win greater political and economic concessions from U.S. and inflict punitive damage to those it identifies as its enemies.

One of the major factors in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was the spectacle of the pre-eminent global superpower being manipulated due to the capture of U.S. embassy employees in Iran. With the wounds of the Vietnam War still felt by the U.S. electorate, the vision of U.S. political and military impotency, as further expressed by the Iranian hostage situation, engendered the demand for a more muscular foreign policy.

Much of the public's dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy was vented towards U.S. government dealings with Third World nations. With the inability of the U.S. to retrieve desired policy outcomes in international forums as the U.N. (due to the post-World War II growth of decolonized Third World nations), support was building in the U.S. for a more vengeful response to what were viewed as anti-U.S. activities.

Under the Reagan administration, U.S. foreign aid began to reflect the U.S. pursuit of unquestioned political, economic and military hegemony. The management of U.S. foreign policy activity has since reflected the long held conservative view of international forums by increasingly distancing U.S. participation in multilateral relations. The shift to more bilateral agreements is in an attempt to create greater unrestrained policy options and effects. This shift also has an impact on foreign assistance fund distributions and categories.

The President is not the sole advocate of employing development assistance to achieve foreign policy goals. The General Accounting Office (GAO), a congressional agency, acknowledged the use of aid as a means of achieving U.S. foreign policy aims.[243] The uses of U.S. foreign policy with this purpose include:

1. promoting regional and economic stability;
2. encourage democracy;
3. secure or maintain access to strategic facilities;
4. countering Soviet influences;
5. encourage cooperation with the U.S. on international issues.[244]

The beneficiaries of the Reagan approach have clearly been the programs under Security Assistance: Military Aid and Economic Support Fund (ESF). Security Assistance has increased from $5.288 billion in the first Reagan budget in FY 1981 to $9.7 billion in fiscal year 1985 (see Table 24). This represents an increase of $4.4 billion from 1981 and more than 67% of the total increase for foreign assistance.

Military assistance represents more than 61% of the $4.4 billion increase in Security Assistance. The big loser in foreign aid has been development aid, as it has been reduced from 35% of total foreign aid in 1981, to 30%

TABLE 24

U.S. FOREIGN AID BY PROGRAM
(Billions of Dollars)

Program	1981	%	1983	%	1985	%
Development	3.503	35	4.201	31	4.775	30
Food	1.229	12	1.028	7	1.964	11
Military	3.184	31	5.535	40	5.909	36
ESF	2.104	21	2.962	22	3.826	23
Security	5.288	52	8.497	62	9.735	59
Development/ Food	4.732	47	5.229	38	6.739	41

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Main Volume, Fiscal Years 1983, 1985, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983, 1985, 1987).

in 1985. Though food assistance shows a slight drop in its overall percentage of foreign aid, it has only maintained its position due to the evidence of famine, and the pressure to provide emergency assistance.

Table 25 shows that U.S. foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa also reflects the trend of the entire foreign aid account. Though the total U.S. foreign aid budget increased by 48% since 1980, economic assistance declined by 12.8% between 1980 and 1985 (see Table 25). This decline was primarily the result of a 19.7% decrease in food assistance to Africa. Table 26 shows that during the very height of the African famine disaster, 1984-1985, food assistance actually declined from $271 million to $235 million.

While much of the publicly stated intent of Title II PL 480 centered upon its capacity to provide humanitarian food assistance during a time of emergency, nations demonstrating such extreme food emergency needs as Angola and Mozambique received either limited, or no Title II food aid (see Table 26). Despite the desperate condition of the Mozambique economy, brought about by the South African-backed army of the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) and a series of poor weather conditions, Mozambique was obliged to pay for Title I food aid in 1985 (see Table 26). Although the sale of Title I food aid is subsidized by the U.S. government, the pressure for

TABLE 25

U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, FY 1980-1985
(In Millions of Dollars)

Year	Total Economic and Military Assistance	Total Economic Assistance	Development Assistance	ESF	PL 480	Military
1980	824.3	614.3	282.2	132.7	293.3	77.2
1981	908.8	659.0	300.2	162.9	322.1	84.7
1982	1,064.1	57.8	328.8	294.8	208.6	191.3
1983	1,015.6	592.6	315.3	286.1	236.3	134.0
1984	1,141.7	655.1	340.3	333.1	271.2	153.5
1985	1,220.5	535.6	352.2	417.8	235.4	167.4

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Main Volume, Fiscal Years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987).

TABLE 26

DISTRIBUTION OF PL 480 FUNDS TO FAMINE-STRICKEN AFRICA NATIONS

1984-1985
(Millions of Dollars)

	1984		1985	
Country	Title-I	Title-II	Title-I	Title-II
Angola	----	2.54	----	----
Botswana	----	2.53	----	----
Burkina Faso	----	13.70	----	6.50
Cape Verde	----	3.20	----	.73
Chad	----	2.70	----	1.40
Ethiopia	----	7.80	----	3.90
Mali	----	6.50	----	1.50
Mauritania	----	7.10	----	4.40
Mozambique	----	8.10	17.0	----
Niger	----	-----	----	----
Somalia	16.0	2.00	20.0	----
Sudan	50.0	-----	64.5	.28
Zambia	10.0	5.00	10.0	----

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Main Volume, Fiscal Years, 1986, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986, 1987).

Mozambique to provide payment in order to receive the food items, versus food provided as a grant under the Title II provision of PL 480 creates serious demands on a country that is economically strained by its conflicts with the MNR. Any benefits derived from the Nkomati accords are not widely evident.[245]

At the same time that PL 480 food aid experienced a significant drop in funding, military aid grew by 1980 (see Table 25). ESF, the other portion of Security Assistance, grew by an as 53.8% over the same period. The seven Sub-Saharan African nations that have received the bulk of ESF funds are: Botswana, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Table 27). The average per capita GNP of these nations is $524.2 (Table 27). With nineteen (19) African countries possessing economies of less than $300 per capita (see Table 8), the growth of Security Assistance and, in particular, ESF, siphons needed funds from development program accounts.

The major recipients of U.S. military funds in sub-Saharan Africa also coincide with the leading recipients of ESF funding (Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Liberia and Zaire, with Botswana, Cameroon and Chad gaining rapidly). The rise in ESF dollars and the related rise in the sale of military goods substantiates the claim that ESF serves primarily as a means to provide balance of payment supports for nations that would find importing

TABLE 27

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND RECIPIENTS IN AFRICA
(Millions of Dollars)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Total	1983 GNP/ Capita	Rank
Egypt	865.0	829.0	771.0	750.0	852.9	1,065	5132.9	$ 690	1
Sudan	40.0	50.0	100.0	82.2	120.0	114	506.0	400	2
Zimbabwe	22.0	24.9	75.0	60.0	40.0	28	249.9	740	3
Liberia	5.2	32.0	35.0	32.0	35.0	43	182.2	480	4
Zambia	24.0	20.5	20.0	15.5	21.3	40	141.3	580	5
Somalia	5.0	-----	20.0	21.0	35.0	30	111.0	250	6
Kenya	14.5	5.5	10.7	30.0	21.0	25	106.7	340	7
Botswana	13.0	10.8	11.0	10.0	.8	10	56.6	880	8
Tunisia	-----	-----	-----	5.0	1.5	20	26.5	1290	9
Zaire	-----	-----	-----	5.0	10.0	10	25.4	170	10
Senegal	-----	-----	-----	-----	10.0	15	25.0	440	11
Morocco	-----	-----	-----	-----	7.0	15	22.0	760	12
Mozambique	-----	-----	-----	-----	7.0	13	20.7	----	13
Mali	-----	----	-----	-----	-----	18	18.0	150	14
Malawi	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	15	15.0	210	15
Mauritius	-----	-----	2.0	2.0	4.0	7	15.0	1160	15
Djibouti	-----	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3	12.5	----	16
Rwanda	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	12	12.0	270	17
Chad	-----	-----	2.8	-----	3.0	5	10.8	----	18

TABLE 27-Continued

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Total	1983 GNP/ Capita	Rank
Niger	-----	-----	-----	-----	5.0	5	10.0	240	19
Seychelles	-----	-----	2.0	-----	2.0	2	6.0	2430	20
Madagascar	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	3	3.0	310	21
Uganda	.3	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.3	220	22

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Main Volume, Fiscal Years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987).

U.S. arms too much of an economic hardship.

The Rural Development Institute (RDI) recognizes the significance of such a shift in aid funding allocations. The RDI, which performs an annual evaluation of U.S. bilateral and multilateral programs and the extent that such aid programs respond to the needs of the poor in recipient countries offered its assessment of U.S. bilateral aid:

> The quality of both major components of America's economic assistance has declined significantly, and that assistance now appears by any plausible measure to be less likely to meet the needs of the poor than at any time since our assessments began.[246]

Of the total amount of funding distributed to development and/or food assistance, the dollar portion that is directed to the poor has fallen from its zenith of $.64 in 1982, to its nadir of $.38 in 1985.[247] The performance of ESF in providing assistance to the poor is virtually non-existent. In 1982, ESF funded projects had committed only $.19 of each dollar to the poor of aid-recipient nations; by 1985, this figure had declined to only $.07 of each dollar.[248]

As providing support for the poor is not the intention of ESF, the results are less than surprising. Subscribers of targeted development aid view the introduction and rapid growth of ESF as further evidence of how the loose application of development assistance continues to estrange the poor from the development process. The expansion of ESF has also helped to rob the potential for true development as it comes at a time when there is greater awareness and support for programs that aid the poor (e.g.-IFAD). Despite the New Directions mandate codified into law, the emphasis on ESF operations further injures those nations with the greatest need for development dollars.

While ESF has made rapid gains in budgetary allocations and programming to Africa, military assistance has also shown significant increases. From 1973 to 1984, U.S. arms exports to Africa have increased from $300 million to $900 million respectively.[249] U.S. military sales and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased greater than eight times the 1975 amount, from $35 million in 1975 to $288 million in 1984.[250] Under the Reagan administration, military sales and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have grown to greater than three times fiscal year 1981 funding of $136 million to $389 million in 1986.[251]

The number of African nations receiving military aid have also grown during the Reagan tenure from 19 in 1980 to 39 in 1985 (see Tables 28-30). Since fiscal year 1981, the Reagan administration has also emphasized a shift in the purchase of military goods by advancing the opportunity for grants, in lieu of cash sales or loans. In 1980, military grants amounted to $30 million, while in 1985 this category of aid grew to $101.5 million (see

TABLE 28

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA-1983
(Thousands of Dollars)

Country	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales Market	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales Concessional	(MAP) Military Assistance Program	(IMET) Int'l Military Education Training	Total
Botswana	0	5.0	.3	.2	5.2
Cameroon	0	2.5	0	.1	2.6
Egypt*	425	900.0'	0	1.9	1326.9
Gabon	0	1.0	0	.1	1.1
Ghana	0	0	.3	0	.3
Kenya	0	10.0	10.3	1.4	21.7
Liberia	0	6.0	6.0	.7	12.7
Malawi	0	0	.2	0	.2
Mali	0	0	.1	0	.1
Somalia	0	10.0	20.0	.6	30.6
Tunisia*	0	87.0	13.7	1.2	101.9
Zaire	0	2.0	7.5	.6	10.1
Niger	0	1.2	1.0	.3	2.5
Uganda	0	0	.1	0	.1
Djibouti	0	1.5	.1	0	1.6
Congo	0	0	.1	0	.1
Equitorial Guinea	0	0	.1	0	.1
Swaziland	0	43.0	1.3	0	44.3
Zimbabwe	0	0	.1	0	.1
Total	425	1024.7	103.00	9.5	1562.20
Sub-Saharan	0	37.7	89.30	6.4	133.40

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, FY 1985, Main Volume (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985).

TABLE 29

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA-1984
(Thousands of Dollars)

Country	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales Market	Concessional	(MAP) Military Assistance Program	(IMET) Int'l Military Education Training	Total
Botswana	7,000	0	2,000	232	9,232
Burkina	0	0	0	39	39
Cameroon	5,000	0	0	109	5,109
Egypt	900,000	465,000	0	1,657	1,366,657
Gabon	0	0	0	111	111
Ghana	0	0	0	242	242
Guinea Bissau	0	0	0	13	13
Malawi	0	0	0	185	185
Mali	0	0	0	148	148
Rwanda	0	0	0	3	3
Somalia	0	0	32,000	993	32,993
Sudan	0	0	45,000	1,459	46,459
Togo	0	0	0	35	35
Zaire	0	0	7,000	767	7.767
Ivory Coast	0	0	0	181	181
Mauritania	0	0	0	79	79
Niger	0	0	2,000	228	2,228
Uganda	0	0	0	61	61
Djibouti	0	0	2,000	140	2,140
Madagascar	0	0	0	50	50
Congo	0	0	0	6	6
Equitorial Guinea	0	0	0	54	54

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, FY 1986, Main Volume (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).

TABLE 29--Continued

Country	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales: Market	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales: Concessional	(MAP) Military Assistance Program	(IMET) Int'l Military Education Training	Total
Swaziland	0	0	0	50	50
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	150	150
Seychelles	0	0	2,000	477	2,477
Sierre Leone	0	0	0	40	40
Cape Verde	0	0	0	47	47
Burundi	0	0	0	135	135
Central African Republic	0	0	0	99	99
Chad	0	0	2,000	169	2,169
Guinea	0	0	0	100	100
Lesotho	0	0	0	1,621	1,621
Total	912,000	465,000	94,000	9,680	1,480,680
Sub-Saharan	12,000	0	94,000	8,023	114,023

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, FY 1987, Main Volume (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987).

TABLE 30

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA-1985
(Thousands of Dollars)

Country	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales Market	Concessional	(MAP) Military Assistance Program	(IMET) Int'l Military Education Training	Total
Botswana	0	5,000	4,000	287	9,287
Burkina Faso	0	0	0	17	17
Cameroon	0	5,000	0	147	5,147
Egypt	0	117,500	0	1,675	1,176,675
Gabon	0	0	0	125	125
Ghana	0	0	0	293	293
Guinea Bissau	0	0	0	4	4
Kenya	0	0	20,000	1,693	21,693
Liberia	0	0	12,000	1,157	13,157
Malawi	0	0	1,000	218	1,218
Mali	0	0	0	156	156
Rwanda	0	0	0	62	62
Senegal	0	3,000	0	524	3,524
Somalia	0	33,000	0	1,132	34,132
Sudan	0	0	45,000	1,430	46,430
Togo	0	0	0	43	43
Zaire	0	0	7,000	1,341	8,341
Ivory Coast	0	0	0	161	161
Mauritania	0	0	0	77	77
Niger	0	5,000	0	214	5,214
Uganda	0	0	0	6	6
Djibouti	0	2,500	126	2,626	2,626
Madagascar	0	0	2,050	55	2,105

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, FY 1987, Main Volume (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987).

TABLE 30--Continued

Country	(FMS) Foreign Military Sales Market	Concessional	(MAP) Military Assistance Program	(IMET) Int'l Military Education Training	Total
Equitorial Guinea	0	0	0	71	71
Central African Republic	0	0	0	108	108
Sierre Leone	0	0	0	60	60
Seychelles	0	0	0	17	17
Cape Verde	0	0	0	70	70
Burundi	0	0	0	141	141
Benin	0	0	0	83	83
Algeria	0	0	0	64	64
Total	0	1,226,000	101,550	12,142	1,339,692
Sub-Saharan	0	51,000	101,550	10,403	162,953

SOURCE: Ibid.

Tables 28-30). The proposed Reagan budget for FY 1987 seeks to approve more than 90% of the purchase of U.S. military equipment via grant provisions.[252]

The U.S. has tenured military agreements that permit the use of air facilities (Liberia, Somalia); port facilities (Somalia, Liberia, and Seychelles); and military assistance personnel (Liberia, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire and Seychelles).[253] More than $60 million of ESF funds have been spent on military applications in Kenya and Somalia (building and improving airfields and port facilities).[254] The provision of military assistance to these countries not only provides the U.S. with a southern flank to the Middle East (a region where it has been having increasing difficulty in maintaining a presence outside of Israel and Egypt) but also a very high visibility in east Central Africa.

The occurrence of ongoing military exercises provides defacto U.S. military bases throughout the region. Operation "Bright Star 83" involved Oman, Somalia, Egypt and Jordan, and continued for a total of 45 days.[255] This military exercise involved more than 8,000 U.S. troops, honing their skills in amphibious assault, B-52 raids and desert maneuvers.[256]

The full investment of arms supplies to Africa is not limited to existing African governments. The widely publicized support of anti-government forces in Angola (via UNITA) is not a common practice of U.S. covert funding operations. The shepherding of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi by the Administration and its supporters, before Congress and the world, to boldly proclaim the intentions to overthrow an existing government has become the standard of U.S. relations towards Third-World nations.[257] Recent attempts to implement a coup against Ghana also suggests possible U.S. complicity through mercenaries and arms suppliers.[258]

Mozambique is yet another African government facing eminent danger due to direct South African support of anti-Mozambique forces (RENAMO), despite denials to the contrary. In 1981, six U.S. embassy officials were asked to leave Mozambique by the FRELIMO government, on charges that they had helped supply intelligence information to South Africa military officials which lead to attacks by South Africa earlier that year.[259] In reprisal for Mozambique's ouster of the embassy officials, the Reagan administration ended all food shipments to Mozambique for six months.[260] These covert and overt escapades may not reveal the full extent of U.S. financial and material support but they do bring into question the extent of actual concern for the victims of hunger and famine; specifically, as it results from the militarization and ensuing conflict aided and abetted by the global superpowers.

With the advance of military technology has come an increase in the cost of military and military-related goods.[261] The purchase of each new advance in military equipment brings new anxiety to bordering nations and/or opposing political forces. In supporting this cauldron of fear and danger, the U.S. government is creating a vast and expanding market for U.S. arms and supplies for Africans to be more efficient about the killing of one another.

The relationship between developed and under-developed countries is a study of who profits and who pays. By 1983, the developed countries controlled 88.9% of the world's export of arms; developing countries imported 77.9% of arms available on the export market.[262] While U.S. arms are increasingly being offered as grants, versus sales, there is often a need for expanding arms sales purchases above the amount of grant funded arms. There are also significant contracts awarded to U.S. firms for the maintenance of arms equipment. In much the same manner that the U.S., through the PL 480 program, created and currently maintains a market for U.S. food purchases, U.S. military aid and grants programs are also creating and sustaining markets for U.S. military goods. As a growing military and/or shrinking commercial sector absorbs the limited amounts of foreign exchange available to most African countries, the ability of these nations to invest in food production for domestic consumption is made increasingly difficult to provide for their needs.

The competition for foreign exchange to purchase imported goods, ultimately creates a path to the IMF. As debtor nations in need of still further loans, the prospect of engaging in discussions leading for loan agreements comes with the prospect of major changes to the loan recipient nation. With the demands of IMF conditionalities doing injury to the poor of most societies (see also Debt and Trade section in Chapter III), the poor suffer a double inequity. It is the poor who must pay for the arrest of their potential to lift themselves from the suffering which can be attributed to militarization.

The legacy of the Reagan administration will have been the expansion of U.S. military equipment to offset perceived Soviet political and military advantages in the region, as well as, the support an even more favorable balance of trade with Africa. Though the U.S. continues to be a significant force in the export of arms, it is steadily losing its share of the export arms sector. At a time that development needs targeted to the domestic markets of aid recipient countries are crucial, the Reagan administration offers private sector investment to replace public sector financing.

The priority given security assistance over other forms of assistance is indicative of the self-perceived mission that Reagan and his supporters view their role to be in the new conservative era. Frustrated by actions taken by the House Appropriations Committee to shield popular development assistance programs from the budget-cutting axe of those who support a conservative agenda, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, William Schneider, Jr. angrily referred to such aid accounts as: "a large number of low-priority, foreign aid pet rocks."[263] Security assistance was defined in a very narrow domain for Schneider, leaving little doubt as to whose security he was primarily interested.

Diplomatic reactions to African countries over relatively minor disagreements has been particularly harsh under the Reagan administration. Zimbabwe under the rule of Robert Mugabe has been an uncompromising supporter of those who wish to overturn the apartheid state of South Africa. Several times, he and the Reagan administration have debated over policies in international forums which have their base in the concept of the sanctity of black life and the genuine pursuit of freedom under apartheid that is inseparable from the pursuit of freedom anywhere throughout the world.

Comments by the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Witness Mangwende, during a July 4th dinner in Zimbabwe which former President Jimmy Carter attended, criticized

U.S. inaction and complicity in maintaining the apartheid government in South Africa.[264] There were particularly harsh words for the Reagan administration and its role. Carter took exception that Mangwende would use the occasion to denounce U.S. foreign policy in the region and soon exited from the dinner. With all of the options open to the U.S. to employ upon Zimbabwe as a means of demonstrating its displeasure with the remarks, the U.S. cut all food aid to the country.[265]

With Zimbabwe suffering through its worse drought this century, the cessation of food aid was designed to strike a death blow at Zimbabwe's people, to make amends for an action by their government. In the case of Zimbabwe (as with Libya) the implementation of sanctions were never discussed in the context of a loss of influence, or injury to local populations, as was done when sanctions against South Africa were demanded by various elements of the American public. Zimbabwe officials also interpreted this action as a signal to those representatives who were gathering at Harare for the Non-Aligned Conference.[266] The Conference was to commence days after the announcement of the withdrawal of U.S. aid from Zimbabwe.

The disdain for life, particularly those of Africans, as opposed to attempts to placate defense industries and nations which fit into the U.S. global security framework, has created a skepticism which suggests that Reagan administration policies for reducing the incidence of hunger and famine are merely insincere propositions.

ii. Security Aid to Central America As An Obstacle to U.S. Emergency Food Aid to Africa

By January, 1985, a number of legislative vehicles had been introduced to combat the African famine (see Table 31). Congressmen Weiss (D-NY), Wolpe (D-Mich.) and Leland (D-Tex.) introduced the most comprehensive anti-famine legislation (HR 100) with almost $900 million and substantial food and non-food aid. Republican members of Congress Silvio Conte (N.Y.) and Marge Roukema (N.J.) responded with their version of famine assistance, HR 606 (see Table 31). The Conte-Roukema bill had higher totals in food aid but lower figures in non-food aid. It differed significantly with the administration bill as HR 606 contained provisions for inland transport.

The President's response to calls for greater U.S. emergency aid was well below the established need. In addition to the lowest food aid figures offered, non-food aid was almost non-existent. The lack of emphasis on non-food aid was viewed with amazement, as one of the most frequent charges heard in opposition to the U.S. providing food aid is the lack of transport vehicles to move food to its rural destinations.[267]

TABLE 31

A COMPARISON OF 1985 AFRICA EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL LEGISLATION
($ Million)

Program/Assistance	HR 100	HR 606	S 370	Administration
Emergency Food Assistance PL-480, Title II (Total)	$492	$495*	$395	$185
Emergency Non-Food Aid	406	132.5	374	50
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	70	70	105	25
Outreach/Enhancement Grants	25	10	25	----
Refugee Assistance	50	20	25	25
Recovery Assistance	80	30	80	----
Inland Transportation	177	-----	135	----
AID Operating Expenses	4	2.5	4	----
Grand Total	$898	$628	$769	$235
Metric Tonnage	1.4M	1.2M	1.3M	0.4M

SOURCE: Bread for the World, "A Comparison of Africa Emergency Supplementary Bills," (Washington, D.C.: Bread for the World, February 4, 1985).

*includes: $34 million for Bangladesh, $89 million for Inland Transportation, $372 million for Food Aid.

By not offering transport aid, the administration could impose even greater obstacles in blocking food aid, on the grounds that it would be either mismanaged or diverted, versus being delivered to those in the greatest of need. This particular notion had been supported in at least one European daily newspaper during the U.S. debates to decide the extent of U.S. aid commitment.[268] The arguments against sending aid (or providing aid in small quantities) echoed many of the same arguments used against domestic welfare spending.

The administration's food assistance plan also suffered by not offering any substantive additions to combat the famine problem. Congressman Ted Weiss noted that half of the Reagan proposal was in assistance that was already committed.[269] More than $176 million of the Reagan famine bill was merely shifted from existing, development accounts (versus security accounts).[270] Though the situation in Africa is of crisis proportions, that still does not diminish the very real needs in other desperate parts of the world. Reagan, in essence, sought to have Congress to choose between which lives to save with U.S. aid.

The administration's legislative vehicle was further damaged by the Conte/Roukema bill, which offered a higher budget to facilitate relief activities than did the administration's proposal. The Conte/Roukema bill also gave Republicans a politically safe alternative to the President's plan, without being seen as totally abandoning the President. Of related importance was the total lack of funding obligations to AID for its' operating expenses towards implementing relief plans. This area of expense has also been a center for debate as large food shipments have the potential of not being totally accounted. By not offering related funds for AID administrative costs and the oversight of such food aid activity, the Administration was again establishing the environment for a self-fulfilling prophecy of food-aid waste, thereby, creating the basis upon which to either cut or eliminate food aid funding.

John Melchor (D-Mt) introduced the Senate version of the African Emergency Supplemental bill. Melcher's supplemental would offer approximately the same funding levels and distribution of aid as HR 100. The Reagan proposal provided one-third the metric tonnage of food grains as that provided under, HR-606, Conte/Roukema (see Table 31).

It was not until April 4th, after a tremendous amount of political haggling that the African Emergency Supplemental for FY 1985 (also known as the Food Assistance for Africa Agricultural Act) was approved for $800 million.[271] One of the key elements of the FAAA was the creation of the $225 million "Presidential" reserve.[272] Under the discretion of the President, the reserve was to provide a means for rapid response to the emergency food needs of African nations. Valuable time would be saved by the collection and storage of food (mainly grains), and having it ready for shipment. The formation of the reserve was not, however, without its own political dimensions. The reserve was formed over the objections of many farm groups that feared its reserve being released onto the domestic market, at an inopportune time, which would further depress the value of return on their individual food commodities.

Safeguards were established to placate U.S. farmers, which made the release of the reserve commodities by the President contingent upon two main factors: (1) AID is required to introduce to Congress a plan for the release of reserve funds; and (2) the President must verify that the essential need for famine relief does exist.[273] Despite the eminent need through the first half of 1986, the reserve was never released.

In constructing relief effort, time becomes the chief adversary. The processing and delivery of food is a tremendous, but time consuming, logistical effort. The process normally involves from 4 to 6 months of effort, that includes:

1. identifying and collecting food products for transport;
2. transport from storage facilities (frequently by rail and truck) to departure site;

3. storage, then loading of food aboard ship/ plane;
4. personnel with emergency relief experience are drawn to famine affected countries from around the world to assist in the oversight of operations;
5. transport of food from donor nation to recipient nation;
6. disembarkation of food in a recipient country; and
7. loading of food onto overland transport vehicles for ultimate destination.[274]

The problems of food shipments are exacerbated by factors that are structural, as well as, economic. The multiple complications involved with the delivery of emergency shipments of food from another country are enormous. With millions of lives threatened by famine conditions and millions more threatened by economic dislocations caused by the creation of famine, the willingness of administration officials to place ideology above the lives of innocent people reveals much of what is wrong with Conservative thinking and American politics, in general.

The principal culprit of this form of guerrilla warfare against foreign food programs has been the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is directly responsible to the President. The influence of OMB stems from its role on the Development Coordination Committee (DCC).[275] The members of the DCC have the option to delay fund approval of country requests for development activities. By late August, OMB had frozen $502.2 million in approved emergency assistance.[276] These funds included:

1. $167.2 million in food and transportation;
2. $110 million for seeds, tools and emergency assistance to be distributed by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); and
3. $225 million for the "Presidential" African Famine Reserve Fund.[277]

By engaging in such actions, OMB was not only violating the letter and the spirit of a congressional mandate but had also lifted itself above the internal decision-making process of the DCC, as the DCC had already approved the dispensation of funds.[278] OMB had awarded itself the power of the veto.

The basis for OMB's decision to delay funds was expressed as a failure of AID to provide OMB with the needed reports on how each country was to use its allocation of emergency funds.[279] AID responded by stating that the reports in question had been completed and given to OMB ten days prior to the day that OMB deferral notifications were to be sent to Congress.[280] OMB offered the rejoinder that the reports were inadequate.[281] Despite Congress ruling that the AID report was sufficient, OMB delays were still in force.[282] OMB became the final arbiter of food aid by introducing its demand for a case-by-case review, the process severely impeded the responsiveness to famine stricken African countries.[283] The net effect of OMB actions was to reduce Congressional appropriations for African famine food aid to the levels originally introduced by the President.[284]

The numerous political ploys engineered by the White House had a disastrous impact on inland transportation, a crucial factor for the survival of those most victimized by famine. Funds that were delayed and intended for use by OFDA were to have been spent on seeds, tools and emergency medical aid.[285] These and other goods are essential for the short-term recovery efforts in Africa.

The single-mindedness of the Reagan foreign policy architects to make U.S. security issues the paramount concern of U.S. foreign policy prompted several strategies by the President. A major feature of the Reagan administration's embroglio over the authorization of emergency famine funds for Africa was the result of determination to fund U.S. allies in Central America, particularly, the Nicaraguan anti-government forces known as the Contras.

Since 1984, when U.S. public awareness about the famine crisis grew to massive proportions, the Reagan administration has repeatedly provided obstacles for the dispensation of emergency aid that either unnecessarily slowed the aid process or buttressed his foreign policy agenda.

This unwanted dialogue of humanitarian imperatives and security posturings became apparent from the first congressional response to the African crisis. On March

6th, the House of Representatives passed a $150 million supplemental (H.J. Res. 492), earmarked for Africa, to Title II food aid for FY 1984; which was $60 million more than the administration requested.[286] On March 14th, the Appropriations Committee of the senate passed the $150 House supplemental but only after having approved $92.8 million in military aid to El Salvador and $21 million in covert aid to the Contras.[287]

On March 15th, the Senate moved $80 million of the $150 million in emergency food aid and amended it to H. J. Res. 493, the Domestic Heating Subsidy Bill, which passed by voice vote.[288] A Conference Committee set for H.J. Res. 493 agreed to $90 million in the African aid and another $90 million in food commodity credits.[289] The fate of the remaining $60 million was still in limbo due to the attachment of military aid to pro-U.S. forces in Central America. A compromise fashioned by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hi) would obtain the release of the $60 million by agreeing to the passage of aid to El Salvador.[290] The agreement also included the separation of covert aid to the Contras from the Africa food aid bill. The House agreed to those terms on May 24th; the Senate concurred on June 25th.

By ultimately signing emergency food aid to Africa, the President had secured another round of military aid for pro-U.S. forces in Central America. The

President exchanged $60 million of famine aid to preserve life in Africa for almost $93 million in military aid to Central America, to destroy life. The number of lives lost in Africa during the famine because of this unwarranted delay are a tribute to the priority given to "security" issues by the President.

Later in 1986, on September 9th, OMB again introduced an request to defer $97.20 million in Title II funds and $53 million of funds from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.[291] Ten days after this arrest of Congressionally obligated funds, the House sub-committee on Africa held emergency hearings to summon USAID before it and demand their accountability for not having responded to an urgent cable, sent by Congressman Howard Wolpe on August 19th, which reflected an appeal by the USAID missions in Sudan and Ethiopia for additional transport assistance.[292]

The cables point to either one of two possible conclusions: (1) collusion of AID with OMB on the prohibition of transport aid (thus crippling relief efforts); or (2) the intimidation of AID by OMB. The main agency that is capable of coordinating transport for emergency foods exports, OFDA, is not directly responsible to the DCC. AID has sole authority over OFDA; therefore, the decision to respond to emergency transport needs by authorizing the release of funds belongs solely to AID.[293]

Despite this fact, AID did not exercise its prerogative of spending congressionally appropriated funds for OFDA.

African famine funds and military aid to Central America again commanded center stage as issues of conflicting political interests. The passage by the House of aid to the anti-government forces in Nicaragua (Contras) involved more than supplying forces that are directed by U.S. global strategic strategy. The Contra-aid legislation (HR-5052), as part of the military construction appropriations legislation, provided $300 million in military aid to Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, by deleting "unused" appropriations from the following three accounts:

1. $225 million Presidential Africa famine reserve;
2. PL-480; and
3. development and humanitarian assistance (health, education, transport) accounts.[294]

The extent that such funds were "unused" was not due to and absence of need but because of the deliberate machinations and defacto veto power of OMB in the policy-making and implementation process.

The plan as conceived by Sen. Robert Kasten's staff member, Jim Bond, and Senate Budget Committee staff person, Charlie Flickner, would grant the $300 million in aid by attaching the funds to the African Famine Reserve.[295] The advantages for pro-Contra members of Congress were: (1) the famine reserve was controlled by the President and did not need Congress to verify its release of funds; (2) in adding $300 million (by adding another title to the legislation), it avoids having to negotiate considerations in a conference committee; (3) improves the funding authority of the reserve and, thereby, gives the impression of being active on the behalf of those suffering from famine in Africa.

Despite the political chess play, victory for the pro-Contra forces was short-lived. The length of time involved in attaching Contra-aid to the famine reserve conflicted with the onset of the next fiscal year. Appropriation for Contra-aid spending had to be won in the next session. The famine reserve, without the Contra-aid amendment, was dismantled.

iii. African Debt, Trade and President Reagan

The span of Ronald Reagan's two terms of office has given witness to the application of conservative economic themes onto the international arena, in addition to their introduction onto the domestic agenda. The argument against centrally-planned economies as being a substantive cause of poverty and hunger in underdeveloped countries received even greater exposure during the Reagan tenure.[296]

The tonic for Third World development and debt woes was analyzed to be the shrinkage of government activity in the economic sectors in concert with an expansion of private sector initiatives. The ideological stance of the Reagan approach achieved the following: (1) shifted the focus and blame from western complicity in the factors which have led to the debt crisis to that of being solely an African creation; (2) emphasized growth, rather than development, which, subsequently, served as a pretext for reductions in food and development aid below basic needs assessments; (3) acceptance of IMF styled conditionality that advances the capitalist mode of production in centralized, underdeveloped economies; and (4) reductions in public sector activities, which have ultimately led to higher costs, increased unemployment, and a shrinkage of basic and emergency government services to the nation.

The importance of Third-World trade is not lost upon the Reagan administration. It is this category of countries which has formed a significant basis for the growth in U.S. exports from 1975 through 1980.[297] Agriculture, an area of major trade activity, is directed towards the export sector. One out of every five acres planted in the U.S.[298] More than seventy per cent of bilateral U.S. assistance and fifty per cent of U.S. contributions to multilateral development banks are spent on U.S. goods and services.[299] For every billion dollars of farm exports 25,000 to 35,000 jobs are created.[300]

Though much of the world's attention has been upon the importance of South Africa's mineral wealth to global industrialization, the African continent is replete with nations whose mineral importance to the U.S. and the world is substantial. The U.S. imports ninety per cent of its cobalt, bauxite, and manganese.[301] Zaire and Zambia are leading world producers of cobalt and together supply about fifty per cent of U.S. import requirements.[302] Guinea possesses more than a quarter of the world's bauxite reserves and provides about thirty per cent of U.S. import needs.[303] The nation of Gabon provides twenty-six per cent of total U.S. import requirements of manganese; by 1983, this total reached ninety-nine per cent.[304] U.S. trade, as with U.S. aid to Africa and other underdeveloped nations is not simply a matter of humanitarian concern. These relations form a very important feature of U.S. economic growth, industrial production and economic security. The decisions by the Reagan administration to punish even its allies, in addition to those it regularly perceives as its foes, over the perceived role of the U.S. in the international arena forces downward all aspects of U.S. foreign obligations save those of security.

The release of the 1981 World Bank study on African development, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, (commonly referred to as the Berg report) supplied the Reagan administration with additional support for directing its emphasis on factors that are internal to African nations. With the Berg plan focused on African governments as themselves the cause of maldevelopment and debt, the criticisms and solutions followed a familiar orthodoxy: (1) the need for production to become increasingly export-oriented; and (2) the preponderance of public sector economic investment, at the expense of private sector dynamics. Berg's solutions to Africa's development crisis included substantial increases in: (1) the amount of aid money available; and (2) the movement from project aid distribution to program distribution of aid.[305]

The emphasis subscribed to by the Berg Plan found its adherents in the Reagan camp. The Reagan response to the development needs of the world's poor focused squarely upon the internal factors of a nation. The cure (as with domestic U.S. policy) is the release of private sector forces by lifting regulations and laws that are seen as inhibiting economic growth. In 1984, the President's Task Force On International Private Enterprise recommended a series of changes to encourage more capitalist forms of development in the Third-World. Among some of the points raised in the report was one which crystallized the purpose of the Task Force: "Foreign assistance programs should substantially expand their efforts to help developing countries adopt policies that will strengthen the opportunities for private enterprise."[306]

At a 1986 Howard University/United Nations sponsored conference on Drought and Desertification, Peter McPherson, AID administrative director, underscored those internal factors that have inhibited economic activity from prevailing in Africa as the factors most prevalent and detrimental in creating famine and hunger in Africa. As seen by McPherson, these internal forces are:

> policies that discriminate against farmers in production, pricing and marketing; inefficient, centralized government planning; growing population pressures; civil disorders; and short-sighted agricultural practices, the misuse of fragile lands, and excessive cutting of trees for firewood.[307]

McPherson's solution calls for African governments to "reform and implement policies that: reinforce a strong private sector; [develop] a tax structure that encourages savings and investment; [promote] a greater reliance on market forces; and [sustain] reasonable profit incentives for farmers.[308]

All of the points raised by McPherson, without exception, relate to what the perceived impact of African policies and actions have been on their own societies, without an appreciation of those external (foreign) influences and areas of control which have promoted the existence of those 'internal' dimensions. The recommendations forwarded by McPherson do little to reverse the same causes of Africa's famine and, equally important, limits the prospects for Africa to create a truly self-reliant continent of nations. Former Secretary of Agriculture, John Block, stated in a 1985 speech on the Farm Bill of that year:

> The push by some developing nations to become self-sufficient in food production may be reminiscent of a by-gone era. Those countries could save money by importing more of their food from the U.S. Modern trade practices may mean that the world's major food producing nations, especially the U.S., are the best source of food for some developing countries.[309]

The implication is that these countries will never develop the benefits that producing and trading for essential commodity goods can offer a nation.

Though the cost of food may indeed be higher in the short-term, it is also likely that as nations develop their own technologies to more effectively produce food crops and as markets expand, the cost for food will decline. The potential benefit to non-crop producing sectors hastens the overall employment and development of a country. The potential benefit for African counties that have surplus food commodities (e.g.- Zimbabwe) and are able to market these (commodities to countries within its region (e.g.- Mozambique) could lead to an Africa that is fully capable of stemming the tide of famine and provide a more stable political and economic environment.

These potential benefits and the subsequent impact on U.S. farm producers (and global strategists) is evident from a letter signed by Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), he stated:

> If we do not (lower our food prices) to discourage these countries now, our world-wide competitive position will continue to slide and be much more difficult to regain. This (discouragement) should be one of the foremost goals of our agricultural policy.[310]

It is plain that there are major limitations in defining the economic and political interests of Africa out of the conceptual framework of U.S. policy interests. No nation, or group of nations, can truly call themselves independent if they must depend on foreign governments (particularly those that have a dubious history of international support) for the essential food needs of its people.

The Reagan administration has only followed that which fits its rhetorical stance and is appealing to what people wish to believe about Africa and its people, to justify decreasing levels of assistance. The program of the World Bank most directed to the poorest of the Third World, IDA, was cut drastically under the 1984 Reagan budget.[311] Until alternative measures are devised to promote development and respond to Africa's debt problems, the relatively easier credit terms of IDA highly coveted by a wide range of African countries.[312]

The World Bank initiative was designed to provide economic incentives to African nations seeking to reorder economic policies in accordance with expanding activity and involvement by the private sector.

The direction of the initiative mirrored one of the recommendations advanced by the aforementioned Task Force on International Enterprise. The Task Force wrote that:

> The United States should sharply increase its efforts to guide developing countries towards market-oriented policies; it should reward those countries that adopt strategies that will lead to a positive climate for business and investment.[313]

Though one would imagine the Administration to be quite comfortable with the World Bank's approach, the U.S. has not invested in the program to date. Programs such as IFAD, which could easily be embraced by free market advocates have also suffered heavily under the Reagan reign; IFAD lost more than $46 million during its second replenishment.[314]

A program designed to encourage African countries to design their economies to be more in keeping with market forces (i.e.-capitalism), the African Economic Policy Reform Initiative (AEI), has had only $75 million set aside as incentive.[315] Even for African countries that are experimenting with the prescriptions of a market economy, such levels of assistance would only provide a modicum of incentive to promote substantive change in their economies.

The nations that have benefitted the most from AEI have been: Malawi, Mauritania, Mali, Rwanda and Zambia.[316] Only Mali and Mauritania were listed as nations most harshly impacted by famine. At a time when African nations were suffering from severe drought and famine, the Reagan administration sought to promote capitalism under the guise of a new program.

In December, 1984, the Reagan administration further demonstrated the extent of its sensitivity to the urgent needs of Africa during its famine crisis by offering budget cuts that proposed to eliminate the total $49.9 million of U.S. contributions to the FAO during 1985.[317] The reasons cited by the administration were similar to the charges levelled against the United Nations Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), that the FAO was too heavily weighted with administrators and that it held an ideological bias that conflicted with U.S. national interests.[318] The FAO was the central international organization that coordinated the anti-famine efforts in Africa, as part of its continuing role as the international agency most intimately involved with global anti-hunger activities.

The only other alternative set forth by the Reagan administration to provide relief to Africa's debt (and by implication, trade) problems has been the plan advanced by Secretary of the Treasury James Baker. This plan sought to encourage commercial banks to provide an additional $20 billion in new loans to 15 of the leading debtor nations.[319] The regional development banks

(Inter-American, African) would be responsibile for raising the amount of disbursements to the ascribed debtor countries by $3 billion per year.[320] In effect, the Baker plan is performing a political form of triage by providing partial debt relief (of sorts) to the major debtor nations while either ignoring or, resigning as hopeless, most of the other Third World nations which suffer grievously under their indebtedness (see Table 32). Nigeria would be the only African nation that would receive what is seen as support under the Baker plan.

The prescription that Baker advances comes with its own set of conditionality terms, primary of which is the reduction of state authority over the economy (e.g.- removal of import restrictions).[321] While the terms of the Baker plan are viewed as a means of propelling economic growth in the Third-World, the Baker plan is merely a thinly disguised attempt to expand the market for U.S. exports and provide relief to major, privately-held, U.S. banks.

The pressure felt by the U.S. in global trade activities from nations as diverse as: Japan, Argentina, Australia, W. Germany and South Korea for new and existing markets is of studied concern for U.S. trade officials. In order to offset the loss of markets abroad (and at home) to these and other competitors, the U.S. is anxious to expand its economic dominance and prevent inroads from its other competitors.[322] In addition to identifying the importance of securing its economic markets at home, the U.S. also feels that it is incumbent to create new markets or expand existing ones.[323]

There is little to suggest, either from the Baker plan or from other concoctions that have emerged from the Reagan White House, that Africa is intended to serve anything more than a peripheral role in discussions on global trade and debt. This translates to defining for Africa a role such that its only importance is to the extent that it is willing to place more of its economy under the control of western corporate producers for the extraction of raw materials at ever cheaper prices to further reduce the cost of industrial production. The Baker plan also ignores the development plans initiated by African nations themselves in pursuit of developing their own economies, in the context of the political realities which exist in these nations.

The Reagan remedy for the debt crisis of Africa and the Third World is not to be found solely in exploring the potential for internal development. Though the Baker plan calls for increased contributions from development banks (IBRD, African, Inter-American), the Reagan budgets have reduced U.S. contributions to these and other agencies. The African Development Foundation, for example, had contributions from the U.S. withheld, eliminating the ability of the ADF to provide new loans after 1985.[324]

The solution to this seemingly chronic debt has included several harsh responses to African and Third World debt. The World Bank has become more active in its discussions on conditionalities with the IMF. Wilfred Thalivitz, World Bank Vice-President for Eastern and Southern Africa stated:

> I know that countries are worried about us (IMF/World bank) ganging up on them-cross-conditionality-I'd say that they had that for years, they just didn't know it.[325]

Bilaterial U.S. aid also reflected these biases in conditionality arrangements. In the Sudan, this could have contributed to the downfall of President Nimeiry (see below).

The Baker Plan also propositions commercial banks which are already exposed financially to Third World nations that are on the brink of calling for default, to commit additional funds. There is no reason to believe that commercial banks are willing to further commit funds to indebted nations without more concrete guarantees for the return of their investments.

It therefore remains for Africa to lift itself by its own strapless boots, though it does not possess an alternative to an absence of finance capital. With a private sector unable to accomplish many of the larger, economic functions that nations require, the prospects for the kind of self-help that the U.S. administration envisions is bleak. The very reason that the debt of African countries is primarily public, as opposed to the privately-held debt of South America, is because of a lack of broad-based private investment; especially, those investors that would be willing to enter into a partnership with an African government, rather than with local investors.

With low per capita income, and a generally small labor force, Africa does not have a large middle-class (nor the foreign exchange generated by domestically produced and owned goods) capable of broad-based purchases of a variety of goods and services. As reported in Africa Recovery, "the combined Gross Domestic Product of all of the member states of the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa is only 60% of that of Denmark."[326] For the short-term gain of having U.S. financial investments, African nations are being asked to return to the days of colonialism and, at a minimum, the strengthening of traditional neo-colonial relations.

In "The Two Faces of Third-World lending, the editors of the Monthly Review describe how the pursuit of financial loans can create a situation, whereby, debt servicing exceeds the amount of new loans received.[327] The article further states that even at low interest rates, the amount of capital exported from the borrowing country exceeds the levels of capital imported. Only the investment of further finance capital, internally generated growth in the economic sector, or the continuation (and expansion) of loans can fill the deficit gap among Third World nations. If a nation shows a negative balance-of-payments, securing new loans at whatever the interest rate can only lead to further indebtedness.

The nature of the Reagan response to the economic causes of Africa ignores not only the external causes of the problem but also ignores the potential major contributions that the public sector (in tune to the needs of the poorest of a country) can make alleviating the worst vestiges of famine and hunger. To the degree that capitalism (indigenously formed) has lead to a nation's economic growth, official (public sector or foreign) investment and controlled markets of trade have been important contributing components in its success.[328] With official investments showing sharp declines, the avenue of trade would seem to be one of the few choices available, but this too is denied to most African countries. Few foreign or domestic markets are dominated by African countries. A fair return on the price of the given commodity is not normally the rule, as the declining terms of trade have given witness (see Table 9).

Internal markets for even the most basic of goods have also avoided the African grasp, as ever rising food imports have also given testimony. Some of the choices available include:

1. Debt Moratorium (Unilateral). The difficulty here is that high levels of imports for essential commodities and the current inability of African countries to adequately provide the minimum levels of such goods, would undoubtedly result in massive starvation during the short term. Unless the major debtor nations can be convinced to enter into a debtor cartel, this option is effectively a non-option.

2. Debt Restructuring. The purpose would be to establish debt payments to approximate economic and political realities. Though many nations have already engaged in such negotiations, it is still a matter of only further delaying the repayment cycle of debt.

3. Acceptance of Conditionalities. Such steps, as orchestrated by the lending institutions and countries have the great potential to risk the very government of the ruler seeking to comply with western demands. Even if successful, such steps mean that the primary concern for an aid recipient government would then become the servicing of its official debt, even at the expense of the basic health, employment, food, and educational needs of the debtor country. The affront to Third-World debtor nations to subscribe to IMF conditionality terms while the

world's largest violator of good economic practices, the U.S., decides the distribution of payments was not lost on former Nigerian ruler and general, Olusegun Obasanjo, who stated:

> ...it is far from clear that an American administration, currently unable to qualify for an IMF program because of its high deficits, over-valued currency, and import restrictions, would willingly meet IMF conditions.[329]

In 1985, Sudanese President Nimeiry's visited the U.S. in hopes of gaining economic relief to assist in the transition of his nation's economy to one viewed as more compelling to the west and its financial institutions. Discontent had become increasingly evident at the time of his trip to the U.S. The basis for such disapproval had two main sources. One, was the imposition of Islamic law on non-Islamic segments of the country.[330] The other was the worsening economic hardship in the country, as created by the devaluation of the Sudanese currency by 48% and the elimination of price subsidies on essential goods.[331] Though President Reagan released $67 million in previously held economic aid to Sudan and praised Nimeiry's draconian actions as "worthy of international support," it proved to be too late to salvage Nimeiry's rule.[332] Before Nimeiry could return to Sudan with his agreement, his rule had ended; Nimeiry had been deposed.[333]

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia rescinded the imposition of IMF inspired "reforms" after a number of violent reactions by segments of Zambian society.[334]

President Kaunda, on the occasion of reversing his economic measures, is quoted as having stated:

> You've got your choice, all of you. If you want to eat maize, go out and grow it, because the government cannot deliver maize to you people anymore. We'll lower the price of maize again, but that means fewer jobs, that means fewer school teachers, that means clinics without medicine, that's what this means, gentleman and ladies. Just get it straight, you've got your choices.[335]

Not all economic reforms have been imposed from western sources. The severity of the decline in domestic food production is also evidenced by the government of Mozambique's ideological concessions to promote national economic development. The Mozambique government, known as FRELIMO, rescinded its decision of the Third Congress (February, 1977) to centralize production in the form of state farms, for an apparatus which would permit greater reliance upon private ownership in the production of food.[336] The stated objective of this move was to permit the government to direct its scarce resources upon its major development projects.[337] Despite such movements towards a more market economy and the imposition of the Nkomati accords with South Africa, U.S. economic, political and emergency assistance to Mozambique have been restrained.

Possibly the most important set of African reform initiatives have emerged from the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the U.N.'s Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery. Developed during the 1980 Extra-

Ordinary session of the OAU, the Lagos Plan of Action offers what is perceived to be a blueprint for Africa's economic development. The differences between the LPA and the Berg Plan are essentially in their scope, though the LPA is quick to identify those manifestations of economic backwardness that are seen as developed under African governments, such criticisms and the exploration of other shortcomings are placed in a setting of Africa in a world that has been dominated by western political and economic interests.

Factors such as the declining terms of trade for African countries are approached, whereas, the Berg report does not even address this concern.[338] Contrary to the Berg report, the LPA expresses a fundamental urgency for Africa to develop its own self-sufficient food production system, for domestic consumption. The LPA also seeks to further the linkages of regional economic cooperation to assist in better communication, transport and labor activity.

In May, 1986, a special session of the U.N. General Assembly was called to focus attention on Africa's economic duress and proposals for its resolution. African countries specified the causes of its underdevelopment (which in itself is a very important conceptual proposition) as "...aggravated by exogenous and endogenous factors."[339]

These factors range from disparities in income distribution, to refugee growth and the heavy debt burdens with which many African nations shoulder. In addressing these areas of concern, four main sectors were highlighted: (1) agricultural; (2) agriculture support; (3) drought and desertification; and (4) human resources. The total package of programs and reforms were totalled at $128.1 billion, covering a period from 1986-1990.[340] The emphasis on producing food and creating structures to respond to emergency food needs is clear with the targeting of 44.8% ($57.4 billion) of the proposed recovery program for agricultural development.[341] Of the $128.1 billion total, $82.5 billion (64.4%) will be drawn from the national budgets of African nations.[342] Though a very concrete framework had been offered before the world by African nations to direct significant changes in their economic and, subsequently, social and political structures, African countries have had little response to their proposals. The U.S. has, in fact, not approved the adoption of the proposal from the African countries, despite these governments having made significant overtures toward altering their governments' policies to meet western approval.

Though African governments are offering programs for economic development, even in areas where western nations have sought changes, these measures have not motivated the U.S. and many other western nations to support Africa in self-determined development approaches. The U.S. and the west appear to prefer the approaches fermented in the intellectual vats of the IMF, and as increasingly offered bilaterally by nations as the U.S.

The choice of the more harsh reforms as instigated by the major financial institutions has often been the bane of its recipients. Coups and coup attempts have been spawned over the effects of such impositions (Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Kenya). Despite this distressing reality, IMF-directed economic reforms have been adopted in Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania.[343] Even those nations that view themselves as being socialist are experimenting with private enterprise measures. Tanzania and Mozambique are just two examples of self-defined socialist nations that are experimenting with free market solutions or infusions of private sector investment.[344]

Reform measures are themselves limited. The lament of the Zambian Planning Minister is indicative of the problems faced, even after the imposition of western-styled reform measures:

> We have devalued our currency, we are cutting the public sector drastically, we are reducing subsidies. But I have a debt of $5 billion. Over 50% of my export credits are going to service debts, not to pay it off, only to service it...what am I supposed to do?[345]

In sum, the Reagan administration is promoting private sector investment, on a continent that has, at best, an underdeveloped indigenous private sector. While the President seeks to promote a greater role for the World Bank and other development banks to help offset tragically high debt rates, the administration also drastically cuts U.S. contributions to these funds. At a time of continent-wide crisis, Reagan seeks to force severe shrinkage in the public sector when the need to address the life-threatening vice of famine is at its most dangerous level.

The Reagan administration also seeks to win concessions that amount to the African nations leaving themselves vulnerable to foreign imports, at the same time that it is trying to develop indigenous businesses and, especially, food production. The changes proposed are the very type of concessions that U.S. strategists hope to avoid in its trade relations with Japan.

Without a hint of change under the U.S. Generalized System of Preference to accommodate a greater flow of imports from those Third World nations who are attempting economic reform, there can be little hope for expanded trade opportunities to better Africa's debt problems with the west. The intransigent of western nations have rendered deliberations under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) virtually useless as forums to resolve debt and trade imbalances.

At a time that African nations have taken very serious steps to alter economic policies to fit the demands of western governments and financial institutions, African countries have experienced substantial cuts in U.S. bilateral economic development aid. From an administration that is always sensitive to send the right "signal", the message that the Reagan administration is indeed sending is one which merely seeks to enhance the expand and advantages and options of the U.S. and the west in Africa.

An important obstacle for Africans to provide for their own food needs has been their integration into the global development activities of the numerous international organizations. The proliferation of aid programs and the need by aid-recipient countries to coordinate their activities and personnel expends an inordinate amount of administrative hours by the recipient country on projects and programs whose history of effectiveness is not on par with expectations.[346]

The application of assistance must be consistent with the perception of the needs of the region to be served, as developed by the people who themselves are products of the area. Donor assistance must therefore respect the indigenous culture and technologies that exist and must seek ways of integrating changes into the activities of the local populations while respecting what is native to the recipients.

iv. Environment

In the African famines of the 1970s and the 1980s, the initial response by the world media has been an emphasis upon the environment as the primary culprit of this form of human tragedy. Bill Rau expresses the view that environmental degradation is the result of "economic and political factors which are designed to serve the interests of dominate groups inside the Sahel and without, i.e., donor nations."[347] This may account for the lack of attention placed on correcting the degradation of Africa's environment.

For every one tree planted, twenty-nine trees were felled due to the impact of human and natural causes.[348] Since 1965, drought in famine-stricken Sudan has contributed to a loss of twenty-five per cent of its forest cover.[349] Environment technology such as agro-forestry, mixed farming and low-input agriculture suffer from a lack of investment.

The Sahel Development Program of which the U.S. is a contributor has faced ongoing attempts to eliminate its funding. The Reagan administration has been accused of appointing administrators with responsibility for the SDP, who have limited expertise for the positions in which they are asked to serve, in an attempt to limit and reverse the effectiveness of the organization's work.[350] U.S. financial contributions to the U.N. Environment Program have also declined during the Reagan tenure.

If drought, deforestation, and desertification are indeed significant obstacles to development, then the question of international and indigenous investment becomes relevant. From between 1975 and 1982, donor nations and affected countries have invested $160 million in forestry projects.[351] Only 25,000 hectares have been reforested.[352] Mohammed El-Ashiry of the World Resources Institute strongly claims that environmental concerns are least prioritized in both the donor and the recipient, famine communities.[353] Though there have been numerous reports, congressional hearings and international forums, the money allocated for the purpose of correcting the advance of environmental decline is an example of the art of minimalism.

With governments seeking to balance foreign debts and profits to be made from the harvesting of forests, concerns for the proper balance of the environment do not receive proper priority. What remains is for those who must live in the raped landscapes of Africa to survive as best they are able.

Chapter Summary

The investment of U.S. economic and political resources clearly reflect a bias towards those nations which embrace western prescriptions of governance, finance and geopolitical leanings. The extent that the Reagan administration so blatantly forfeited humanitarian responses that could have aided the lives of famine victims, brought into sharp relief the thrust of Reagan foreign policy.

Despite the many programs that the U.S. has at its disposal to address the emergency crisis, African lives proved to be of secondary importance to geopolitical concerns. Though a number of glaring needs exist if African countries are to be able to prevent future famines and the decline of their environment, the increased emphasis by the U.S. on exports of military equipment and services has assumed priority under the Reagan administration. Though western modes of development have a history of serving western nations better than those they are intended to serve, African nations are facing declines in development dollars at the very time that alternative modes of development have been successfully attempted (e.g.-IFAD, African Development Foundation).

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CONCLUSION

By investigating causes of famine in Africa, and the U.S. response, there is an opportunity to identify specific areas of major importance that are within the grasp of people and governments to resolve. The tragedy of the African famine reveals a series of controllable human factors which have helped to forge famine conditions and have limited a response that is equal to the challenge of such devastation. The range of factors include: the inheritance of colonial governments, economic systems, and political boundaries; mammoth debt; disadvantages of trade with developed nations and anemic trade relations among African countries; militarization; warfare; desertification; and deforestation. The primary victims of this onslaught are the landless and the poor, mainly those live in rural communities.

Food security must encompass an early-warning system of famine prevention, development of food producing and supporting sectors and an emergency response structure that is able to reach those people in the greatest threat of losing their lives. As shown in earlier chapters, the structure of U.S. food aid and development assistance prior to the arrival of the Reagan administration has not supported programs and projects which support the creation of self-sustaining food security as defined by the newly independent countries of Africa and the world.

U.S. food and development assistance are subject to the imprimatur of U.S. foreign policy. This consolidation of U.S. governmental authority is itself guided by the ideology of what constitutes the U.S. national interest. Melvin Gurtov writes that three elements constitute U.S. national interests:

> (1) America's domestic tranquility depends on security and structure abroad.
> (2) Security and stability abroad for the forces of freedom depend on America's willingness to carry out the mission and responsibilities entrusted to it.
> (3) Fulfillment of America's mission and security responsibilities depends on a willingness and ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of other Peoples.[354]

At its root, the structure which defines U.S. national interests resists the claims of nationalism as expressed by foreign countries but claims for itself the basis for intervention on its own terms. As a nation with a wide variety of means to fulfill its policy options, the U.S. may choose to intervene in a nation's affairs via possibilities that are economic and political, as well as, military. The U.S. may also affect a nation's domestic and foreign policy agendas by demonstrating the national interest of the U.S. as the foundation for conflict and for the promotion of the U.S.:

> ...the American role leads American policy-makers to subordinate the aspirations and national self-interests of other societies to those of the

United States, and to define them in terms that harmonize with American globalism.[355]

The importance of U.S. national interests in defining emergency and development assistance is evident in the application of U.S. aid. Humanitarian assistance had been ill-defined and misapplied from its earlier construct. Proper humanitarian concern seeks to insure the survival of hunger victims without regard to political ideology or the fear of market competition. If this concern were indeed the salient feature, then the composition of U.S. foreign assistance would support attempts to meet basic food needs. From its inception, U.S. food and development policies and programs have subordinated support for those most affected/threatened by famine to buttress U.S. economic and strategic interests. The essential question that such foreign assistance has posed in the guidance of programs and projects is the extent that aid programs and projects advance U.S. economic gain, political strength and military advantage (vis-a-vis the Soviet Union).

The approach taken by the U.S. and its western European allies towards foreign assistance has been to control the manner of its distribution and the access to its potential benefits. Though these nations identify themselves as democracies, they have yet to democratize the development process to include greater participation by the recipient countries in the design and implementation of development projects and programs, especially, the supposed object of their attentions, those in advanced stages of hunger, poverty and duress.

By introducing political and security aims to a purely humanitarian effort, U.S. assistance has contributed heavily towards the strangulation of the African potential to evolve beyond its problems during its post-colonial period. The thrust of foreign assistance by the U.S. and its western allies cling to the primacy of a nation's vested self-interest. In this context, actions taken by the Reagan administration are consistent with how food assistance was first conceived and utilized, that is, as yet another tool of U.S. diplomacy.

Actions taken by the Reagan administration have invested little in attacking major contributors to famine and hunger and have shown an ongoing reluctance to provide emergency food relief. In many respects, Reagan's foreign policy treatment of Africa has reflected his solutions to domestic hunger in the U.S. One, a reduction of U.S. governmental assistance, policy reform (creation of a better climate for foreign businesses), the promotion of 'boot-strap' capitalism and the participation in 'free market' forces to resolve economic deficiencies. Two, a greater emphasis on militarization in the region, versus diplomatic recourse. In the former, attempts to reduce the U.S. government role both bilaterally and multilaterally in matters of financial sponsorship of food security and development programs which are to be replaced by the promise of 'free enterprise.' Promises are cost-effective; funds need not be committed.

While touting the joys of the 'free market,' programs such as IFAD continued to be savaged by the Reagan administration, despite an approach that could easily be claimed by free market gurus. Though IFAD, ADF and similar micro-development programs are alternative approaches to development that do not require large budget outlays as the more traditional approaches of AID and the World Bank, there has not only been little enthusiasm from the Reagan camp but actual hostility toward the programs. These alternative development models which address the needs of some of the poorest of a society directly, are avoided by Reagan.

Providing for an effective food security program has been viewed by many as endangering the food export market of the U.S. to African countries, thus threatening one of the major aims of the PL 480 program, the expansion of overseas markets for U.S. agricultural goods. At a time of mounting trade deficit and the decline of the U.S. farming industry, food self-sufficiency on the continent is an anathema to the so-called business interests of the U.S.

Debt relief would reduce the pressure that the

U.S. can apply on a debtor nation to comply with desired policy interests. The effectiveness of the conditionality attached to loans is such that the U.S. is increasingly engaging in bilateral program efforts while affixing its own conditionalities that are much more in tune with Administration goals. With trade to Africa being to the advantage of the U.S., there has not been any internal interest in negotiating increased access to U.S. markets, nor to increase profit ratios for African commodities.

This approach does not differ with past U.S. administrations which had not yielded to the logic of the call for a New International Economic Order or to discussions at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. From the administration's view, the traditional western approach towards Africa reigns, that is, as a sources of revenue to be derived from the import of cheap primary resources and the marketing of finished goods for export to Africa.

The perceived loss of prestige overseas and a decline in self-esteem at home contributed to the creation of a more combative foreign posture. In international forums such as the U.N., the U.S. has been more aggressive in its anti-socialist, anti-Marxist rhetoric and has displayed an unwillingness to work cooperatively with adversarial nations on issues that are truly humanitarian. There has also been a desire to seek to confront, militarily and diplomatically, those nations and organizations that challenge perceived U.S. foreign policy aims and interests (Zimbabwe, SWAPO, ANC).

Urged by its 'New Right' constituency, the Reagan administration has also engaged in several attempts to unseat Marxist/Socialist leaning governments (Angola, Ghana). The advantage in pursuing such tactics has been that with Africa's inability to coalesce effective external economic and military pressures. The U.S. is, therefore, immune from the possibility of punitive counter measures being employed by African countries.

The U.S. does see potential in Africa being a fertile market for exports of U.S. military equipment. With the expansion of the sale of military goods to African nations, the potential for increased warfare by the governments upon their own citizens, as well as on neighboring countries, threatens and delays Africa's recovery from the onslaught of famine and hunger. There is also the threat of a diversion of funds from development and food sectors to pay for military growth, again endangering food security efforts. With the rise of the ESF, there is a greater prospect that aid will be directed to those nations that favor U.S. policies in the region, rather than to those in need.

Evidence of the lack of esteem held for African life was further demonstrated by the prohibitions placed on U.S. food exports to Zimbabwe and Mozambique during their famine. It is difficult to imagine what definition of humanitarian aid the Reagan administration declare its allegiance to people with such an obvious need. Despite the numerous political and economic tools that could have been used to voice U.S. government displeasure, Reagan chose food aid to make his point. The decision to eliminate all funding for the FAO at the height of the famine is also a clear message to anyone willing to interpret it, that the U.S. government is not particularly interested in saving the lives of Africans. By withdrawing food and development assistance during a time of famine, and subsidizing the availability of military assistance, the U.S. has taken broad measures to threaten the future survival of African people gripped by the prospect of starvation.

Beyond the question of the priority given U.S. assistance to food security is the process which certifies nations for eligibility. As the deficit continues to grow and sectors of the U.S. economy continue to decline, there will be an even greater call for the U.S. to command its resources for the interests of the domestic economy. Development and food aid will be distributed to fewer countries and for fewer dollars. With the process that approves assistance closed from the scrutiny of the general public and the basis for approval further politicized by the executive branch, decisions on the distribution of both emergency and long-term assistance will increasingly yield to political mandates rather than humanitarian intentions.

Though from the onset, U.S. foreign assistance had contaminated the very concept of humanitarian aid and development assistance, the Reagan administration has seized upon these shortcomings in a manner that could only be described as ruthless. Emergency food assistance was calculated as only another budget item to be cut. Even among U.S. allies in Africa, apart from official U.S. antagonism with Ethiopia, emergency food assistance was slow in coming. The intentional delay in qualifying nations for emergency food shipments, providing needed transport for the distribution of food shipments, and the delay in distributing congressionally-approved funding, guaranteed the needless deaths of countless thousands of people, at the same time that the Reagan administration congratulated itself on the funding spent on emergency food relief, was one of the most bizarre actions taken by an American government. Without the incredible (though short-lived) response by the American people, it is doubtful that famine in Africa would have ever received its due attention by the U.S. government.

With the movement towards a greater reliance on ESF as the mechanism to distribute bilateral foreign assistance and as the retreat from multilateral to bilateral accounts further politicizes development financing, aid from the U.S. will only further demand a quid pro quo relationship with the recipient nation. Add to this schemata the overtones of racism in the president's dealings with African countries, and it would appear that Africans are only able to attract attention from the U.S. while dying in massive numbers from famine or in demonstrating a willingness to kill one another with weapons of foreign purchase.

There are many advocates on both the political left (Susan George, Frances Moore Lappe') and the right (Heritage Foundation) who would argue for greatly reduced foreign assistance from all nations and development institutions. Susan George recommends the reduction of all aid to only 15% of current levels, with that being directed towards emergency food assistance.[356] However, this call for the virtual cessation of aid would be devastating to those nations which are the current recipients, without major adjustments to the debt crisis and trade imbalances so common among African nations.

There is a need for investment capital which would be prioritized towards developing sectors of Africa's food production and distribution sectors. Transportation routes linking rural markets, even across national boundaries, are also vitally needed. Regional common markets, though without past successes, are an integral part of Africa's future needs. The emphasis of this approach must be wholly inclusive of the rural poor and landless, integrating communities of people into a development process which addresses domestic needs.

The picture of Africa as hapless victim undermines the heroic efforts by African people to respond to the urgent demands that the famine crisis has made upon them. On a governmental level, the Special Session of the U.N. in May, 1986 was significant as the continent identified areas of priority and commitment, as well as, areas of error on the part of its governments.

The Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) predated its famines of the 1980s and continues to lay the foundation for a regional cooperation, despite the reality of warfare and economic disruption coordinated by South Africa. The framework of the Lagos Plan of Action also provides a basis upon which Africans have come together to plan their future out of despair.

By understanding that U.S. emergency and development assistance is guided by U.S. foreign policy, the inability of U.S.-initiated programs to efficiently and effectively identify and respond to the substantive needs of those most vulnerable to famine (and other) disasters, is no longer surprising. The Reagan administration can only be faulted for not being more blatant in its view of development and emergency assistance as yet another tool of U.S. foreign policy aims. From the perspective of the Reagan administration, the African famine produced still another opportunity to seek revenge upon nations that have not been entirely supportive of U.S. foreign policies, particularly, in international forums.

For those nations which claimed themselves to be socialist, or which counted the Soviet Union as their ally, the opportunity of famine and droughts gave the Reagan administration the exposure to compare the ineffectiveness of these modes of governance, as opposed to capitalist forms. The crucial omission of transport assistance in administration proposals demonstrated the tensions between military needs and assessments versus those requirements for effective disaster relief. Upon examining the limited amounts and variety of assistance proposed by the Reagan administration during the famine, it is evident that even those who claim to be allies of the U.S. were of less significance as consumers of food than as military personnel. Africans, no matter what their political or economic bias, are not of a very high priority as people to those manage and design U.S. foreign policy.

The effectiveness of AID as the prime respondent to development and emergency efforts must also be questioned. U.S. assistance programs still reflect a national interest which seeks to limit development funding or emergency relief unless it is in the orbit of U.S. priorities of economic, political or military needs. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that even when effective, cost-saving development and disaster programs do exist, there is a tendency for them to be underfunded. The direction of U.S. assistance towards bilateral activities gives witness to the dominance of U.S. political priorities over humanitarian needs.

The extent that U.S. foreign food and development assistance is inconsistent in addressing the causes of African famines is not due to a lack of awareness of the causes of such devastation. This lack of policy cohesion is because of the very intimacy of knowledge that the U.S. has over the causes of food crisis as has been witnessed in the earlier part of the 1980s. When faced with the choice of ending its support of UNITA and South Africa in Angola, erasing the debt owed by Africa to public and private U.S. institutions, reducing trade barriers to promote African exports to the U.S., such remedies are not viewed as serious considerations.

Africa is more than a continent of nations, governments and development planning, Africa is its people. Though there are refugee camps across the region of the Horn and in southern Africa, it is its people who are sheltering the victims of famine and war. Without the benevolence of the African people themselves, relief operations would be overwhelmed.

It is also the sacrifices of the victims themselves that call for special commendation. Harry Belafonte, who as the appointed good will ambassador to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), spoke before Congress and offered one example of such support and dignity:

> There was one occasion when there wasn't enough to feed thousands of drought victims. When the food ran out, the 30,000 who had not received anything turned their backs en masse to spare the sated 10,000 any embarrassment.[357]

In a nation where people have been killed while fighting over who gets which portion of a Thanksgiving turkey, or over the order in line of an individual's car who is receiving gas (during the sharp rise in gas prices during the early 1970's), it is almost inconceivable that this same level of cooperation and dignity would readily be found available in the U.S. under similar circumstances.

Those who have been victimized by famine should be the primary emphasis in U.S. planning and implementation of foreign assistance, even under the conservative administration of Ronald Reagan.

NOTES

[354]Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 4-6.

[355]Ibid., p. 7.

[356]Speech given by Susan George, Conference entitled: "Feeding the World: The Paradox of Plenty and Scarcity," UCLA Ackerman Union, April 26, 1986.

[357]"Harry Belafonte's Song of Sorrow," Washington Post (April 4, 1987): C3.

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